The Bombay High Court has granted an ad-interim injunction restraining a defendant from making further defamatory statements about the plaintiff in public interviews and on digital platforms. The order, issued on prima facie grounds, underscores the continued protection of personality rights even in cases involving long-separated ex-spouses. The court emphasized that the nature and content of the statements, not the duration of separation, determine the viability of a defamation claim.
The Verdict
The plaintiff won the interim relief. The Bombay High Court granted an ad-interim injunction restraining Defendant No.1 from publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating any defamatory, false, or slanderous statements about the plaintiff through any medium, including social media and print. The court also directed her to cease further interviews making the same allegations until the matter is fully heard. The relief was granted on prima facie grounds, with the court noting the personal tirade in her statements.
Background & Facts
The plaintiff, Sanu Bhattacharjee, and Defendant No.1, Rita Bhattacharya, were married for a significant period but have been legally separated for over 32 years. Despite the long separation, Defendant No.1 has recently given multiple public interviews and made statements in media outlets that the plaintiff alleges are defamatory, false, and malicious. These statements, detailed in paragraphs 7.1 to 7.13 and 8.1 to 8.23 of the interim application, include personal attacks, insinuations about the plaintiff’s character, and allegations damaging to his professional reputation.
The plaintiff, who is remarried and a father of two daughters, claims these statements have caused him severe mental anguish and financial harm, including the cancellation of pre-scheduled international performances. He filed a civil suit seeking permanent injunction, damages, and deletion of the contested content. The interim application sought immediate restraint on further dissemination.
Defendant No.1, represented by Mr. Atif Noor Hasan Shaikh, did not contest the factual allegations outright but instead urged the court to refer the matter to mediation, citing the recent marriage of her son to the plaintiff’s daughter. She sought time to file an affidavit in reply. The other defendants, including media platforms, were not directly addressed in the interim order but were directed to file their replies.
The Legal Issue
The central legal question was whether a person can be restrained from making defamatory public statements about a former spouse after a separation spanning more than three decades, and whether such statements, even if made in the context of personal grievance, can still constitute actionable defamation under civil law.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Sana Raees Khan, argued that the statements made by Defendant No.1 were not mere expressions of opinion but constituted deliberate defamation. She cited the Delhi High Court’s recognition of personality rights as part of the right to life under Article 21, and emphasized that the repeated, targeted nature of the statements - made in interviews accessible to the public - caused tangible harm to the plaintiff’s professional standing and mental well-being. She contended that the passage of time does not extinguish the right to protect one’s reputation.
For the Respondent
Defendant No.1’s counsel acknowledged the contentious nature of the statements but framed them as personal expressions arising from long-standing family tensions. He argued that the plaintiff had not demonstrated irreparable harm sufficient for an injunction and that the matter, being deeply familial, was better resolved through mediation. He did not dispute the content of the statements but sought to contextualize them as emotional outbursts rather than malicious defamation.
The Court's Analysis
Justice Milind N. Jadhav conducted a focused review of the transcripts and interview excerpts cited in the application. He noted that the language used by Defendant No.1 was not neutral or reflective but carried a clear tone of personal animus. The court observed that the statements were not confined to private discourse but were disseminated publicly, amplifying their potential to harm.
"Prima facie, after going through the same, I am of the opinion that at some places in the interviews which have been given by Defendant No.1 there is a clear personal tirade against Plaintiff which is prima facie qualified by words that are used therein."
The court rejected the argument that the 32-year separation negated the plaintiff’s right to seek redress. It held that the duration of separation is a contextual factor, not a bar to relief. The court emphasized that reputation remains a protected interest under civil law regardless of the relationship history between parties.
The court also declined to grant the broader relief sought under prayer clauses (c) and (d) against media platforms at this stage, recognizing their potential role as intermediaries. However, it directed them to file affidavits explaining their role in hosting the content and whether they had taken steps to verify its veracity.
The court’s reasoning was grounded in the principle that public figures, even those in private disputes, retain the right to be free from false and damaging statements that circulate in the public domain. The injunction was narrowly tailored to prevent further dissemination, not to suppress all speech.
What This Means For Similar Cases
This order reinforces that the passage of time does not immunize individuals from liability for public defamation, even in familial contexts. Practitioners should note that courts are willing to grant interim injunctions where statements are demonstrably defamatory, repeated, and disseminated publicly - even if the parties have a long history of separation.
The ruling clarifies that personality rights under Article 21 are not contingent on marital status or duration of separation. It also signals that courts will scrutinize the nature and reach of statements, not merely their origin. Media platforms may face greater scrutiny in future cases if they fail to exercise due diligence in hosting contentious content.
However, the court’s refusal to grant immediate deletion of existing content suggests that such remedies require a fuller evidentiary record. Future litigants should prepare detailed logs of dissemination, audience reach, and quantifiable harm to strengthen claims for broader relief.
What This Means For Similar Cases
This order reinforces that the passage of time does not immunize individuals from liability for public defamation, even in familial contexts. Practitioners should note that courts are willing to grant interim injunctions where statements are demonstrably defamatory, repeated, and disseminated publicly - even if the parties have a long history of separation.
The ruling clarifies that personality rights under Article 21 are not contingent on marital status or duration of separation. It also signals that courts will scrutinize the nature and reach of statements, not merely their origin. Media platforms may face greater scrutiny in future cases if they fail to exercise due diligence in hosting contentious content.
However, the court’s refusal to grant immediate deletion of existing content suggests that such remedies require a fuller evidentiary record. Future litigants should prepare detailed logs of dissemination, audience reach, and quantifiable harm to strengthen claims for broader relief.
