The Delhi High Court allowed review petitions challenging an interlocutory condition that denied statutory interest on enhanced compensation in land acquisition proceedings due to delay in filing amendment applications. Holding that interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 runs from the date of dispossession or award and cannot be withheld on account of such delay, the Court relied on Supreme Court precedents in Ratti Ram v. Union of India and Koli Nanji Bhuta v. State of Gujarat. The decision clarifies the scope of review jurisdiction when new binding precedents emerge after an interlocutory order.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, M/S SYLVANIA & LAXMAN LTD., acquired land under proceedings arising from LA.APP. Nos. 450/2009 and 515/2009. After the original appeals were allowed, the appellant sought amendment of its compensation claim under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The single judge allowed the amendment but imposed a condition denying statutory interest on the enhanced amount for the period between the filing of the appeals and the filing of the amendment applications.
Key Facts
- The underlying land acquisition appeals (LA.APP. 450/2009 and 515/2009) were filed in 2009.
- The Coordinate Bench of this Court delivered judgments on 29 October 2024 in L.A. Appeal Nos. 253/2016 and 255/2016 (M/s Anant Raj Projects Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr.).
- Approximately eleven months thereafter, the appellant filed amendment applications vide C.M. APPL. Nos. 10816/2025 and 10833/2025.
- On 10 April 2026, the single judge passed the Impugned Order, allowing the amendment applications but stipulating that the appellant would not be entitled to interest on the enhanced compensation for the period of delay attributable to the filing of the amendment applications (paragraph 41).
- The Impugned Order also directed that the appellant could seek amendment of the claim to claim just compensation.
- The review petitions (REVIEW PET. 239/2026 and REVIEW PET. 236/2026) were filed thereafter, challenging the condition on interest.
Procedural History
- 29 October 2024: Judgments of the Coordinate Bench (L.A. Appeal Nos. 253/2016 and 255/2016) delivered.
- Circa September 2025 (approx eleven months later): Amendment applications filed (C.M. APPL. Nos. 10816/2025 and 10833/2025).
- 10 April 2026: Impugned Order passed (single judge) allowing amendment but denying interest on enhanced compensation for the delay period.
- 21 August 2026: Matter reserved.
- 12 October 2026: Date of judgment on the review petitions.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought review of the Impugned Order to have the condition denying interest on the enhanced compensation removed, and to be declared entitled to statutory interest on any enhanced compensation awarded, in accordance with law.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the condition imposed in the Impugned Order, denying statutory interest on the enhanced compensation for the period of delay in filing amendment applications under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC, is sustainable in light of the Supreme Court’s binding decisions in Ratti Ram v. Union of India & Anr. (2016) 11 SCC 110 and Koli Nanji Bhuta v. State of Gujarat (2005) 4 SCC 518, which hold that interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 runs from the date of dispossession or award and cannot be withheld due to delay in seeking amendment or filing of appeals.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant/Petitioner
The appellant contended that the review was maintainable because the Impugned Order proceeded without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ratti Ram and Koli Nanji Bhuta, which constituted new and important matter not previously before the Court. It argued that interest on compensation is a statutory incident under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the only reference point is the date of dispossession, as held in Ratti Ram. Reliance was placed on Koli Nanji Bhuta to assert that interest runs from the date of award till realisation, and that delay in filing appeals or amendment applications does not defeat such entitlement. The appellant further submitted that the condition amounted to an error apparent on the face of the record, as it contradicted binding precedent, and thus warranted review under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the CPC.
For the Respondent/State
The respondent opposed the review petitions, raising a preliminary objection to maintainability. It submitted that the petitions sought a mere reconsideration of the merits of the Impugned Order, which is not permissible under the limited scope of review jurisdiction, and relied on Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, to argue that review is not an appeal in disguise and requires either new important matter or an error apparent on the face of the record. The respondent contended that the condition denying interest was a deliberate exercise of judicial discretion to balance the equities between the parties, considering the delay in seeking amendment, and was based on applicable legal principles then prevailing. It argued that no error apparent on the face of the record existed, and that the petitions did not disclose any new evidence or circumstance that was not known at the time of the Impugned Order.
The Court's Analysis
The Court first examined the scope of its review power under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the CPC, noting that review is not an appeal in disguise and can be exercised only upon discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, was not known to the petitioner, or where there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The Court observed that the principles governing review were summarised in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, on which the respondent itself relied.
The Court then turned to the authorities relied upon by the appellant. It noted that the decisions in Ratti Ram v. Union of India & Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 110 and Koli Nanji Bhuta v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 4 SCC 518 were neither produced before the Court nor discussed when the amendment applications were heard and the Impugned Order passed. These decisions have been brought to the notice of the Court for the first time in the present review petitions.
Quoting from Ratti Ram, the Court highlighted the observation that “There is no exclusion of any period contemplated on whatever account under Section 28 of the Act. The only reference is to the date of dispossession. Liability to pay interest starts to run from that date.” The Court further quoted Koli Nanji Bhuta, where the Supreme Court held that interest on enhanced compensation is payable from the date of the award till realisation, and declined to deny such interest on the ground that the appeal itself was filed belatedly and the amendment application later.
The Court reasoned that the principle laid down in these decisions applies with greater force to the present case, where the appeals were filed within time and the only delay relates to the timing of the amendment applications. If statutory interest could not be withheld where the appeal itself was belated, there is no occasion to withhold it where the appeals were instituted in time and the only lapse concerns the amendment applications.
The Court concluded that the condition in paragraph 41 of the Impugned Order, denying interest on the enhanced compensation for the period of delay, is not sustainable in light of the binding Supreme Court precedents. Since these decisions constitute new important matter not previously before the Court, the review petitions are allowed having substantial material pointing towards review. Accordingly, the applications under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code (C.M. APPL. Nos. 10816/2025 and 10833/2025 in L.A.APP. Nos. 450/2009 and 515/2009) stand allowed without the condition in paragraph 41 of the Order dated 10th April, 2026. The said paragraph shall now read as: “Accordingly, the present applications filed under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are allowed.” The petitioners shall be entitled to statutory interest on the enhanced compensation, if awarded, in accordance with law.
The Verdict
The appellant succeeded. The Court set aside the condition in paragraph 41 of the Impugned Order dated 10 April 2026, directing that the amendment applications (C.M. APPL. Nos. 10816/2025 and 10833/2025) stand allowed without any denial of interest on the enhanced compensation. The petitioners are entitled to statutory interest on any enhanced compensation awarded, payable from the date of dispossession or award at the rate prescribed under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (e.g., six per cent per annum as illustrated in Koli Nanji Bhuta v. State of Gujarat). The review petitions are disposed of accordingly.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Interest on Compensation Runs from Date of Dispossession or Award
- Statutory interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not subject to exclusion for any period of delay in seeking amendment or filing appeals.
- The only reference point for commencement of interest is the date of dispossession (or, as held in Koli Nanji Bhuta, the date of award).
- Practitioners must ensure that interest claims are computed from the appropriate date, irrespective of procedural delays.
Delay in Amendment Applications Does Not Defeat Statutory Interest
- Even if amendment applications are filed after a considerable interval, the entitlement to interest on enhanced compensation remains unaffected.
- The principle that interest cannot be denied due to belated appeals extends with greater force to delays limited to amendment applications.
- Courts exercising discretion under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC must not impose conditions that contradict the statutory interest regime.
Review Jurisdiction Allows Reconsideration of Interlocutory Conditions Based on New Supreme Court Precedents
- When a binding Supreme Court decision emerges after an interlocutory order, it may constitute “new and important matter” justifying review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
- Review is permissible to correct interlocutory conditions that are inconsistent with such subsequently declared law.
- Litigants should promptly bring to the court’s attention any relevant Supreme Court judgments that were not before the court at the time of the interlocutory order.
