Case Law Analysis

Directors Liable Under Air Act Even After Resignation | Burden of Non-Involvement Shifts to Accused at Trial : Allahabad HC

The Allahabad High Court ruled that directors can be prosecuted under the Air Act if named in the complaint, even if they had resigned before the environmental violation occurred. The burden now shifts to them to prove they had no role in the company’s conduct at the time of the offence, significantly expanding personal liability for corporate environmental breaches.

Cassie News NetworkCassie News Network
Apr 18, 2026, 6:23 PM(Updated: Nov 3, 2026)
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Directors Liable Under Air Act Even After Resignation | Burden of Non-Involvement Shifts to Accused at Trial : Allahabad HC

The Allahabad High Court has reaffirmed that directors of a company can be held criminally liable under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, if they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the time the offence was committed. The judgment clarifies that mere directorship is insufficient, but where statutory responsibility is established, prosecution may proceed without requiring proof of individual culpability at the pre-trial stage.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The dispute arises from a complaint filed by the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB) against M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited under Section 37 of the Air Act, 1981, for operating a thermal power plant expansion project at Panki, Kanpur, without obtaining mandatory environmental consent. The applicants, Bithal Das Mundhra and another, were named as co-accused in the complaint solely on the basis of their former directorship of the company.

Key Facts

  • The thermal power plant expansion project was approved by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change on 29.06.2017.
  • The UPPCB granted environmental clearance to the project on 25.06.2018.
  • Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) was the main contractor and subcontracted civil work to M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited effective 19.12.2018.
  • The alleged violation occurred in 2020, during the construction phase of the project.
  • Applicant No. 1 ceased to be a director of Simplex Infrastructures Limited on 15.03.2014.
  • Applicant No. 2 ceased to be a director on 20.09.2016.
  • Both applicants were no longer directors at the time the project commenced in December 2018 and during the alleged violation in 2020.
  • Form No. 32 and Form DIR-12 filed under the Companies Act, 1956, confirm the cessation of directorship.
  • The UPPCB, in its Annexure-3, admitted it did not ascertain whether the applicants were in charge of or responsible for the company’s business at the relevant time.
  • The inspection report dated 2020, which formed the basis of the complaint, did not identify any current director or officer responsible for operations.

Procedural History

  • 06.01.2021: UPPCB filed complaint before Special Judicial Magistrate, Pollution/CBI, Lucknow, naming Simplex Infrastructures Limited and its former directors as accused.
  • 14.03.2022: Magistrate issued summoning order against the applicants.
  • 22.01.2022: Application U/s 482 CrPC No. 9058 of 2022 filed by applicants seeking quashing of proceedings.
  • 03.04.2023: Application U/s 482 CrPC No. 22 of 2023 filed by applicants (same relief).
  • 15.04.2026: Judgment delivered by the Allahabad High Court.

The Parties' Positions

For the Applicants

  • Argued they ceased to be directors years before the project commenced and the alleged violation occurred.
  • Contended that the complaint lacks any allegation of their involvement in day-to-day management or operational control during 2020.
  • Relied on Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry to argue that holding directors liable merely for their designation is a travesty of justice.
  • Submitted that the UPPCB failed to conduct due diligence before filing the complaint.

For the Respondent (UPPCB)

  • Argued that the applicants were directors at the time the complaint was filed, as per Ministry of Corporate Affairs records.
  • Contended that the offence under the Air Act is one of strict liability, and directors are vicariously liable under Section 40.
  • Asserted that the company operated without consent, and the Board of Directors collectively bears responsibility.
  • Relied on U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi and S.P. Rastogi v. State of U.P. to argue that directors are presumed responsible for statutory compliance.

Relief Sought

The applicants sought quashing of the entire proceedings and the summoning order dated 14.03.2022, on the grounds that they were not in charge of or responsible for the company’s business at the time of the alleged offence.

The central question was whether directors who ceased to hold office years before the alleged environmental violation can be prosecuted under Section 40 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, solely on the basis of their former directorship, without any allegation of their involvement in the company’s operations at the relevant time.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant/Petitioner

The applicants relied on Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry to argue that liability under environmental statutes cannot be imposed merely on the basis of designation. They emphasized that Section 40(1) requires proof that the accused was "in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business" at the time the offence was committed. They submitted that the complaint contained no factual averments linking them to the project’s management, operations, or decision-making in 2020. The UPPCB’s reliance on outdated MCA records, they argued, was legally insufficient and amounted to a presumption without foundation.

For the Respondent/State

The UPPCB contended that Section 40 imposes vicarious liability on directors as a class, and the statutory language does not require proof of individual negligence or knowledge. Citing Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi and S.P. Rastogi, the State argued that when an offence is committed by a company, the entire Board is presumed responsible for statutory compliance, particularly where the violation involves failure to obtain consent or install pollution control equipment. The Board’s collective duty, they asserted, cannot be evaded by claiming individual disengagement.

The Court's Analysis

The Court examined the statutory framework under Section 40 of the Air Act, which mirrors Section 47 of the Water Act, and analyzed the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate liability. The Court noted that while Sunita Palita dealt with negotiable instruments and required proof of active involvement, environmental statutes operate differently due to their public interest nature.

"Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director... such director shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence."

The Court held that Section 40(2) creates a presumption of liability against directors if the offence is attributable to neglect. The burden then shifts to the director to prove due diligence. However, at the stage of summoning, the Court emphasized that only a prima facie case needs to be established.

The Court distinguished Sunita Palita, noting that the Negotiable Instruments Act requires proof of dishonest intent, whereas environmental laws impose strict liability for statutory non-compliance. The Court relied on Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi, where the Supreme Court held that directors are liable for failing to obtain consent or install treatment plants, even without proof of individual knowledge.

The Court further cited S.P. Rastogi, observing that when the Board collectively fails to comply with statutory obligations, the entire Board is responsible. The fact that the applicants were no longer directors at the time of the violation was deemed a disputed question of fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the pre-trial stage under Section 482 CrPC.

"This Court cannot weigh the evidence and do a mini-trial here. The defence advanced by the applicants cannot be scanned at this stage."

The Court concluded that the complaint, on its face, alleged that the company operated without consent and that the applicants were directors at the time of filing the complaint. The UPPCB’s reliance on MCA records, even if outdated, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for summoning.

The Verdict

The applications under Section 482 CrPC were dismissed. The summoning order dated 14.03.2022 was upheld. The applicants may raise their defence of non-involvement at the trial stage, including through an application for discharge under Section 227 CrPC. No quashing of proceedings was granted. The Court clarified that the burden of proving due diligence under Section 40(1) lies with the accused at trial, not at the stage of summoning.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Director Liability Is Not Automatic, But Presumed

  • Practitioners must now argue that directorship alone is insufficient, but the prosecution need only allege that the accused was a director at the time of filing the complaint.
  • The burden of proving non-involvement or due diligence shifts to the accused at trial.

Statutory Compliance Is a Collective Duty

  • Environmental offences under the Air and Water Acts impose liability on the Board as a whole.
  • Failure to obtain consent or install pollution control equipment triggers liability even if no individual director acted negligently.

Pre-Trial Quashing Is Limited

  • Courts will not examine the veracity of directorship dates or operational control at the Section 482 stage.

  • Defence on factual grounds must be raised before the trial court via discharge application.

  • Always verify directorship status as of the date of the alleged violation, not the date of complaint.

  • Maintain contemporaneous records of director resignations and filings under the Companies Act.

  • In environmental cases, assume liability unless due diligence can be proven.

Case Details

Bithal Das Mundhra and Another v. State of U.P. and Another

PDF
Court
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
Date
15 April 2026
Case Number
Application U/s 482 No. 22 of 2023 and No. 9058 of 2022
Bench
Brij Raj Singh
Counsel
Pet: Asim Kumar Singh, Chandra Bhushan Pandey
Res: G.A. Ashok Kumar Verma, Rajiv Mundhra

Frequently Asked Questions

Yes, if the complaint names them as a director at the time of filing, the prosecution need not prove active involvement at the time of the offence. The accused must prove due diligence or non-involvement at trial under Section 40(1).
No. Under Section 40(2), liability arises if the offence is attributable to neglect. Knowledge is not required at the pre-trial stage; the burden shifts to the director to prove they exercised due diligence.
Mere non-involvement in daily operations is not a defence at the summoning stage. The Court will not adjudicate factual disputes before trial; the accused must raise this defence in a discharge application under Section 227 CrPC.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.