The High Court of Kerala has delivered a pivotal clarification on the legal boundaries between consensual sexual relationships and rape under Section 375 IPC, holding that a promise of marriage, even if broken, does not automatically vitiate consent unless proven to be a mala fide ploy from the outset. This ruling reinforces the necessity of proving dishonest intent at the time of sexual intercourse, not merely subsequent breach of promise.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Vivek, is accused of committing rape under Section 376(2)(n) and outraging modesty under Section 354 IPC. The de facto complainant, a widow employed at a marriage bureau, alleged that the petitioner, after promising to marry her, engaged in repeated sexual intercourse between June 2022 and July 2023. She claimed she consented based on his assurance of marriage, which he later reneged upon when he began proceedings to marry another woman.
Procedural History
- 2023: Crime No. 865/2023 registered at Mannuthy Police Station
- 2023: Charge sheet filed before Judicial Magistrate First Class-III, Thrissur
- 2024: Petitioner filed Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 1086 of 2024 under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings
- 2026: Hearing concluded; judgment delivered on 11 February 2026
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of all criminal proceedings on the ground that the facts, even if accepted as true, do not constitute the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC, as the sexual relationship was consensual and the promise of marriage, even if false, did not amount to a misconception of fact under the law.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether consent to sexual intercourse given on the basis of a promise to marry, later broken, amounts to consent obtained under a misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC, thereby rendering the act rape under Section 375 IPC.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel argued that the relationship was consensual and rooted in mutual affection, not coercion or deception. They relied on Uday v. State of Karnataka, Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, and Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra to assert that a broken promise of marriage, without proof of mala fide intent at inception, cannot be equated with rape. They submitted that the chat history (Annexure-A1) showed the complainant sought to keep the relationship secret, undermining her claim of reliance on the marriage promise.
For the Respondent
The Public Prosecutor contended that the repeated sexual acts, coupled with symbolic acts like applying sindoor and tying a knot, indicated a deliberate deception to secure consent. They argued that the complainant’s vulnerability as a widow and the petitioner’s subsequent conduct demonstrated a pattern of exploitation, warranting continuation of trial.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a meticulous review of Supreme Court precedents on consent and deception in sexual relationships. It emphasized that consent is not vitiated merely because a promise of marriage is later broken. The Court quoted Uday v. State of Karnataka:
"It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code."
The Court further relied on Deepak Gulati and Dhruvaram Sonar, noting that the critical distinction lies between a mere breach of promise and a false promise made with mala fide intent to seduce. The Court observed that the prosecution had failed to establish that the petitioner never intended to marry the complainant from the outset. The chat logs, which indicated the complainant’s desire for secrecy, further weakened her claim of being misled into consent. The Court held that absence of consent cannot be presumed and that the burden remains on the prosecution to prove mala fide intention at the time of the act.
The Verdict
The petitioner succeeded. The Court quashed all proceedings against him under Section 482 CrPC, holding that the facts alleged, even if true, do not establish the essential ingredient of non-consent under Section 375 IPC, as there was no proof of mala fide intent at the time of sexual intercourse.
What This Means For Similar Cases
False Promise Alone Is Not Rape
- Practitioners must now argue that mere breach of a marriage promise cannot substitute for proving mala fide intent at inception
- Prosecutors must gather contemporaneous evidence - texts, emails, witness accounts - to establish that the promise was never genuine
- Defence counsel should focus on the complainant’s conduct and knowledge at the time of intercourse, not post-facto regret
Burden of Proof Remains on Prosecution
- The burden to prove lack of consent under Section 90 IPC is not shifted by allegations of broken promises
- Courts must avoid inferring deception from subsequent conduct; the focus must remain on the accused’s state of mind at the time of the act
- In cases involving long-term relationships, the absence of force, threats, or fraud at the time of intercourse is a strong indicator of consensual conduct
Documentary Evidence Can Undermine Alleged Misconception
- Digital communications (chat logs, call records) are critical to assess whether the complainant understood the nature of the relationship
- If the complainant sought to conceal the relationship, it undermines claims of being misled by a public or solemn promise
- Courts may now treat secrecy as evidence of mutual understanding, not deception
