The Karnataka High Court has clarified that executing courts cannot direct the removal of belongings by an obstructor under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC before adjudicating the objection filed by such party. This ruling reinforces the procedural sanctity of execution proceedings and prevents summary disposals that bypass statutory safeguards.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, M/s Samridddhi Petro Products Private Limited, operated a petrol pump on property owned by the decree holders (respondents 1 to 8). The property was subject to a compromise decree in O.S. No. 304/2019, which led to execution proceedings (Ex. No. 1810/2023) against the sole judgment debtor, respondent No. 9, the owner of the petrol pump. The petitioner, though not a party to the original suit, claimed possession and ownership of installations and petroleum inventory on the premises.
Procedural History
- 11 February 2023: Compromise decree passed in O.S. No. 304/2019
- 2023: Execution proceedings initiated against respondent No. 9
- 17 February 2025: Petitioner filed application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC as an obstructor, claiming lawful possession of installations and stock
- 25 June 2025: Executing Court passed order directing petitioner to remove belongings within 15 days, threatening liability for rent from 4 June 2025, despite the Rule 97 application being pending
- 8 July 2025: High Court granted interim stay against demolition pending hearing
- 5 February 2026: Writ petition heard and disposed of by Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of the impugned order and requested liberty to file a fresh application before the Executing Court for extension of time to remove petroleum installations, citing regulatory delays from the Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organization (PESO).
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether an executing court may direct the removal of belongings by an obstructor under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC before deciding the substantive objection filed under the same rule, thereby bypassing the statutory procedure.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel argued that Order XXI Rule 97 CPC mandates a formal adjudication of objections before any coercive action is taken against an obstructor. The Executing Court’s order was premature and violated the principle of natural justice. The petitioner’s inability to remove petroleum installations was due to unavoidable regulatory delays from PESO, which required technical clearance and could not be expedited. Reliance was placed on Smt. Sushila Devi v. Smt. Kamla Devi to emphasize that execution courts cannot override the procedural hierarchy of CPC.
For the Respondent
Respondents contended that the petitioner was merely a trespasser and had no legal right to retain possession after the decree. They argued that the order directing removal was merely a direction for possession and did not prejudice the petitioner’s right to seek extension. They maintained that the petitioner’s delay was inexcusable and that rent liability was a reasonable consequence of non-compliance.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the nature of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, which provides a distinct remedy for persons claiming rights in property subject to execution. The Court emphasized that this provision is not a mere formality but a substantive safeguard designed to protect third-party interests. The Executing Court’s order, issued while the Rule 97 application remained pending, effectively decided the very issue it was statutorily bound to adjudicate.
"The objector’s application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is not a procedural formality but a statutory right that must be adjudicated before any coercive action is taken against the objector."
The Court distinguished this from mere possession disputes, noting that the petitioner’s claim involved valuable, hazardous petroleum installations requiring specialized removal. The Executing Court’s imposition of rent liability from 4 June 2025, prior to adjudication, amounted to a de facto eviction without due process. The Court further held that the period during which the writ petition was pending must be excluded from any limitation for filing a fresh application, as the petitioner was effectively barred from approaching the Executing Court while the writ was sub judice.
The Verdict
The petitioner prevailed. The Court held that Order XXI Rule 97 CPC requires the Executing Court to decide the objection before directing removal of belongings. The impugned order was set aside, and liberty was granted to file a fresh application for extension of time, with the period of pendency of the writ petition excluded from limitation.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Obstructor Applications Cannot Be Ignored
- Practitioners must ensure that any application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is formally heard and decided before any eviction or removal order is passed
- Executing courts that bypass Rule 97 applications risk having their orders quashed on writ jurisdiction
- Failure to adjudicate Rule 97 applications violates the principle of natural justice and renders the order voidable
Time Extensions Must Account for Judicial Delays
- Any period during which a writ petition is pending must be excluded when computing limitation for filing applications before the Executing Court
- This protects litigants from being penalized for delays caused by the judicial system itself
- Practitioners should explicitly pray for exclusion of pendency period in applications for condonation of delay
Regulatory Compliance Is a Valid Ground for Delay
- Delays caused by statutory authorities like PESO, fire departments, or environmental agencies constitute sufficient cause under CPC
- Courts must recognize that certain removals (e.g., petroleum, chemicals, hazardous materials) require regulatory clearances and cannot be completed on demand
- Evidence of pending applications with such authorities should be annexed to applications for extension of time
