The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed the foundational principle that once a writ petition is finally disposed of, the court loses jurisdiction to entertain any subsequent interim application seeking relief based on events that occurred after disposal. This ruling underscores the necessity of procedural finality in constitutional litigation and prevents litigants from circumventing the requirement to file fresh petitions for new causes of action.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., sought to enforce its security interest under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 over a property that had been transferred to Respondent No.7 on 12.03.2025. The petitioner had initiated proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to take possession of the property under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. However, the DRT passed an interim order on 27.06.2025 staying these proceedings pending resolution of the borrower’s application.
Procedural History
- June 2025: DRT granted interim stay against SARFAESI enforcement.
- October 2025: Petitioner filed Writ Petition No.16499 of 2025 challenging the DRT’s stay order.
- 10.12.2025: Division Bench disposed of the writ petition, directing the DRT to dispose of pending applications by 07.01.2026.
- 12.01.2026: Bench reiterated direction, ordering DRT to decide applications by 23.01.2026.
- 17.01.2026: Borrower filed application under Section 94 of the IBC, 2016 before NCLT, triggering an interim moratorium.
- 19.01.2026: DRT adjourned proceedings citing the moratorium, rendering the High Court’s directions unenforceable.
- 26.01.2026: Petitioner filed Interim Application No.813 of 2026 in the already disposed writ petition, seeking declaration that the moratorium is inapplicable and stay of DRT’s order.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought: (a) declaration that the moratorium does not apply to the subject property; (b) stay of DRT’s 27.06.2025 order; and (c) direction to Tahsildar to hand over physical possession under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a High Court can entertain an interim application in a writ petition that has already been finally disposed of, where the relief sought arises from events occurring after disposal and constitutes a fresh cause of action.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner argued that the DRT’s reliance on the NCLT moratorium was legally erroneous, as the property had been transferred prior to the moratorium’s commencement. It contended that the High Court’s prior directions for expeditious disposal had been frustrated, justifying intervention under inherent powers. Reliance was placed on the court’s duty to ensure compliance with its own orders and prevent abuse of process.
For the Respondent
The respondents countered that the interim application was an abuse of process, seeking to revive a concluded proceeding. They cited State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma and Ajay Kumar Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh to argue that once a writ petition is finally disposed of, no subsequent application can be entertained unless it seeks clarification or modification of the existing order. The filing of a fresh petition under Article 226 was the only lawful remedy.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the doctrine of finality in judicial proceedings and the limits of jurisdiction after disposal of a writ petition. It emphasized that the High Court’s authority under Article 226 is exhausted upon final disposal, and reopening proceedings through interim applications would undermine the certainty of judgments.
"When proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of the writ petition... it is not open to the Court to re-open the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action."
The Court distinguished between applications seeking clarification of an existing order and those seeking entirely new reliefs based on subsequent events. The petitioner’s prayer for a declaration that the moratorium was inapplicable was not a clarification of the 10.12.2025 or 12.01.2026 orders - it was a new challenge to the NCLT’s moratorium and the DRT’s compliance with it. This constituted a fresh cause of action, independent of the original writ petition.
The Court further noted that even if the DRT’s interpretation of the moratorium’s applicability was erroneous, the petitioner’s remedy lay in filing a fresh writ petition challenging the NCLT order or the DRT’s adjournment order, not in resurrecting a concluded proceeding. The court declined to entertain the application on grounds of procedural propriety, even while acknowledging the petitioner’s substantive concerns.
The Verdict
The petitioner’s interim application was dismissed. The Court held that final disposal of a writ petition extinguishes jurisdiction to entertain subsequent interim applications based on fresh causes of action, regardless of the urgency or merit of the new grievance. The petitioner was granted liberty to file a fresh petition under Article 226.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Finality of Writ Disposal Is Absolute
- Practitioners must file fresh writ petitions for any new grievance arising after disposal, even if related to the same subject matter.
- Interim applications in disposed petitions will be summarily dismissed unless they seek clarification, rectification, or implementation of the original order.
SARFAESI Enforcement Cannot Be Delayed by Post-Disposal Moratorium Claims
- If a secured creditor has initiated SARFAESI proceedings and obtained a DRT order, any subsequent IBC moratorium filed after transfer of property must be challenged in a separate proceeding.
- Courts will not entertain belated challenges to moratorium applicability through backdoor applications in concluded writs.
Procedural Discipline Over Substantive Urgency
- Even where a court’s prior direction is frustrated, the remedy lies in enforcing compliance through contempt or fresh litigation - not by reopening closed proceedings.
- This judgment reinforces that procedural finality is not a technicality but a constitutional safeguard against endless litigation.
