The Kerala High Court has held that an unreasonable delay in initiating proceedings under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, severs the necessary proximate connection between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order. The court quashed a one-year detention order against a detenu after finding that a 46-day gap between the last alleged offence and the proposal for detention lacked justification, undermining the requisite subjective and objective satisfaction.
The Verdict
The petitioner, mother of the detenu, won. The Kerala High Court set aside the detention order passed under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, on the ground of undue delay. The court held that a 46-day gap between the last prejudicial activity and the proposal for detention, without a credible explanation, snapped the live and proximate link required for valid preventive detention. The detenu was directed to be released immediately.
Background & Facts
The detenu, Femis, son of Abbas, was classified as a 'known rowdy' under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act based on his involvement in ten criminal cases. The last of these cases, Crime No. 726/2025 of Tirur Police Station, arose from an incident on 26 April 2025, involving offences under multiple sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. After the incident, the detenu absconded. The District Police Chief of Malappuram submitted the proposal for detention to the District Collector on 11 June 2025 - 46 days later. The detention order was issued on 22 July 2025 and confirmed by the State Government on 18 September 2025, authorizing one year’s detention.
The petitioner challenged the order before the High Court, arguing that the delay rendered the detention arbitrary and violative of Article 21. The detaining authority, in its order, acknowledged the delay but attributed it to the time required to compile details of the ten cases. The petitioner contended that these records were readily accessible and that the delay indicated a lack of genuine apprehension regarding future criminal conduct.
The case was heard on 21 January 2026, with the court delivering judgment on the same day.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a 46-day delay between the last prejudicial activity and the initiation of detention proceedings under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act invalidates the detention order by breaking the live and proximate link required for preventive detention, even when the detenu was absconding.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel argued that preventive detention must be grounded in a proximate connection between the last prejudicial act and the detention order. The 46-day delay, they submitted, was neither explained nor justified, especially since the detenu’s criminal history was well-documented. The delay, they contended, indicated a lack of bona fide apprehension of future misconduct. Reliance was placed on precedents holding that preventive detention cannot be a substitute for punitive action and must be temporally proximate to the threat.
For the Respondent
The Public Prosecutor conceded that there was a delay but argued it was reasonable given the need to compile records from multiple cases and ensure compliance with natural justice. He asserted that the detaining authority had applied its mind and that the delay was not inordinate, particularly since the detenu was absconding. He cited general principles that some administrative delay is inevitable in complex cases.
The Court's Analysis
The court emphasized that preventive detention under the KAA(P) Act is an extraordinary measure that infringes upon fundamental rights. It cannot be invoked casually or as a routine response to past conduct. The authority must demonstrate both objective and subjective satisfaction that the detenu is likely to commit further prejudicial acts. The court rejected the notion that any delay, however long, is permissible if the detenu is absconding.
"When there is undue delay in making the proposal and passing the detention order, the same would undermine its validity, particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay."
The court found the explanation offered - that additional time was needed to collect case details - untenable. With modern record-keeping systems and institutional capacity, compiling details of ten cases within 46 days was not a legitimate impediment. The court noted that the very fact of delay, especially when the detenu was not in custody, suggested a lack of urgency and genuine apprehension.
"If the Superintendent of Police who mooted the proposal was having bona fide apprehension regarding the repetition of anti-social activities by the detenu, definitely he would have acted swiftly after the last prejudicial activity."
The court held that the delay of 46 days, unexplained and unjustified, severed the necessary temporal link between the last prejudicial act and the detention order. This rendered the order legally unsustainable, irrespective of the detenu’s past conduct.
What This Means For Similar Cases
This judgment establishes a clear precedent that preventive detention under the KAA(P) Act cannot be sustained if there is an unexplained delay between the last prejudicial activity and the initiation of proceedings. Practitioners must now treat such delays as a ground for challenge, particularly when the gap exceeds 30 days without compelling justification. Authorities must document and justify any delay with specificity - general assertions of administrative burden will no longer suffice.
The ruling reinforces that preventive detention is not a tool for retrospective punishment. It must be narrowly tailored to imminent threats. Future detention proposals must be filed promptly after the last act, and any delay must be accompanied by contemporaneous records explaining why immediate action was not feasible. This judgment also signals judicial scrutiny of routine classifications as 'known rowdy' without fresh, proximate evidence of threat.
The direction to release the detenu forthwith underscores the court’s view that unlawful detention must be remedied immediately, even if the detenu is subject to other proceedings.
