Case Law Analysis

Finality of RERA Orders | Post-Judgment Legal Changes Cannot Reopen Closed Cases : Bombay HC

Bombay High Court rules that RERA orders attaining finality cannot be challenged based on subsequent Supreme Court judgments, even if the law evolves retrospectively. The decision shields developers and authorities from endless litigation over closed cases, reinforcing the sanctity of final adjudication under the RERA Act.

Cassie News NetworkCassie News Network
Apr 9, 2026, 3:17 PM(Updated: Nov 3, 2026)
•9 min read
Be the first to share in your circle
Finality of RERA Orders | Post-Judgment Legal Changes Cannot Reopen Closed Cases : Bombay HC

The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed that final orders passed under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, cannot be set aside merely because a subsequent Supreme Court judgment redefines the scope of authority of RERA’s adjudicating officers. The Court emphasized that finality, once attained through non-challenge within the statutory appeal period, creates irrevocable rights that even retrospective legal changes cannot disturb.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The dispute arises from an order dated December 17, 2019, passed by the Adjudicating Officer of the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (MahaRERA), directing Marvel Landmarks Pvt. Ltd. to refund Rs. 1,35,99,246 to flat purchaser Mr. Siddharth Mohan Palesha, along with interest at 10.20% per annum. The order was issued under Section 71 of the RERA Act, following a complaint filed by the purchaser alleging non-delivery of possession. Marvel did not file an appeal against this order within the 60-day statutory period under Section 44 of the RERA Act, nor did it seek an extension.

Key Facts

  • The Impugned Order was passed on December 17, 2019, by the Adjudicating Officer of MahaRERA.
  • The order directed refund of Rs. 1,35,99,246 with interest at 10.20% per annum from the date of payment until realization.
  • No appeal was filed by Marvel against the Impugned Order within the 60-day window under Section 44 of the RERA Act.
  • On October 8, 2021, a Recovery Order was issued under Section 45 of the RERA Act, treating the refund amount as arrears of land revenue under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.
  • The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP on November 11, 2021, holding that the Authority (including Whole Time Members) may direct refunds under Sections 18 and 19, but the Adjudicating Officer’s jurisdiction is limited to compensation.
  • Marvel filed the present Writ Petition on August 26, 2024 - nearly four and a half years after the Impugned Order and nearly three years after the Newtech judgment.
  • Marvel had previously filed a writ petition (WP No. 10088 of 2024) on July 24, 2024, seeking a stay on the same refund order, which was later withdrawn after settlement.
  • Marvel was admitted into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the IBC on June 13, 2025, but withdrew the CIRP after settlement.
  • In July 2025, Marvel filed an interim application in WP 2271 of 2024 (filed by the flat purchaser) claiming protection under the IBC moratorium, but did not raise the jurisdictional challenge based on Newtech.

Procedural History

  • December 17, 2019: Impugned Order passed by MahaRERA Adjudicating Officer directing refund and interest.
  • October 8, 2021: Recovery Order issued for enforcement of refund as arrears of land revenue.
  • November 11, 2021: Supreme Court delivers judgment in Newtech Promoters v. State of UP.
  • August 26, 2024: Writ Petition No. 12121 of 2024 filed before Bombay High Court seeking quashing of Impugned Order and Recovery Order.
  • January 22, 2026: Judgment reserved.
  • April 7, 2026: Judgment pronounced.

The Parties' Positions

Petitioner (Marvel Landmarks Pvt. Ltd.):

  • Argues that the Adjudicating Officer had no jurisdiction to order a refund under Section 71 of the RERA Act.
  • Relies on Newtech to contend that only the Authority (Chairperson and Whole Time Members) may order refunds, and that any such order by an Adjudicating Officer is a nullity.
  • Invokes Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan to assert that a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged at any stage, including execution.
  • Cites Marveledge Realtors v. State of Maharashtra (September 13, 2024) as precedent where a Division Bench of this Court quashed a similar order.

Respondents (State of Maharashtra & Flat Purchaser):

  • Contend that the Impugned Order became final on February 15, 2020, after the statutory appeal period expired.
  • Argue that Newtech did not address whether an Adjudicating Officer could be delegated the power to order refunds under Section 81 of the RERA Act.
  • Emphasize that Section 30(c) of the RERA Act validates proceedings despite procedural irregularities not affecting merits.
  • Highlight inordinate delay of nearly five years from the Impugned Order and three years from Newtech.
  • Point out that Marvel never raised the jurisdictional objection during enforcement proceedings or during CIRP.
  • Cite Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange, UP Jal Nigam, and Bhailal Bhai to argue that courts must not disturb crystallized rights due to delay and acquiescence.

Relief Sought

Marvel seeks:

  • Quashing of the Impugned Order dated December 17, 2019.
  • Quashing of the Recovery Order dated October 8, 2021.
  • Declaration that both orders are nullities under Kiran Singh and Newtech.
  • Stay on all enforcement proceedings.

The central question is whether a final order passed by a RERA Adjudicating Officer directing a refund, which became final due to non-appeal, can be quashed years later on the ground that a subsequent Supreme Court judgment has redefined the jurisdictional boundaries under the RERA Act.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

Marvel relied on Newtech to argue that the Adjudicating Officer’s jurisdiction under Section 71 is strictly confined to adjudicating compensation, and that ordering a refund exceeds this mandate. It contended that such an order is a nullity under Kiran Singh, as it is passed by a court without jurisdiction, and can be challenged at any stage, including execution. It cited Marveledge as binding precedent where the Bombay High Court had quashed a similar order. Marvel further argued that Section 81 of the RERA Act does not permit delegation of non-compensation functions to an Adjudicating Officer, as it would violate the separation of powers under the Act.

For the Respondent

The Respondent countered that Newtech did not hold that Adjudicating Officers cannot be delegated the power to order refunds under Section 81. It emphasized that the Supreme Court in Newtech only addressed whether Whole Time Members could issue refunds - not whether Adjudicating Officers could be delegated that power. The Respondent argued that the Impugned Order had attained finality under Section 44, and that Section 30(c) protects such orders from being invalidated on procedural grounds. It invoked UP Jal Nigam and Bhailal Bhai to argue that courts must not entertain belated challenges to final orders, especially when the petitioner has acquiesced through delay and inaction. The Respondent also highlighted that Marvel had not raised the jurisdictional objection during CIRP or enforcement, indicating tactical litigation.

The Court's Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the RERA Act’s structure, particularly Sections 71, 81, and 30(c), and the judgment in Newtech. It held that Newtech did not address the issue of delegation under Section 81, which permits the Authority to delegate any of its functions (except rule-making) to any officer, including an Adjudicating Officer. The Supreme Court in Newtech had only ruled that the Authority (not the Adjudicating Officer) has the primary power to order refunds, and that the Adjudicating Officer’s role is limited to compensation under Sections 12, 14, 18, and 19.

"The Supreme Court was not dealing with a case of a positive delegation to the Adjudicating Officer under Section 81 of the Act."

The Court emphasized that Newtech’s observation that extending adjudication beyond compensation "may intend to expand the ambit and scope of the powers and functions of the adjudicating officer" was made in the context of the appellants’ argument that the Adjudicating Officer alone should have jurisdiction over refunds - not as a prohibition on delegation. The Court further noted that the Newtech judgment explicitly recognized that delegation under Section 81 is permissible and subject only to judicial review if it defeats the Act’s purpose.

The Court also examined the doctrine of finality. It held that once the statutory appeal period under Section 44 expired without challenge, the Impugned Order became final and enforceable as a decree. The Court cited Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange and UP Jal Nigam to affirm that judicial decisions, even if retrospective, cannot disturb rights that have crystallized through finality and acquiescence.

"Once there is a statutory period for an appeal and that period has expired, the order has attained finality. If a subsequent declaration of the law [...] is made, it would not follow that long-closed matters can be reopened."

The Court rejected the applicability of Kiran Singh, noting that the doctrine of nullity applies only where jurisdictional defect is apparent on the face of the record at the time of passing the order. Here, at the time of the Impugned Order, the law was unsettled, and the Adjudicating Officer acted under the Authority’s operational guidelines. The Court also distinguished Marveledge, noting that it did not consider Section 81 or the issue of delay.

The Court found that Marvel’s delay of nearly five years from the Impugned Order and three years from Newtech, coupled with its failure to raise the issue during CIRP or enforcement, amounted to laches and acquiescence. The Court concluded that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 must not be used to reopen settled matters.

The Verdict

The writ petition was dismissed. The Court held that the Impugned Order dated December 17, 2019, and the Recovery Order dated October 8, 2021, remain valid and enforceable. The Court declined to quash either order, affirming that finality under the RERA Act cannot be undone by a subsequent judicial interpretation, especially when the aggrieved party has failed to appeal within the statutory period and has delayed seeking relief for over three years after the Newtech judgment. No costs were awarded.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Finality of RERA Orders Is Absolute

  • Practitioners must file appeals under Section 44 within 60 days (extendable to 120 days) - failure to do so renders the order final and immune from collateral attack.
  • Even if a later judgment redefines jurisdictional boundaries, final orders cannot be reopened via writ petitions.

Delegation Under Section 81 Is Valid

  • RERA may delegate refund-related functions to Adjudicating Officers under Section 81, provided the delegation is not contrary to the Act’s scheme.
  • Challenges to such delegation must be raised promptly, not years after enforcement.

Delay and Acquiescence Bar Writ Relief

  • Courts will not exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction to revive time-barred claims, even if legal principles change.
  • Parties must act promptly; silence during enforcement or CIRP proceedings constitutes acquiescence.
  • Writ petitions filed solely to exploit favorable judgments after delay will be dismissed on grounds of laches.

Case Details

Marvel Landmarks Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

2026:BHC-AS:16466
Judgment
Court
High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Date
07 April 2026
Case Number
Writ Petition No. 12121 of 2024
Bench
Somasekhar Sundaresan
Counsel
Pet: Amit Gharat
Res: Abhishek Kothari, Monish Jain, Gaurav Nashikkar, R.S. Pawar

Frequently Asked Questions

No, Section 71 limits the Adjudicating Officer’s jurisdiction to adjudicating compensation only. However, under Section 81, the Authority may delegate the power to order refunds to the Adjudicating Officer, and such delegation is valid unless shown to be contrary to the Act’s scheme.
No. Once the 60-day appeal period under Section 44 expires without challenge, the order becomes final and enforceable. It cannot be quashed later via writ petition, even if a subsequent judgment redefines jurisdictional boundaries.
No. Newtech clarified that the Authority, not the Adjudicating Officer, has primary jurisdiction over refunds. However, it did not hold that past orders are nullities. Orders passed before Newtech and not appealed remain valid and enforceable.
0

Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.