The Karnataka High Court dismissed a criminal petition seeking to quash proceedings under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, holding that such proceedings are not maintainable under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as the Magistrate exercises only civil jurisdiction under the DV Act, and interference under inherent jurisdiction is warranted only in cases of gross illegality or injustice, which was absent here.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Sabuj Paul, a permanent resident of Toronto, married respondent Arpita Dasgupta on 06.12.2013 in Kolkata via Shaadi.com. After marriage, they resided briefly in Bangalore with respondents 2 and 3 (parents-in-law) before the petitioner took his wife to Toronto, where they led married life. Respondent No.1 returned to Kolkata to visit parents but stayed back in India without joining her husband in Toronto.
Key Facts
- Marriage solemnized: 06.12.2013
- Respondent No.1 returned to India from Toronto in April 2016
- Petition under Section 12 of DV Act filed: August 2017 (C.Misc.No.148/2017)
- Petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act filed by petitioner: decreed on 03.11.2018 (M.C.No.4543/2017)
- Criminal petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed: 2019 (CRL.P No. 7018 of 2019)
- Petition heard: 08.10.2026
- Judgment pronounced: 17.10.2026
Procedural History
- August 2017: Respondent No.1 filed DV petition (C.Misc.No.148/2017) before MMTC, Bengaluru, seeking reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20, 22 of DV Act
- 03.11.2018: Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru decreed petition under Section 9 of HMA in favour of petitioner (M.C.No.4543/2017)
- 2019: Petitioner filed criminal petition (CRL.P No. 7018 of 2019) before High Court of Karnataka to quash DV proceedings
- 08.10.2026: Matter heard and reserved for orders
- 17.10.2026: Judgment pronounced
Relief Sought
Petitioner sought quashing of the entire proceedings initiated under Section 12 of DV Act, 2005, with costs throughout.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, considering that the Magistrate granting relief under the DV Act exercises civil jurisdiction and not criminal jurisdiction.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Learned senior counsel contended that the DV petition was filed after limitation period, as respondent No.1 stayed back in India for over a year without joining husband, and no application for condonation of delay was made under Section 473 Cr.P.C. Counsel argued that the petition lacked specific allegations of domestic violence, relying on averments that showed no subjecting to violence. Counsel further contended that when the husband is in Toronto, question of domestic violence does not arise, and relied on judgments where courts held that a wife returning from abroad cannot file DV application after such time. Counsel also cited precedents where blanket orders for quashing were set aside without hearing contesting parties, and where quashing was granted when no specific role or allegation was levelled against petitioner.
For the Respondent
Learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that petitioner lived with in-laws in Bangalore for 5 months before moving to Toronto, and wife did not desert husband but was made to live separately by respondents. Counsel argued that Section 468 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked as relief is sought under DV Act, not criminal prosecution. Counsel relied on apex court judgments emphasizing that DV Act is welfare legislation, and High Court should not invoke Section 482 casually; interference is warranted only in cases of gross illegality or injustice. Counsel further contended that the DV petition contained specific allegations against petitioner, and thus quashing was not maintainable.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the nature of proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act. Referring to the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Arul Daniel and Others vs. Suganya, it held that an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is not a complaint under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C., consequently, the procedure set out in Sections 190(1)(a) and 200-204 Cr.P.C. for complaint cases has no application. The Magistrate, while granting relief under Chapter IV of the DV Act, exercises only civil jurisdiction, not criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not lie to quash such proceedings, as Section 482 preserves only the inherent criminal jurisdiction of the High Court.
"An application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act does not fall in either category, as what the Court is called upon to do at that stage is to interdict the exercise of civil jurisdiction by the Magistrate at the threshold. As indicated supra, since the Magistrate is exercising only a civil jurisdiction in granting relief's under Chapter IV of the Act, it follows that a Magistrate is not a criminal Court for the purposes of proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act. It follows that an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. does not lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act".
The Court further relied on the order of the Co-ordinate Bench in Mr. Oliver Menezes vs. Mrs. Serita Therese Mathias, which cited the Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court in Rajamanickam vs. State of Tamil Nadu, to reiterate that Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable only if the order complained of is passed by a criminal court or a court exercising powers under Cr.P.C. Since the Magistrate under DV Act is exercising civil jurisdiction, the petition under Section 482 is not maintainable.
The Court noted that while the apex court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi vs. Vidhi Rawal discussed the scope of Section 482 in DV Act proceedings, it emphasized that interference under Section 482 is warranted only in cases of gross illegality or injustice. In the present case, no such gross illegality or injustice was found; the allegations of domestic violence were specific and required trial. The Court observed that the petitioner had not made out any ground to exercise power under Section 482 to quash the proceedings, as contended by learned senior counsel.
The Verdict
The criminal petition (CRL.P No. 7018 of 2019) was dismissed. No costs were awarded as the order merely stated the petition's dismissal, with no monetary relief, interest, or compliance timelines granted since the sought quashing of proceedings was denied.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Jurisdictional Boundaries of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Practitioners must note that Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to quash proceedings under special statutes like the DV Act where the magistrate exercises civil jurisdiction. The inherent criminal jurisdiction of the High Court is preserved only for orders passed by criminal courts or courts exercising powers under Cr.P.C.
Threshold for Interference in DV Proceedings
Interference under Section 482 is warranted only in cases of gross illegality or injustice, not mere dissatisfaction with proceedings. In DV Act cases, where specific allegations are made, the matter must proceed to trial unless illegality is manifest.
Limitation and Delay in DV Petitions
Arguments regarding limitation under Sections 468 and 473 Cr.P.C. are not maintainable in petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging DV proceedings, as such questions pertain to the trial and not to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.
Practitioner Guidance
Lawyers handling DV Act cases must now refrain from filing Section 482 petitions to quash proceedings without demonstrating gross illegality or injustice, focusing instead on trial defenses, as the court clarified the jurisdictional limits of inherent power in welfare legislation contexts.
