Section 304 Part II IPC | Knowledge of Likely Death Must Be Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt : Allahabad HC Acquits Accused After 41-Year Delay

The Allahabad High Court recently overturned a 1985 conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, emphasizing that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge that their act was likely to cause death. The judgment underscores the critical distinction between mere negligence and culpable homicide, offering significant guidance on the evidentiary standards required for convictions under this provision.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The case stems from an altercation on 11.12.1982 in village Dhamkan, P.S. Babina, District Jhansi, between the deceased Kali Charan and the accused appellants - Veer Singh, Baan Singh, Balak Ram, Bagh Raj Singh, and Rakesh. The dispute escalated into a physical confrontation, resulting in the death of Kali Charan on 13.12.1982 due to head injuries sustained during the incident.

Key Facts

• Morning Incident (11.12.1982, ~6 a.m.): An altercation occurred between Smt. Lali (wife of Salig Ram) and the accused. Kali Charan intervened and was assaulted by Veer Singh, Baan Singh, Balak Ram, and Bagh Raj Singh with fists, kicks, and sticks.
• First Report (11.12.1982, 10.30 a.m.): Prem Narain (PW-4), brother of Kali Charan, lodged a non-cognizable report under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC at P.S. Babina.
• Afternoon Incident (11.12.1982, ~1 p.m.): While returning from the police station, Prem Narain and Kali Charan passed the accused’s house. The accused abused them for lodging the report and assaulted Kali Charan with sticks. Rakesh threw stones from the roof, one of which struck Kali Charan on the head, causing him to fall. Smt. Wati (PW-5), wife of Prem Narain, was also injured by stones.
• Second Report (11.12.1982, 3.15 p.m.): Prem Narain lodged a second non-cognizable report under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC.
• Medical Examination (11.12.1982, 2.15-2.45 p.m.): Dr. Naresh Chand Dube (PW-1) examined Kali Charan and Smt. Wati at P.H.C. Babina. Kali Charan was referred to District Hospital, Jhansi, for X-ray examination of his skull and nose.
• Death of Kali Charan (13.12.1982): Kali Charan succumbed to his injuries at the District Hospital, Jhansi.
• Postmortem Examination (14.12.1982, 5.20 p.m.): Dr. S.C. Shrivastava (PW-7) conducted the postmortem and concluded that death was caused by haemorrhage and shock due to injury to the brain. The postmortem report (Ex-Ka-16) detailed multiple injuries, including a fracture of the skull bone.

Procedural History

• 11.12.1982: First non-cognizable report (Ex-Ka-4) lodged at P.S. Babina.
• 11.12.1982: Second non-cognizable report (Ex-Ka-5) lodged at P.S. Babina.
• 18.12.1982: Case converted to Section 304 IPC, and a crime was registered.
• 30.01.1983: Charge-sheet submitted against the accused.
• Trial Proceedings: The case was committed to the Court of Session, where charges under Section 304/34 IPC and Section 323/34 IPC were framed. The accused denied the charges and claimed trial.
• 25.03.1985: Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Jhansi, convicted the appellants under Sections 304(II)/34 IPC and 323/34 IPC, sentencing them to 7 years R.I. and 6 months R.I. respectively, to run concurrently.
• 1985: Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 1985 filed before the Allahabad High Court.
• 13.07.2026: High Court delivered the judgment, allowing the appeal and acquitting the appellant.

Relief Sought

The appellants sought acquittal on the grounds that:

1. The prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The medical evidence was inconsistent with the prosecution’s version.
3. No specific role was attributed to the appellant Rakesh in causing the fatal injury.
4. The essential ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC were not proven.

The Legal Issue

The central legal question was whether the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant Rakesh possessed the requisite knowledge under Section 304 Part II IPC that his act of throwing stones was likely to cause death. Additionally, the Court examined whether the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 IPC was applicable in the absence of a pre-arranged plan or specific role attribution.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant

1. Failure to Establish Guilt: The prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Non-Examination of Key Witnesses: Two material witnesses, Ghanshyam and Komal, named in the F.I.R. as eyewitnesses, were not examined. Their non-examination, without plausible explanation, cast doubt on the prosecution’s case.
3. Absence of Motive: No motive was established for the appellant to commit the offence.
4. Lack of Independent Witnesses: Despite the occurrence taking place in a populated area, no independent witnesses were examined, raising suspicions of withheld evidence.
5. Inconsistency in Medical Evidence: The nature and extent of injuries were inconsistent with the prosecution’s version of events.
6. Failure to Prove Knowledge: The prosecution did not establish that the appellant had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, a sine qua non for Section 304 Part II IPC.

For the Respondent/State

1. Motive Disclosed: Motive was evident from the second F.I.R. (Ex-Ka-5), which recorded that the accused assaulted the complainant party for lodging a police report.
2. Non-Cognizable Reports: Both F.I.R.s were non-cognizable reports and were rightly proved through the Non-Cognizable Register by PW-2.
3. Explanation for Non-Examination of Witnesses: PW-6 Jash Rath deposed that Ghanshyam and Komal were won over or frightened by the accused and refused to testify.
4. Reliability of Eye-Witnesses: The testimony of related witnesses, including the injured witness Smt. Wati, was consistent and corroborated by medical evidence. Their evidence could not be discarded merely on the ground of relationship.

The Court's Analysis

The Court conducted a meticulous examination of the evidence and legal principles governing Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 34 IPC:

1. Section 304 Part II IPC:

   "Section 304: Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death."

   The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredient of knowledge under Section 304 Part II IPC. Mere throwing of stones during a quarrel did not irresistibly infer that the appellant had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death.

2. Doctrine of Common Intention (Section 34 IPC): The Court observed that the occurrence was sudden and lacked evidence of a pre-arranged plan or meeting of minds among the accused. It was difficult to ascertain which stone caused the fatal injury, and no specific role was attributed to the appellant Rakesh. Thus, Section 34 IPC was inapplicable.

3. Non-Examination of Material Witnesses: The prosecution’s failure to examine Ghanshyam and Komal, despite naming them as eyewitnesses in the F.I.R., created a material infirmity in the case. Their non-examination, without plausible explanation, cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s version.

4. Precedents Cited: The Court relied on Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192, which held that if the genesis and manner of the incident are doubtful, the accused cannot be convicted. It also cited Natthu v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 3547, emphasizing that if two views are possible, the one favorable to the accused must be adopted.

5. Evidentiary Standards: The Court noted inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence, including:

   • Undue delay in lodging the F.I.R.
   • Infirmities in the statements of alleged eyewitnesses.
   • Inconsistency between oral evidence and medical evidence.
   • Vague version regarding motive.

   These factors raised doubts about whether the accused were responsible for the death.

The Verdict

The Allahabad High Court allowed the criminal appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 25.03.1985 passed by the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Jhansi. The appellant Rakesh was acquitted of all charges and directed to be set free forthwith, unless wanted in any other case.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Knowledge Under Section 304 Part II IPC Must Be Proved Beyond Doubt

• The judgment reaffirms that Section 304 Part II IPC requires the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge that their act was likely to cause death.
• Mere participation in a quarrel or throwing objects during an altercation is insufficient to infer such knowledge. The prosecution must adduce specific evidence linking the accused’s act to the fatal injury with the requisite knowledge.

Non-Examination of Material Witnesses Can Be Fatal

• The non-examination of material witnesses, especially those named in the F.I.R., can seriously dent the prosecution’s case.
• Courts may draw an adverse inference if the prosecution fails to provide a plausible explanation for their non-examination, particularly when they are the best available witnesses to unfold the true genesis of the incident.

Common Intention Requires Specific Evidence

• Section 34 IPC cannot be invoked in the absence of evidence showing a pre-arranged plan or meeting of minds among the accused.
• The prosecution must attribute a specific role to each accused in causing the fatal injury. Vague or general allegations are insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 34 IPC.

Benefit of Doubt Favors the Accused

• In cases where the evidence is neither credible nor consistent, courts are inclined to grant the benefit of doubt to the accused.
• The judgment underscores the principle that if two views are possible - one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence - the view favorable to the accused must prevail.