
The Madras High Court has clarified that an interim order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, directing the deposit of original title deeds with the court, does not amount to enforcement of an arbitral award - even when a Section 34 challenge is pending. This ruling reinforces the distinction between protective interim measures and substantive relief in arbitration proceedings.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The dispute arose from a Development Agreement dated 23.05.2008 between the respondents, Sujay Senthil and Siranjeevi Saravanan (through their Power of Attorney holder and mother, Shanthi N.), and the appellant, M/s Corromandel Engineering Company Limited. Under the agreement, the respondents, as owners of a property in Coimbatore, granted the appellant the right to develop the land in exchange for 36% of the built-up area, while the appellant retained 64%. As part of the arrangement, the appellant was required to pay an interest-free, refundable security deposit of Rs. 3 Crores and was handed over the original title deeds of the property for the purpose of carrying out development.
Key Facts
- The Development Agreement contained an arbitration clause for resolution of disputes.
- The appellant took possession of the property and the original title deeds on 23.05.2008.
- The development project stalled due to delays in statutory approvals, regulatory hurdles, infrastructure constraints, and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.
- The appellant claimed the contract was frustrated due to supervening circumstances.
- The respondents invoked arbitration on account of non-performance and breach.
- A Sole Arbitrator was appointed by order dated 18.06.2021.
- The arbitral award dated 20.09.2024 directed: (i) forfeiture of the Rs. 3 Crore security deposit; (ii) payment of monetary compensation by the appellant; and (iii) return of the original title deeds to the respondents.
Procedural History
- 20.09.2024: Arbitral award passed by Sole Arbitrator.
- 2025: Appellant filed Arb.O.P. (Com. Div.) No. 83 of 2025 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging the award. The petition remains pending.
- 2025: Respondents filed Arb. Appln. No. 756 of 2025 under Section 9 seeking interim relief, including custody of title deeds.
- 30.01.2026: Learned Single Judge ordered the appellant to deposit the original title deeds with the court pending adjudication of the Section 34 petition.
- 06.04.2026: Judgment reserved in the Original Side Appeal.
- 29.04.2026: Judgment pronounced by the Division Bench.
The Parties' Positions
Appellant: Argued that the Section 9 order was a substantive interference, effectively enforcing the arbitral award before its validity was determined. Contended that possession of title deeds was lawful under the Development Agreement and that the order violated principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. Also alleged the order was non-speaking and passed without affording adequate opportunity to file objections.
Respondents: Maintained that they are the lawful owners of the property and title deeds. Argued that the Section 9 order was a protective measure, not enforcement, and that the appellant had no continuing right to retain documents once the contract was breached. Emphasized that Section 34 petitions do not automatically stay awards and that the order merely preserved the status quo pending final adjudication.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought to set aside the order dated 30.01.2026 directing deposit of title deeds. The respondents sought dismissal of the appeal with costs.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a court, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, may direct the deposit of original title deeds with the court as an interim measure when the arbitral award directing their return is under challenge under Section 34, and whether such an order constitutes impermissible substantive relief.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The appellant relied on Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd. and Arvind Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Kalinga Mining Corporation to argue that Section 9 powers must be exercised in accordance with the principles governing interim injunctions: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. It was contended that the order was mandatory in nature, effectively transferring possession to the respondents, and thus amounted to granting final relief at an interim stage. The appellant further argued that the order was non-speaking, lacked reasoning, and violated natural justice by not permitting adequate opportunity to respond.
For the Respondent
The respondents, through senior counsel, emphasized that ownership of the title deeds remained with them, and the appellant’s possession was purely contractual and conditional. They cited that the arbitral award had already directed return of the deeds, and Section 34 proceedings do not operate as an automatic stay. The direction to deposit the deeds with the court was framed as a neutral, protective step to prevent alienation or loss, not as enforcement. It was also noted that the Single Judge had indicated willingness to hear the Section 34 petition expeditiously, but the appellant failed to cooperate.
The Court's Analysis
The Division Bench examined the nature of the interim order and its legal effect under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It held that the order directing deposit of the title deeds with the court was not equivalent to handing them over to the respondents. The court emphasized that the purpose was purely protective - to preserve the subject matter of the dispute until the Section 34 challenge was decided.
"The direction of the learned Single Judge is only to deposit the documents before the Court and does not amount to handing them over to the respondents. It is only a protective measure to safeguard the subject matter until the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act are decided."
The Court reiterated that the filing of a Section 34 petition does not automatically stay the arbitral award. Interim relief under Section 9 is designed to preserve the status quo and prevent prejudice to the arbitral process. The court found no error in the Single Judge’s conclusion that depositing the deeds with the registry was a reasonable safeguard, particularly given the respondents’ undisputed ownership and the award’s explicit direction for return.
The Court also rejected the argument that the order was non-speaking. While the order was brief, the reasoning was implicit in the context of the application, the award, and the nature of the documents. The court noted that the appellant had ample opportunity to file objections and that the order was not passed ex parte.
The Bench further observed that the Single Judge had indicated a willingness to expedite the Section 34 proceedings, and the delay in hearing was attributable to the appellant’s lack of cooperation.
The Verdict
The Original Side Appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the order dated 30.01.2026 directing the appellant to deposit the original title deeds with the Madras High Court. The court directed both parties to cooperate for the expeditious disposal of Arb.O.P. (Com. Div.) No. 83 of 2025, and either party may seek an early hearing, which the Single Judge shall prioritize. There shall be no order as to costs.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Interim Deposit Orders Are Not Enforcement
- Practitioners must distinguish between orders directing deposit of documents with the court and orders directing transfer to the opposing party.
- A Section 9 order requiring deposit with the court registry is a neutral, protective step and does not constitute enforcement of an arbitral award.
- Such orders are permissible even when a Section 34 challenge is pending, provided they preserve the subject matter without prejudicing either party.
Section 34 Petitions Do Not Automatically Stay Awards
- Parties cannot rely on the mere pendency of a Section 34 petition to retain possession of property or documents subject to an award.
- To obtain a stay, a separate application under Section 36(2) must be filed and granted.
- Courts may grant interim measures under Section 9 to prevent dissipation or loss of assets, even if the award is under challenge.
Procedural Fairness in Interim Applications
- While interim orders need not be lengthy, they must reflect judicial reasoning sufficient to show consideration of the parties’ positions.
- Courts are expected to facilitate early hearing of Section 34 petitions when interim relief is granted, and failure to cooperate may weigh against the party seeking delay.






