
The Allahabad High Court has clarified that the simultaneous invocation of Sections 406 and 420 IPC is not invalid once charges have been framed, even if the Supreme Court in Delhi Race Club held such charges incompatible at the pre-trial stage. This ruling reinforces procedural flexibility under Section 221 CrPC and limits judicial interference at the post-charge stage.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The applicant, Manoj, is accused of cheating and criminal breach of trust in connection with fraudulent promises to secure government employment in the Army, FCI, and Railways for multiple individuals. The complainant, Pradeep, alleged that in 2015 - 2016, Manoj approached him at Mahmoodpur and requested him to act as a guarantor for others seeking jobs. Pradeep, along with Harendra Pradhan, Nakul, and Sanju, collectively paid Manoj Rs. 32,60,000/- for these services. Manoj allegedly failed to deliver any employment, and when the complainants demanded refunds, he threatened them with violence. Pradeep, under pressure from the other victims, sold his property to repay part of their money but continued to be harassed. He lodged an FIR on the basis of these allegations.
Key Facts
- The alleged transactions occurred between 2015 and 2016
- Total amount allegedly received by Manoj: Rs. 32,60,000/-
- Pradeep paid Rs. 11,10,000/- for his own employment; the rest was paid by Harendra, Nakul, and Sanju
- Manoj allegedly arranged fake medical examinations and forged joining letters
- The complainants approached Manoj’s village in 2019 and discovered he was in jail for similar offences
- No documentary evidence of bank transfers was produced by the complainants
- The applicant claims he was owed Rs. 5,00,000/- by Pradeep and had paid him Rs. 2,00,000/- as advance
- Pradeep allegedly collected money from others and used Manoj as a scapegoat
- Statements of Harendra, Nakul, and Sanju were recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation
Procedural History
- 2019: Crime No. 148 of 2019 registered at Police Station Dhaulana, District Hapur
- 08.09.2021: Charge-sheet filed under Sections 120B, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC
- 05.10.2021: Cognizance taken and summons issued by Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), IInd, Hapur
- 10.07.2023: Charges framed against the applicant
- 2025: Application under Section 528 BNSS filed before the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of charge-sheet, cognizance order, and all proceedings
- 12.06.2026: Hearing conducted before Hon’ble Sanjiv Kumar, J.
The Parties' Positions
Applicant (Manoj): Argued that the dispute is purely civil, with no criminal intent at inception; that the FIR is belated (filed after four years); that the complainant is equally culpable; and that Sections 406 and 420 IPC cannot co-exist under Delhi Race Club. He submitted that the Investigating Officer acted unfairly and that the charge-sheet is based on false and concocted facts.
Respondent (State): Contended that the allegations disclose a prima facie case of cheating and criminal breach of trust; that the charge-sheet was filed after proper investigation; that charges were framed on 10.07.2023; and that the matter is now at the stage of prosecution evidence, making quashing impermissible.
Relief Sought
The applicant sought quashing of the charge-sheet dated 08.09.2021, the cognizance and summoning order dated 05.10.2021, and all proceedings in Case No. 1006 of 2021, on grounds of abuse of process, delay, and legal inconsistency in framing charges under Sections 406 and 420 IPC.
The Legal Issue
Can proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 IPC be maintained simultaneously after charges have been framed, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Delhi Race Club v. State of Uttar Pradesh that these offences are mutually exclusive and cannot co-exist on the same set of facts?
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant/Petitioner
The applicant relied on Delhi Race Club v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 10 SCC 690, arguing that Sections 406 and 420 IPC are mutually exclusive offences: cheating requires fraudulent inducement from inception, while criminal breach of trust requires lawful entrustment followed by dishonest misappropriation. He contended that the charge-sheet is legally unsustainable because both charges are based on identical facts. He further argued that the FIR was filed after a four-year delay without explanation, and that the complainant’s own conduct as a money-collector and guarantor renders the prosecution mala fide and an abuse of process.
For the Respondent/State
The State countered that the charges were framed on 10.07.2023, placing the matter beyond the pre-trial stage addressed in Delhi Race Club. It invoked Section 221 CrPC (now Section 244 BNSS), which permits charging an accused with multiple offences when it is doubtful which offence the facts establish. The State emphasized that the Trial Court is the proper forum to evaluate evidence and determine whether the accused is guilty of one, both, or neither offence, and that quashing at this stage would amount to a mini-trial.
The Court's Analysis
The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holding in Delhi Race Club that Sections 406 and 420 IPC are distinct and generally incompatible when applied to the same transaction. The Court quoted the Supreme Court’s reasoning:
"For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or misleading representation i.e., since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously."
However, the Court distinguished the present case on a critical procedural ground: the charges had already been framed on 10.07.2023. The Court emphasized that Delhi Race Club dealt with the stage of summoning and cognizance, prior to charge framing. At that stage, the Court must determine whether a prima facie case exists for any offence. But once charges are framed, Section 221 CrPC (now Section 244 BNSS) governs the permissible scope of charges.
Section 221 CrPC explicitly permits a court to frame charges for multiple offences when it is doubtful which offence the facts establish. The Court cited Illustration (a) to Section 221 CrPC, which directly includes cheating and criminal breach of trust as examples of offences that may be charged together. The Court further relied on its own coordinate bench’s recent decision in Vikash Kumar v. State of U.P. and the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Bhim Sain Arora v. State, both holding that concurrent charges under Sections 406 and 420 IPC are permissible at the stage of framing charges.
The Court held that the applicant’s argument conflated the pre-charge stage with the post-charge stage. Once charges are framed, the trial court is empowered to consider whether the accused committed one offence, both, or neither. Quashing the proceedings at this stage would usurp the trial court’s function and violate the principle that appellate or writ courts must not evaluate evidence or conduct mini-trials.
Regarding the delay in filing the FIR, the Court noted that such issues require evidentiary evaluation and are not grounds for quashing at this stage. Similarly, the applicant’s allegations against the complainant’s conduct must be ventilated during trial, not in a Section 528 BNSS application.
The Verdict
The application under Section 528 BNSS was dismissed. The Court held that the framing of charges under Sections 406 and 420 IPC on 10.07.2023 was legally valid under Section 221 CrPC, and the proceedings may continue. The Court directed that the trial proceed without interference, and that the applicant may raise all factual and legal defenses during the trial.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Concurrent Charges Are Permissible After Framing
- Practitioners may now confidently argue that Sections 406 and 420 IPC may be charged together after charges are framed, even if the Supreme Court has restricted their co-existence at the summoning stage
- Applications under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing on this ground will fail if charges have already been framed
- The burden shifts to the accused to prove lack of criminal intent or absence of entrustment during trial, not at the quashing stage
Delay in FIR Is Not a Ground for Quashing Post-Charge
- Delay in lodging an FIR, without more, cannot justify quashing once the case has progressed to the stage of prosecution evidence
- The trial court must assess the explanation for delay, if any, and its impact on the prosecution’s case
- Absence of documentary evidence (e.g., bank records) does not automatically invalidate the FIR if oral testimony is corroborated by other circumstances
Trial Courts, Not Writ Courts, Must Evaluate Competing Allegations
- Where the complainant is also alleged to be a co-conspirator or beneficiary, the accused must raise these defenses during trial
- Writ courts must not substitute their opinion for the trial court’s role in weighing evidence
- Section 528 BNSS applications are not forums for mini-trials; their purpose is to address jurisdictional or procedural illegality, not factual disputes






