The Gujarat High Court dismissed a criminal appeal against acquittal, holding that a prolonged live-in relationship governed by mutual written agreements declaring free consent cannot support a rape prosecution based on an alleged false promise of marriage. The Court affirmed that where parties cohabit for months under deeds expressly recording voluntary cohabitation and later cancel them by consensus, the prosecution fails to establish lack of consent or dishonest intent from inception.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant-victim, a second-year college student at Usmanpura, Ahmedabad, alleged that the respondent-accused, Pavan Shaileshbhai Parmar, employed at a showroom, induced her into a physical relationship on the false promise of marriage. The parties were in a relationship for approximately one year before the incident. On 13.08.2019, the victim went to the accused's house and both presented themselves at a police station. The accused's parents and uncle took her from the station. A mutual agreement (maitri karar) was executed on 14.08.2019. The victim alleged forcible physical relations, assault, and demands for money during approximately two months of cohabitation at the accused's house and later at a rented accommodation in Gujarat Ratna Society, Ranip.
Key Facts
- 13.08.2019: Victim went to accused's house; both went to police station; accused's family took her away
- 14.08.2019: First deed of understanding (friendship agreement) executed; accused was 20 years old
- 14.08.2019 to 29.01.2020: Parties lived together at Vasuki Nagar Vibhag-2, Juna Vadaj, and Gujarat Ratna Society, Ranip
- 29.01.2020: Accused informed victim they would marry on her birthday (31.01.2020); asked her to cancel agreement; threatened suicide when she refused; agreement cancelled by mutual consent; accused left her at Motera Stadium
- 30.01.2020: FIR lodged at Vadaj Police Station (C.R. No. 11191023200089 of 2020) under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 323 IPC
- 08.02.2020: Accused arrested and subsequently released on bail
- 24.09.2020: Charge sheet filed before Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.9, Ahmedabad (Criminal Case No. 51051 of 2020)
- 23.08.2022: Charge framed by Sessions Court (Sessions Case No. 457 of 2021)
- 31.01.2026: Sessions Court acquitted accused, giving benefit of doubt under Section 235(1) CrPC
Procedural History
- 30.01.2020: FIR registered at Vadaj Police Station
- 08.02.2020: Accused arrested and released on bail
- 24.09.2020: Charge sheet filed
- 23.08.2022: Charge framed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.7, Ahmedabad
- 31.01.2026: Sessions Court judgment of acquittal
- 21.10.2026: Gujarat High Court dismissed appeal against acquittal
Relief Sought
The appellant-victim sought quashing of the acquittal order dated 31.01.2026, conviction of the respondent under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 323 IPC, and sentencing in accordance with law.
The Legal Issue
The central questions were: (1) Whether the Sessions Court erred in relying on the mutual consent agreements to conclude the relationship was consensual, particularly when the second agreement was allegedly procured under duress and threat of suicide; (2) Whether the victim's consistent testimony and medical evidence of injuries were wrongly discarded without reasoning; (3) Whether a promise to marry made when the accused was below marriageable age (20 years) can constitute a false promise vitiating consent under Section 376 IPC; (4) Whether the appellate court should interfere with a plausible view of evidence in an appeal against acquittal.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
Learned advocate for the appellant-victim contended that the Sessions Court committed patent error by treating the second agreement (29.01.2020) as voluntary when it was executed under threat of suicide and assault. He submitted the Court ignored medical evidence recording multiple injury marks, failed to discuss the physical assault allegations, and discarded the victim's consistent testimony without assigning reasons. He argued the FIR was lodged the very next day (30.01.2020), negating any theory of afterthought. He relied on Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar to argue that a false promise from inception vitiates consent, and that the agreement cannot efface the independent offence under Section 323 IPC supported by medical evidence.
For the Respondent
Learned APP for the State supported the appellant, submitting the Sessions Court committed manifest error in evidence appreciation. He contended the victim's testimony, if consistent and trustworthy, can alone sustain conviction and cannot be rejected based on a subsequent agreement. He argued the medical evidence directly supported the Section 323 IPC charge, the circumstances of the second agreement's execution (marriage assurance and assault) were unexamined, and the one-day gap between agreement and FIR showed no delay. He prayed for setting aside the acquittal.
The Court's Analysis
The High Court conducted a comprehensive re-appreciation of evidence. It first examined the victim's medical history given to the treating doctor, which described a consensual, continuing relationship: "she recognised the accused for one year, that the two were in love, and that for the last eight months they had been living together under a friendship agreement." This contemporaneous account, recorded long before court deposition, contained no mention of force, coercion, or deceit. The Court found no infirmity in the Sessions Court's reliance on this history.
The depositions of the victim's father (PW-1) and uncle (PW-13) were pivotal. In cross-examination, the father admitted the victim went to stay with the accused after asking him, entered the agreement with consent, and he gave no written complaint while she was away. The uncle admitted she went of her own will. The Court held: "A father who permits his daughter to go, who does not complain at any stage while she is away, and who does not dispute that she acted with consent cannot be said to support a case of forcible intercourse."
The landlady (PW-14) deposed they stayed as husband and wife, and the victim never complained of harassment. The Court found this independent witness's testimony inconsistent with allegations of coercion.
The two deeds were central. The first deed (14.08.2019) expressly declared: "We have done this of our own free will, willingly, and voluntarily. No pressure or coercion has been applied... We have made this decision while in a sound state of mind and with free consent." It stipulated marriage upon the accused attaining 21 years. The second deed (29.01.2020) recorded mutual cancellation, stating they "had decided to live separately... of their own free will and without any harassment or threat" due to "differences in temperament." It contained no recital of beating, threat to die, or forcible intercourse.
The Court held: "When two adults, after living together for several months under a written arrangement that itself declared free consent, mutually put an end to that arrangement by a further written instrument that again affirms the absence of coercion, the prosecution case that the relationship was throughout the product of a false promise of marriage and of repeated force becomes difficult to sustain."
Critically, the Court noted the accused was 20 at the time of the first deed, below the marriageable age of 21. The agreement to marry on attaining majority was "opposed to public policy" and its "probative value... is nil." The case was not one of a promise made with dishonest intention from inception to obtain sexual favours. Rather, parties entered a written agreement to live together and mutually cancelled it. The prosecutrix, being a major, resided with the respondent of her own consent.
The Court also upheld the Sessions Court's findings on investigative lapses: panch witnesses turned hostile, original agreements were never seized, and panchnamas lacked support. The medical and investigative material could not fill the gap where main evidence was doubtful.
On the scope of interference, the Court cited Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka (2026 INSC 67) and Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand (2025), reiterating that interference in acquittal appeals is warranted only in exceptional cases with compelling circumstances and perversity. The Sessions Court's view was plausible and called for no interference.
The Verdict
The Gujarat High Court dismissed the criminal appeal against acquittal. The Court upheld the Sessions Court's judgment dated 31.01.2026 acquitting Pavan Shaileshbhai Parmar of offences under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 323 IPC. The benefit of doubt was rightly extended to the accused. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Records and proceedings were remitted to the concerned court.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Written Consent Agreements Create Strong Presumption of Voluntary Cohabitation
- Contemporaneous deeds declaring free will, absence of coercion, and mutual consent to live together constitute powerful evidence against subsequent allegations of force or deception
- Courts will scrutinise the language and circumstances of such agreements; recitals of voluntary cohabitation are difficult to rebut without cogent evidence of duress at execution
- Practitioners must examine whether agreements were executed under threat; mere subsequent allegations are insufficient without corroboration
Long Live-In Relationships Raise Presumption of Implied Consent
- Where able-minded adults cohabit for a considerable period in rented accommodation with knowledge of family, a presumption arises that the relationship is based on valid consent
- The Court recognised societal changes: financial independence and conscious life choices have led to proliferation of live-in relationships
- A subsequent dispute or break-up cannot retrospectively criminalise a consensual relationship
- The desire to formalise a live-in relationship into marriage does not prove the relationship originated from a false promise
Promise to Marry by Person Below Marriageable Age Is Unenforceable and Against Public Policy
- An agreement to marry executed when the promisor is below the legal marriageable age (21 for males) has nil probative value and cannot form basis of a false promise prosecution
- Such agreements are void as against public policy; breach cannot be converted into a criminal offence
- Prosecution must prove dishonest intent at the time of promise, not mere breach; the burden is heavy where parties documented their consensual arrangement
Investigative Lapses Fatal to Prosecution Case
- Failure to seize original agreements, hostile panch witnesses, and unsupported panchnamas critically undermine the prosecution
- Medical evidence alone cannot establish the accused's involvement when the victim's testimony is found unreliable
- Practitioners should highlight investigative gaps to demonstrate reasonable doubt
