The Rajasthan High Court has affirmed that industrial adjudication cannot permit one-sided legal advantage. When a workman is effectively represented by a qualified advocate masquerading as a trade union office bearer, denying the employer similar representation violates the foundational principles of fairness and equality.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS), a statutory body established under the All India Institutes of Medical Sciences Act, 1956, terminated the services of the respondent, Hansraj Sharma, a Nursing Officer, vide order dated 23.03.2023 following disciplinary proceedings. The respondent challenged the termination before the Industrial Disputes Tribunal and Labour Court, Jodhpur, under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Key Facts
- The respondent filed an application under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, objecting to AIIMS being represented by its advocate, Mr. K.S. Yadav.
- The respondent was represented by Shri Bhagirath Chandora, an enrolled advocate, who appeared as an office bearer of a registered trade union.
- The Tribunal, by order dated 16.05.2024, allowed the respondent’s objection and prohibited AIIMS from being represented by legal counsel.
- AIIMS contended that Bhagirath Chandora, though formally appearing as a union office bearer, was in substance providing legal representation as a practicing advocate.
- AIIMS argued that the Tribunal’s refusal to permit its legal representation created a gross imbalance in adversarial proceedings.
Procedural History
- 23.03.2023: Termination order issued against respondent by AIIMS.
- Before 16.05.2024: Proceedings initiated under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- 16.05.2024: Tribunal passed impugned order restraining AIIMS from legal representation.
- 07.04.2026: Writ petition filed before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur.
- 01.04.2026: Arguments concluded.
- 07.04.2026: Judgment pronounced.
Relief Sought
AIIMS sought quashing of the Tribunal’s order dated 16.05.2024 and permission to be represented by its advocate, Mr. K.S. Yadav, or any other counsel of its choice, before the Tribunal.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 permits a Tribunal to deny legal representation to an employer when the opposing workman is effectively represented by a qualified advocate, even if formally appearing as a trade union office bearer.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
AIIMS contended that Section 36(4) does not impose an absolute bar but allows legal representation with the Tribunal’s leave and the consent of the other party. The Tribunal’s refusal was arbitrary and violated principles of natural justice. The respondent’s representative, Bhagirath Chandora, was an enrolled advocate providing legal services, making the denial of similar representation to AIIMS discriminatory and violative of Article 14. Reliance was placed on T.K. Varghese v. Nichimen Corporation and G.M, IB Valley Area v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal.
For the Respondent
The respondent argued that Section 36(4) strictly prohibits legal representation unless consent and leave are obtained. He claimed Bhagirath Chandora was appearing solely as a trade union office bearer, not as a legal practitioner, and thus the restriction applied. He relied on Thyssen Krupp Industries v. Suresh Maruti Chougule, Paradip Port Trust v. Their Workmen, and Ambuja Cements v. Hema Ram to support the Tribunal’s mechanical application of the statutory bar.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a detailed textual and purposive interpretation of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It observed that while the provision restricts legal representation in industrial proceedings, it does not create an absolute prohibition. Subsection (4) explicitly permits representation by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other party and the leave of the Tribunal, indicating legislative intent to allow discretion, not rigidity.
"The statutory restriction under Section 36 of the Act of 1947 cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to permit one party to enjoy the benefit of legal assistance while denying the same to the other, particularly when such objection emanates from a party who is itself in breach of the said norm."
The Court found that the respondent’s representative, Bhagirath Chandora, was not merely acting as a union office bearer but was rendering legal services in his professional capacity as an advocate. This rendered the Tribunal’s refusal to permit AIIMS legal representation fundamentally unequal. The Court emphasized that industrial adjudication, though informal, must not become a forum where one party enjoys legal expertise while the other is handicapped.
The Court distinguished the judgments relied upon by the respondent. In Thyssen Krupp and Paradip Port Trust, the issue was whether legal representation should be permitted at all. In contrast, the present case involved a situation where legal representation was already being availed by one party. The Court held that precedents are binding only when facts are substantially similar, and here, the factual matrix was materially different.
The Court also cited T.K. Varghese and G.M, IB Valley Area to affirm that discretion under Section 36(4) must be exercised to ensure parity. The Madras High Court’s observation in Registrar, Anna University was adopted: denying legal representation to the employer when the workman is effectively represented by an advocate violates Article 14.
The Tribunal’s order was found to be a mechanical application of the law, devoid of judicial reasoning, and therefore perverse.
The Verdict
The writ petition was allowed. The Tribunal’s order dated 16.05.2024 was quashed and set aside. AIIMS is permitted to be represented by its advocate, Mr. K.S. Yadav, or any other counsel of its choice before the Tribunal. The Tribunal is directed to proceed expeditiously with the pending proceedings in accordance with law.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Legal Representation Must Be Equitable
- Practitioners must challenge any Tribunal order that permits one party to use an advocate under the guise of a union office bearer while denying the same to the opposing party.
- The burden shifts to the objecting party to prove that the representative is not providing legal services, not merely asserting formal compliance.
Discretion Under Section 36(4) Is Judicial, Not Mechanical
- Tribunals must record reasons for granting or denying legal representation.
- Denial without considering parity, especially when the other side is represented by a qualified advocate, invites writ intervention.
Article 14 Overrides Procedural Formalities
- When a statutory restriction leads to manifest inequality, it becomes unconstitutional.
- Courts will not uphold procedural bars that result in substantive injustice, particularly in quasi-judicial forums.
