The Madhya Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed that allegations of cruelty, dowry demand, and physical assault in matrimonial disputes do not automatically warrant quashing of an FIR under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, merely because the accused raise counter-allegations or claim false implication. The Court emphasized that such matters require full trial and evidence, and cannot be resolved at the pre-trial stage.
The Verdict
The petitioners sought quashing of an FIR registered under Sections 85, 296, 351(3), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The High Court dismissed the petition. The core legal holding is that allegations of cruelty and dowry demand, even in the context of a matrimonial dispute, are sufficient to sustain criminal proceedings unless the FIR is manifestly devoid of any offence or demonstrably malicious. No relief was granted; the trial shall proceed.
Background & Facts
Petitioner No.1 is the husband of respondent No.2, with whom he was married in 2010 and had two children. On 8 October 2024, the wife filed a complaint at Mahila Thana, Gwalior, alleging sustained cruelty, dowry demands, physical assault, verbal abuse, and threats by the petitioners. Based on this complaint, FIR No. 394/2024 was registered. After investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet on 18 November 2024.
The petitioners, including the husband and several family members, challenged the FIR under Section 528 BNSS. They claimed the allegations were vague, lacked specific dates or incidents, and were filed in retaliation for a divorce petition initiated by the husband. They further alleged that the wife concealed her lifelong epilepsy at the time of marriage, rendering the marriage voidable. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are elderly parents, No. 4 resides abroad, and Nos. 5 and 6 live separately, making their inclusion in the FIR, they argued, an abuse of process.
The charge-sheet was filed after witness statements were recorded and material was collected. The petitioners did not dispute the existence of the complaint or the investigation but sought to pre-empt trial by invoking the High Court’s inherent powers.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether allegations of cruelty, dowry demand, and physical assault in an FIR, even when contested as retaliatory or vague, are sufficient to resist quashing under Section 528 BNSS, or whether the court may intervene at the pre-trial stage based on defences that require evidentiary determination.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Learned counsel contended that the FIR was a retaliatory measure triggered by the husband’s divorce petition. He argued that the allegations were general, lacking specific incidents, dates, or corroboration, rendering them legally insufficient. He relied on Supreme Court precedents including Preeti Gupta, Geeta Mehrotra, Rajesh Sharma, and Bhajan Lal to assert that matrimonial disputes, especially where allegations are vague or retaliatory, should not lead to criminal prosecution. He emphasized that implicating elderly family members and an absent relative amounted to abuse of process.
For the Respondent
The State countered that the FIR contained clear, specific allegations of criminal conduct under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Dowry Prohibition Act. The filing of a charge-sheet after investigation demonstrated prima facie evidence. Counsel argued that defences such as concealment of illness or retaliatory motive are factual disputes that must be resolved at trial, not through a quashing petition. The court’s power under Section 528 BNSS is not a substitute for trial.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by recalling the well-established principle that the power to quash under Section 528 BNSS must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. It emphasized that the court cannot act as a trial court at the pre-trial stage. The Court held that the mere assertion of false implication or retaliatory motive does not render an FIR legally unsustainable.
"The arguments raised by the petitioners regarding false implication, concealment of illness, living separately, or filing of the FIR as a counterblast are matters of defence. Such issues require evidence and cannot be decided at this stage."
The Court noted that the FIR explicitly alleged acts constituting offences under Sections 85 (cruelty), 3(5) (dowry demand), and 351(3) (assault) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The fact that a charge-sheet was filed after investigation further indicated the existence of prima facie material. The Court distinguished the cited precedents, clarifying that they do not establish a blanket rule for quashing all matrimonial disputes. Each case must be evaluated on its own facts.
"In the present case, the allegations cannot be said to be so improbable or absurd that no offence is made out."
The Court rejected the argument that inclusion of distant relatives justified quashing, noting that the law permits joinder of persons reasonably connected to the alleged offence. The court explicitly stated it expressed no opinion on the merits of the case, preserving the right of the accused to present their defence at trial.
What This Means For Similar Cases
This judgment reinforces that Section 528 BNSS is not a tool to evade trial in matrimonial disputes. Practitioners must now recognize that vague or retaliatory allegations, if they prima facie disclose an offence under the BNSS or Dowry Prohibition Act, will not be quashed merely on the basis of counter-allegations. The burden remains on the accused to prove falsity or malice through evidence at trial.
For defence counsel, this means that pre-trial quashing petitions must focus on the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not factual disputes. Arguments about concealment of medical conditions, family structure, or timing of divorce proceedings are now clearly relegated to trial. Prosecutors may rely on this ruling to resist premature termination of cases involving dowry and cruelty allegations.
The judgment also clarifies that the Supreme Court’s guidelines in Rajesh Sharma and Bhajan Lal do not create a presumption of quashment in matrimonial cases. The threshold for quashing remains high: only where the complaint is legally non-existent or manifestly malicious.
