The Allahabad High Court has reaffirmed that sexual intercourse obtained through a false promise of marriage, made with no intention of fulfillment at the time of the promise, constitutes rape under Section 376 IPC. This ruling reinforces the doctrinal boundary between consensual relationships and criminal deception, offering critical guidance for prosecutors and defense counsel handling cases involving sexual exploitation under the guise of marital intent.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The case arises from allegations that the applicant, Rahul Singh, falsely represented himself as an unmarried man to a widow with three children, who operated a tea kiosk in Vijaypur. Over two years, he cultivated her trust, promised marriage, and engaged in repeated sexual relations. When she became pregnant, he revealed he was already married, demanded she terminate the pregnancy, and with the help of co-accused, forcibly administered abortion medication. She was physically assaulted and threatened with drowning in the Jamuna River if she reported the incident.
Procedural History
- 19.08.2024: FIR registered at PS Kishanpur under Sections 376, 313, 323, and 506 IPC
- 11.11.2024: Cognizance taken by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur
- 2025: Sessions Trial No. 550 of 2025 commenced; charge sheet filed
- 2026: Applicant filed Application under Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing of proceedings
- The co-accused were not charge-sheeted despite alleged involvement in forced abortion and intimidation
Relief Sought
The applicant sought quashing of the FIR, cognizance order, and all subsequent proceedings on grounds of lack of medical corroboration, absence of specific dates/times for rape, and alleged fabrication of events to extort compensation.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 376 IPC, read with Section 90 IPC, criminalizes sexual intercourse obtained through a false promise of marriage, even in the absence of physical force, if the promise was made in bad faith and was the decisive factor in securing consent.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant/Petitioner
Counsel argued that the relationship was consensual, the victim was aware of the applicant’s marital status, and the alleged incident of forced abortion on 17.06.2024 lacked medical evidence. He contended that the victim’s statement was inconsistent, failed to name any medical provider, and was contradicted by the landlord’s affidavit. He relied on State v. Rajesh Kumar to argue that absence of corroboration renders prosecution unsustainable.
For the Respondent/State
The State and victim’s counsel countered that the applicant deliberately concealed his marital status to gain sexual access, which vitiated consent under Section 90 IPC. They emphasized that Section 376 IPC does not require physical force where consent is obtained by deception. They cited the victim’s deposition and the fact that charges had been framed and trial commenced, making quashing inappropriate at this stage.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the legal framework established in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, emphasizing that consent obtained under a misconception of fact - specifically, the belief that the man would marry her - invalidates consent under Section 90 IPC. The Court held that the critical inquiry is not whether the promise was later broken, but whether it was made with no intention of fulfillment at the time it was given.
"The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act."
The Court rejected the applicant’s claim that the victim knew he was married, noting that the burden of proving such knowledge lies with the accused and cannot be assumed. The absence of medical evidence was deemed irrelevant, as Section 376 IPC covers non-forceful rape through deception. The Court further held that the scope of Section 528 BNSS is not a substitute for trial, and quashing is permissible only in the rarest of rare cases to prevent abuse of process - conditions not met here. The framing of charges and recording of the victim’s testimony indicated sufficient material to proceed.
The Verdict
The applicant’s petition was dismissed. The Court held that consent obtained by a false promise of marriage made in bad faith constitutes rape under Section 376 IPC, irrespective of the absence of physical force or medical corroboration. The trial must proceed.
What This Means For Similar Cases
False Promise of Marriage Is Sufficient for Rape
- Practitioners must now treat any allegation of sexual intercourse following a marital promise as prima facie rape under Section 376 IPC, if the promise was made deceitfully
- Defense arguments based on consensual history are irrelevant if the initial inducement was fraudulent
- Prosecutors should focus on establishing the accused’s state of mind at the time of the promise, not the outcome of the relationship
Medical Evidence Is Not Mandatory
- Absence of medical reports, injuries, or forensic proof cannot be grounds for quashing proceedings
- The victim’s testimony, if credible and consistent, suffices to sustain a charge under Section 376 IPC
- Courts must avoid imposing evidentiary standards more stringent than those prescribed by statute
Quashing at Pre-Trial Stage Is Rarely Permissible
- Applications under Section 528 BNSS cannot be used to circumvent trial on disputed facts
- Once charges are framed and prosecution witness statements recorded, quashing is impermissible unless the allegations are manifestly false or legally unsustainable
- Defense counsel should prioritize discharge applications under Section 227 CrPC rather than seeking quashing at this stage
