The Chhattisgarh High Court has delivered a stern reminder that bureaucratic inertia cannot justify delay in appealing acquittals, particularly in sensitive cases under the POCSO Act. The judgment reinforces that the law of limitation applies equally to the State as to private litigants, and that procedural inefficiencies within government machinery are not acceptable grounds for condonation.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The State of Chhattisgarh sought to appeal the acquittal of Ratandeep Ekka in a POCSO case involving allegations of kidnapping, abduction, and rape of a minor girl. The Trial Court, in its judgment dated 02.09.2025, acquitted the accused despite prosecution evidence including medical reports, witness testimonies, and documentary proof of the victim’s age. The State filed an application for leave to appeal after a delay of 73 days beyond the statutory period.
Procedural History
- 02.09.2025: Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Jashpur, acquitted the accused under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
- 02.12.2025: Statutory period for filing appeal expired.
- 21.04.2026: State filed application for leave to appeal, accompanied by a condonation petition for 73 days of delay.
- 02.02.2026: High Court heard the application and rejected it on grounds of unexplained delay.
Relief Sought
The State sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and leave to appeal the acquittal, arguing that the Trial Court’s findings were perverse and contrary to evidence.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 permits condonation of delay in filing an appeal against acquittal when the State cites internal bureaucratic delays as the sole reason.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner (State)
The State contended that the delay of 73 days was due to procedural formalities within the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, including internal file movement and consultation with the Advocate General. It relied on State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani to argue that government departments require time for internal approvals. It further asserted that the acquittal was erroneous and that substantial justice demanded the appeal be heard.
For the Respondent (Accused)
The accused, through implication, argued that the State had failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause for delay. He emphasized that the delay was neither due to illness, legal advice, nor external impediment, but purely administrative negligence. He invoked Postmaster General v. Living Media and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary to assert that the State cannot evade statutory deadlines under the guise of bureaucratic processes.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a rigorous examination of the legal principles governing condonation of delay, particularly as they apply to government entities. It held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not operate as a safety net for governmental inefficiency. The Court emphasized that the expression "sufficient cause" must relate to events occurring within the limitation period, not after its expiry.
"The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few."
The Court distinguished between legitimate impediments - such as illness, legal advice, or natural calamities - and systemic delays arising from internal file movement, lack of coordination, or administrative apathy. It cited Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited to underscore that government departments, equipped with legal expertise and modern infrastructure, cannot plead ignorance or procedural red tape as justification for delay.
The Court further relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary to affirm that negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides disqualify a party from claiming condonation. It rejected the State’s reliance on State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, noting that the precedent did not sanction blanket condonation for bureaucratic delays.
Crucially, the Court clarified that events occurring after the limitation period expires cannot constitute "sufficient cause." The delay must be traced to an impediment existing between the date of the order and the last day of limitation. The State’s explanation - that the file was "processed" after the deadline - was deemed legally irrelevant.
The Verdict
The State’s petition was dismissed. The Court held that no sufficient cause was established for the 73-day delay in filing the appeal against acquittal. The application for condonation was rejected, and the appeal was barred by limitation.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Delay Must Be Traced to the Limitation Period
- Practitioners must demonstrate that the cause of delay arose between the date of the order and the last day of limitation.
- Post-limitation events, such as internal approvals or file movement, are legally irrelevant for condonation.
- Any application must specifically identify the impediment that prevented filing within the statutory window.
Government Departments Are Held to Higher Standards
- State agencies must establish internal protocols to ensure appeals are filed within time.
- Delays caused by administrative lapses will not be condoned, even in serious cases like POCSO.
- Courts may now direct departmental action against negligent officers, as explicitly ordered here.
Acquittal Appeals Require Extraordinary Justification
- Appeals against acquittal are already subject to strict scrutiny.
- Delay in filing such appeals compounds the prejudice to the accused.
- Practitioners must prioritize timely filing; condonation cannot substitute for diligence.
