The Bombay High Court has clarified that while maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act is a statutory right, compensation must be grounded in reasoned, evidence-based assessment - not arbitrary quantification. This judgment reinforces the principle that judicial discretion in financial remedies under the D.V. Act is not unfettered.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The respondent-wife, married to the petitioner-husband on 29 April 2007, filed a Criminal Misc. Application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act seeking maintenance for herself and their two minor children, along with compensation for domestic violence. She alleged physical and emotional abuse, leading to her being driven out of the matrimonial home. She claimed no independent income and relied on the husband’s alleged business of running a stone crusher for financial support.
Procedural History
- 2017: Original application filed before the JMFC, Ardhapur
- 2021: JMFC granted maintenance of ₹7,000 per month to each of the three applicants (wife and two sons) and awarded ₹3,00,000 as compensation
- 2022: Husband filed Criminal Appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded
- 2024: First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial court’s order
- 2024: Husband filed Criminal Revision Application before the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of the compensation award of ₹3,00,000, arguing lack of evidence on his income, no reasoned justification, and no proof of domestic violence. He contended that the wife left voluntarily and that both lower courts erred in accepting uncorroborated allegations.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether compensation under Section 22 of the D.V. Act can be awarded without specific findings on the nature and extent of harm, or whether it requires a reasoned, evidence-based determination proportional to the circumstances.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Counsel argued that the trial court failed to establish the husband’s income, despite the wife’s burden to prove financial capacity. He cited Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India to emphasize that allegations without corroboration cannot form the basis of financial liability. He further contended that the compensation amount was exorbitant and unsupported by any quantifiable loss or injury, rendering it arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice.
For the Respondent
Counsel for the wife relied on Rajnesh v. Neha to assert that the D.V. Act is remedial and must be interpreted liberally. She argued that the husband’s silence on his occupation - despite being a stone crusher operator - constituted an adverse inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. She maintained that the cumulative effect of domestic violence, loss of shelter, and economic dependence justified the compensation, even if detailed income proof was lacking.
The Court's Analysis
The Court acknowledged that the wife’s testimony regarding domestic violence remained unchallenged and that the trial court was justified in granting maintenance under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. However, it drew a sharp distinction between maintenance and compensation. While maintenance is a recurring obligation based on need and capacity, compensation under Section 22 is a one-time award for harm suffered and must be tied to demonstrable injury.
"The grant of compensation under Section 22 cannot be a mechanical or punitive exercise. It must reflect a judicial assessment of the nature, duration and impact of the domestic violence, and must be proportionate to the circumstances."
The Court noted that neither the trial court nor the appellate court provided any reasoning for the ₹3,00,000 figure - no breakdown of medical expenses, emotional trauma, loss of earnings, or other quantifiable damages. The absence of such reasoning rendered the award legally unsustainable. The Court emphasized that while the D.V. Act is protective, its provisions are not a license for unstructured financial awards.
The Court further held that the husband’s failure to deny operating a stone crusher, in the face of the wife’s assertion, permitted an adverse inference regarding his income. However, this inference could not substitute for a reasoned determination of compensation.
The Verdict
The petitioner succeeded in part. The Bombay High Court upheld the maintenance award but reduced the compensation from ₹3,00,000 to ₹1,00,000, holding that compensation under Section 22 of the D.V. Act must be reasoned, proportionate, and grounded in factual findings.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Compensation Requires Specific Reasoning
- Practitioners must now ensure that applications for compensation under Section 22 of the D.V. Act include detailed affidavits or evidence linking harm to monetary value
- Courts must record specific reasons for the quantum - e.g., medical bills, psychological evaluation, loss of employment, or relocation costs
- Blanket awards without justification are now vulnerable to revision
Maintenance and Compensation Are Distinct Remedies
- Maintenance under Section 12 is based on need and capacity; compensation under Section 22 is based on harm and culpability
- Courts cannot conflate the two; failure to distinguish them invites appellate interference
- A successful maintenance claim does not automatically justify a high compensation award
Adverse Inference Is Not a Substitute for Evidence
- Silence on income may raise an adverse inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, but it cannot replace affirmative proof of harm
- Petitioners must still articulate the nature of injury suffered to justify compensation
- Courts must avoid punitive awards disguised as compensation
