Case Law Analysis

Section 479 BNSS | Proviso to Section 45 PMLA Applies to All Women, Overriding Multiple Case Bars: Delhi HC

The Delhi High Court held that the gender-based bail proviso under Section 45 of the PMLA is absolute for women, and Section 479 of the BNSS nullifies the cumulative effect of multiple cases in denying bail. This establishes a critical precedent: even when accused in several PMLA proceedings, a woman cannot be denied bail solely on the basis of multiplicity of cases, reinforcing gender equity in financial crime jurisprudence.

Cassie News NetworkCassie News Network
May 7, 2026, 7:30 PM(Updated: Nov 3, 2026)
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Section 479 BNSS | Proviso to Section 45 PMLA Applies to All Women, Overriding Multiple Case Bars: Delhi HC

The Delhi High Court has affirmed that a woman accused under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 45, irrespective of her educational background or alleged sophistication, provided she has undergone more than half the maximum sentence period under Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The judgment reinforces statutory protections against prolonged pre-trial detention and establishes parity as a critical factor in bail decisions.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioner, Leena Paulose, is the wife of Sukesh Chandrasekhar, a central accused in a multi-crore money laundering case linked to extortion and impersonation of senior government officials. The case originated from an investigation into FIR No. 208/2021, lodged at Delhi Police’s Special Cell, wherein Sukesh allegedly extorted over Rs. 200 crores from Aditi Singh by impersonating the Prime Minister’s and Home Minister’s offices using spoofing technology. The Directorate of Enforcement (ED) registered ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021 on 08.08.2021, invoking Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA, alleging that proceeds of this extortion were laundered through shell companies and benami transactions, with the petitioner playing a key role in utilising and concealing these funds.

Key Facts

  • The petitioner was arrested on 05.09.2021 in connection with FIR No. 208/2021 and subsequently on 09.10.2021 in connection with ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021.
  • She has been in continuous judicial custody since 09.10.2021, totaling over four years and six months as of the judgment date (05.05.2026).
  • The petitioner owns five proprietorship firms: M/s Nail Artistry, M/s Super Car Artistry, M/s News Express Post, M/s L S Fisheries, and M/s L S Education.
  • Between June 2020 and August 2021, substantial unexplained credits were received in the bank accounts of these firms from unrelated entities.
  • Sixteen of the 26 luxury vehicles seized from Sukesh’s network were registered in the names of her firms.
  • She booked chartered flights worth approximately Rs. 7.29 crores through Halo Airways Pvt. Ltd.
  • A residential property in Chennai (Nos. 12 and 13, Kanathur Reddy Kuppam Village) was acquired through a benami transaction, allegedly funded by proceeds of crime.
  • Approximately Rs. 20 lakhs were transferred into M/s Nail Artistry via debit/credit card swipes on commission.
  • She opened a Demat account and traded shares based on alleged inside information from Sukesh.
  • The petitioner has no prior criminal convictions.
  • She filed ITR for AY 2020-21 showing income of Rs. 43,69,050/-.
  • She cooperated with the ED investigation and did not abscond.

Procedural History

  • 07.08.2021: FIR No. 208/2021 registered at Special Cell, Delhi.
  • 08.08.2021: ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021 registered by ED.
  • 04.12.2021: First prosecution complaint filed before Special Court, Patiala House.
  • 20.12.2024: Fifth supplementary prosecution complaint filed.
  • 19.05.2023: Bail application dismissed by Sessions Court.
  • 09.10.2021: Petitioner arrested in PMLA case.
  • 13.01.2025: Petitioner had completed 3 years, 3 months, 24 days of custody.
  • 05.05.2026: Judgment delivered; custody period exceeded 4 years, 7 months, 14 days.
  • The trial remains at the stage of arguments on charge, with 311 witnesses listed and no trial conclusion in sight.

The Parties' Positions

For the Petitioner

  • Argued that as a woman, she is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA, per K. Kavitha and Shashi Bala.
  • Claimed entitlement under Section 479 of the BNSS, having undergone more than half the maximum sentence (7 years) of 3.5 years.
  • Highlighted that she is not a flight risk, has deep societal roots, and cooperated fully with the investigation.
  • Cited parity with 12 co-accused already granted bail, including Arun Muthoo, Avtar Singh Kochar, and Jacqueline Fernandez, whose roles were comparable or more serious.
  • Emphasized that her income from legitimate sources (dentistry, modeling, business) was substantial.

For the Respondent (ED)

  • Contended that the proviso to Section 45 is discretionary and not automatic, citing Saumya Chaurasia.
  • Argued that Section 479(2) of the BNSS bars bail where multiple cases are pending, even if custody threshold is crossed.
  • Asserted that delays in trial were attributable to the petitioner and co-accused, warranting exclusion of custody time under the Explanation to Section 479(1).
  • Claimed the petitioner was the second-in-command of the syndicate, not merely a beneficiary.
  • Cited judgments from Karnataka, J&K, and Jharkhand High Courts interpreting Section 479(2) as an absolute bar.

Relief Sought

The petitioner seeks regular bail in connection with ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021 under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA, with conditions including personal bond, surrender of passport, non-travel abroad, and non-tampering with evidence.

The central questions were: (1) Whether the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA automatically exempts a woman accused from the twin conditions for bail, irrespective of her social or economic status; and (2) Whether Section 479(2) of the BNSS completely bars bail to an undertrial who has undergone more than half the maximum sentence, merely because multiple cases are pending against her.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

The petitioner relied on K. Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement and Shashi Bala @ Shashi Bala Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement to assert that the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA is a statutory benefit available to all women as a class, not limited to "vulnerable" women. She argued that the Supreme Court had explicitly rejected the notion that educated or sophisticated women are excluded from this protection. She further invoked Section 479 of the BNSS, contending that having undergone over four years and six months of custody against a maximum sentence of seven years, she had crossed the one-half threshold. She emphasized that the delay in trial was primarily due to the prosecution’s repeated filing of supplementary complaints over three and a half years, and that she had already argued on charge as early as July 2023. Parity with 12 co-accused granted bail, including those with more active roles in laundering, was a critical argument.

For the Respondent

The ED contended that the proviso to Section 45 is not mandatory and must be applied with caution to prevent exploitation by sophisticated women acting as conduits. It relied on Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement to argue that courts must exercise discretion and not grant automatic relief. Regarding Section 479, the ED argued that Section 479(2) of the BNSS, a new provision absent in the CrPC, creates an absolute bar to bail if multiple cases are pending, regardless of custody duration. It cited judgments from Karnataka, J&K, and Jharkhand High Courts to support this interpretation. The ED further claimed that delays in proceedings were caused by the petitioner’s repeated adjournments for arguments on charge, and that the Explanation to Section 479(1) required exclusion of such delays. It also argued that the petitioner’s role was not passive but central to the syndicate’s operations.

The Court's Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed analysis of both statutory provisions and binding precedents. On the applicability of the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA, the Court held that K. Kavitha and Shashi Bala unequivocally establish that the benefit is available to all women, without qualification based on education, status, or sophistication. The Court observed:

"No such special circumstances have been shown in the present case. The ED’s case turns on the alleged involvement of the petitioner as a principal accused in the predicate case, and the quantum of proceeds of crime, which allegedly came into her hands, or passed through her hands. In my view, these factors are insufficient to oust the protection conferred upon the petitioner by statute."

The Court rejected the ED’s argument that the proviso is merely discretionary in a way that permits denial without justification, emphasizing that the statute mandates a special consideration for women, and any denial must be supported by exceptional reasons.

On Section 479 of the BNSS, the Court held that while Section 479(2) introduces a new exception for accused facing multiple cases, it does not operate as an absolute bar. The Court adopted a harmonious interpretation, aligning with the constitutional guarantee of liberty under Article 21 and the Supreme Court’s view in Satender Kumar Antil and V. Senthil Balaji that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception." The Court noted:

"It would, in my view, be inconsistent in this approach to hold that Section 479(2) entirely eclipses Section 479(1), even if the accused is facing trial in more than one offence in the same FIR, or more than one criminal case."

The Court found that the petitioner had crossed the one-half custody threshold well before the final supplementary complaint was filed, and that the delay in trial was attributable largely to the prosecution’s own procedural delays. The Court also noted that the petitioner was already on bail in three other cases, and only the predicate offence under MCOCA remained pending.

On parity, the Court compared the petitioner’s role with that of co-accused who had already been granted bail. It found that Arun Muthoo and Avtar Singh Kochar, who were alleged to have actively layered and moved proceeds of crime, and Jacqueline Fernandez, who was similarly accused as a beneficiary of proceeds, had been granted bail. The Court concluded:

"The petitioner’s case cannot be said to stand on a graver footing than theirs."

The Court further clarified that its observations were strictly for bail purposes and did not prejudge the merits of the trial.

The Verdict

The petitioner succeeded. The Court granted regular bail in connection with ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021 under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. The petitioner shall be released on a personal bond of Rs. 10,00,000/- with two sureties of the like amount, subject to conditions: (1) appearance before the Special Court on all dates; (2) surrender of passport and no travel abroad without permission; (3) disclosure of permanent and current residential addresses; (4) maintenance of a functional mobile number with prior intimation for changes; (5) no tampering with evidence or witnesses; and (6) no commission of any offence during bail. Compliance is to be reported to the Special Court and the Investigating Officer.

What This Means For Similar Cases

The Proviso to Section 45 PMLA Applies to All Women

  • Practitioners must now argue that the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA is not a discretionary privilege but a statutory entitlement for all women, regardless of profession, wealth, or education.
  • The ED cannot deny bail to a woman merely on grounds of her sophistication or alleged centrality to the crime without recording specific, exceptional reasons.
  • Precedents like K. Kavitha and Shashi Bala now bind all courts to apply this benefit uniformly.

Section 479 BNSS Overrides Multiple Case Barriers

  • Section 479(2) of the BNSS does not create an absolute bar to bail even if multiple cases are pending.
  • If an undertrial has served more than half the maximum sentence, bail must be granted unless the court records compelling reasons to deny it under the second proviso.
  • Delays caused by the prosecution must be included in custody computation; only delays attributable to the accused are excluded.
  • Courts must balance multiplicity of cases as a factor, not a disqualifier, under the overarching principle of Article 21.

Parity Is a Valid Ground for Bail in PMLA Cases

  • Courts must examine the roles of co-accused granted bail and apply parity where the accused’s involvement is comparable or lesser.
  • Beneficiaries of proceeds of crime cannot be denied bail if others with similar or more active roles have been released.
  • This principle applies even where the accused is alleged to have used shell companies or benami assets.

Case Details

Leena Paulose v. Directorate of Enforcement

Court
High Court of Delhi
Date
05 May 2026
Case Number
Bail Appln. 4657/2024 & CRL.M.A. 38115/2024, 18039/2025, CRL.M.As. 32921-32922/2025
Bench
Justice Prateek Jalan
Counsel
Pet: Mr. Anant Malik, Mr. Paul John, Mr. Kunal Narwal, Ms. Ananya Chandra
Res: Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Mr. Vivek Gurnani, Mr. Kanishk Maurya, Mr. Prekshit Chauna

Frequently Asked Questions

No. The Supreme Court in K. Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement held that the proviso applies to all women as a class, irrespective of education, status, or sophistication. Courts cannot deny the benefit on grounds of the accused being well-placed or involved in commercial enterprises.
No. Section 479(2) of the BNSS does not create an absolute bar. If an undertrial has undergone detention for more than half the maximum sentence, bail must be granted unless the court records compelling reasons under the second proviso to deny it, considering the constitutional right to liberty.
Yes. The Explanation to Section 479(1) mandates that any period of detention caused by delay attributable to the accused must be excluded from computation. However, delays caused by the prosecution or court cannot be counted against the accused.
Yes. The Delhi High Court held that where co-accused with similar or more serious roles have been granted bail, denial of bail to another accused on the same facts violates the principle of equality and is impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.