Case Law Analysis

Section 13-B of 1949 Rent Act Inapplicable to Tenancies After 2013 : P&H HC

The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that an ejectment petition filed under the repealed East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is not maintainable for a tenancy that commenced after the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 came into force on 30 November 2013. Consequently, an NRI landlord cannot rely on the 1949 Act to claim bona fide personal requirement and must seek relief under Section 24(3) of the 1995 Act, which applies only to tenancies predating that date.

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Sep 8, 2026, 9:38 PM(Updated: Nov 3, 2026)
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Section 13-B of 1949 Rent Act Inapplicable to Tenancies After 2013 : P&H HC

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that an ejectment petition filed under Section 13-B of the repealed East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is not maintainable where the tenancy itself came into existence in 2020, more than six years after the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 came into force. The Court clarified that the statutory exemption under Section 3(1)(c) of the 1995 Act is linked to the date of completion of construction, not the date of acquisition of land, and that the special NRI remedy under Section 24(3) of the 1995 Act is available only for premises let out on or before 30.11.2013.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioner, Manpreet Kaur (tenant), challenged the order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the Rent Controller, Jagraon in Rent Petition No.5 of 2021 titled 'Jai Singh v. Manpreet Kaur'. The respondent, Jai Singh (landlord), had instituted an ejectment petition under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 claiming bona fide personal requirement as a Non-Resident Indian permanently settled in Canada.

Key Facts

  • The respondent-landlord purchased the plot vide registered sale deed dated 24.05.2012 and thereafter raised construction thereon
  • The demised residential premises were let out to the petitioner-tenant on 17.01.2020 at a monthly rent of ₹20,000/-
  • The respondent-landlord instituted the ejectment petition on 29.04.2021 under Section 13-B of the 1949 Act
  • The Punjab Rent Act, 1995 came into force with effect from 30.11.2013, repealing the 1949 Act under Section 75(1)
  • The tenancy was created more than six years after the commencement of the 1995 Act

Procedural History

  • 19.07.2021: Rent Controller passed order (Annexure P-2) noting the 1995 Act had come into force and directed the landlord to amend the petition to conform with Section 24(3) of the 1995 Act, relying on Krishan Kumar v. Kamla Devi, 2016 (1) RCR (Rent) 525
  • Subsequent date: Landlord moved application for reconsideration instead of amending, contending the 1995 Act was inapplicable as plot was purchased in 2012 and construction raised thereafter
  • 12.08.2021: Rent Controller accepted landlord's contention, held 1995 Act inapplicable under Section 3(1), dismissed tenant's leave to contest application, and passed ejectment order
  • Present revision petition: Filed by tenant challenging the impugned order dated 12.08.2021

Relief Sought

The petitioner-tenant sought setting aside of the impugned orders dated 12.08.2021 whereby her application for leave to contest was dismissed and consequential ejectment order was passed, and a declaration that the ejectment petition under Section 13-B of the repealed 1949 Act is not maintainable.

The central questions were: (1) Whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to review its judicial order dated 19.07.2021 without statutory conferment of review power; (2) Whether mere purchase of land in 2012 establishes exemption under Section 3(1)(c) of the 1995 Act without determining the date of completion of construction; (3) Whether Section 13-B of the repealed 1949 Act can be invoked for a tenancy created in 2020; (4) Whether the savings clause in Section 75 of the 1995 Act can revive a right under the repealed enactment that had not accrued before repeal; (5) Whether an NRI landlord can invoke Section 24(3) of the 1995 Act for a tenancy created after the commencement of the 1995 Act.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant assailed the impugned order on three grounds. First, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to review or reconsider its earlier order dated 19.07.2021 which had recorded a judicial determination, relying on Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273. Second, even assuming Section 3 of the 1995 Act could exclude the premises, the Rent Controller was required to determine the date of completion of construction as per the statutory Explanation to Section 3; mere purchase of the plot in 2012 was insufficient. Third, the 1949 Act stood repealed with effect from 30.11.2013 and no fresh right could be created under the repealed enactment for a tenancy created in 2020; the savings clause in Section 75 cannot revive a right that had not accrued before repeal, citing Kesho Ram Co. v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 151 and State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh, (2011) 5 SCC 305.

For the Respondent

Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord defended the impugned order, submitting that construction was raised after purchase of the plot in 2012 and therefore the premises were exempt from the operation of the 1995 Act. It was further contended that the respondent being an NRI is entitled to seek possession of the premises and the impugned order does not call for interference in revisional jurisdiction.

The Court's Analysis

The Court examined the statutory scheme governing the demised premises after the coming into force of the Punjab Rent Act, 1995. Section 75(1) expressly repealed the 1949 Act while incorporating savings for rights, privileges, obligations, liabilities and proceedings already accrued or existing under the repealed enactment. Section 75(2) further provides that cases and proceedings in respect of premises, other than those owned by an NRI, let out prior to commencement of the 1995 Act would continue to be governed by the repealed Act.

The Court emphasized that Section 3(1)(c) of the 1995 Act, as substituted by Punjab Act No.33 of 2013, exempts from the Act's operation "any premises constructed on or after the commencement of this Act, for a period of fifteen years from the date of completion of construction." The Explanation to Section 3 defines "date of completion of construction" as the date of completion as intimated to the concerned authority or of assessment to property tax, whichever is earlier. The statutory provision makes it clear that the exemption is linked to the date of construction/completion of the premises and not to the date of acquisition of the land.

"The statutory provision makes it clear that the exemption under Section 3(1)(c) is linked to the date of construction/completion of the premises and not to the date of acquisition of the land."

The Court found that no categorical finding regarding the date of completion of construction had been recorded by the Rent Controller. The impugned order proceeded substantially on the premise that since the plot had been purchased in 2012 and construction had thereafter been raised, the 1995 Act was inapplicable. Such reasoning does not satisfy the statutory test contained in Section 3(1)(c).

The Court further held that the tenancy admittedly commenced only on 17.01.2020. Therefore, the premises were not "let out before the commencement" of the 1995 Act so as to fall within Section 3(1)(a). The landlord's case could at best be brought within Section 3(1)(c), but only if statutory requirements concerning construction were established.

The Court relied on its judgment in Krishan Kumar v. Kamla Devi (supra) which held that in the case of an NRI landlord, a petition instituted after 30.11.2013 was required to be considered under the 1995 Act. The position was reiterated in Sharanjeet Singh v. Harsimran Singh Manchanda, 2024(2) RCR (Rent) 347. The present case stands on even stronger footing for the tenant because the tenancy itself was created in 2020.

Section 24(3) of the 1995 Act provides a special remedy for NRI landlords in respect of premises "let out by him or her on or prior to the commencement of this Act." Since the present premises were admittedly let out on 17.01.2020, the respondent cannot invoke Section 24(3).

"The statutory language is significant. The special remedy under Section 24(3) is available in respect of premises let out on or prior to the commencement of the 1995 Act. The present premises were admittedly let out on 17.01.2020. Consequently, the respondent cannot invoke Section 24(3) in respect of the present tenancy either."

The Court held that Section 75 of the 1995 Act saves the previous operation of the repealed enactment and rights already acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder. It does not create a new right under the repealed Act after the date of repeal. In the present case, there was no pending proceeding under the 1949 Act on 30.11.2013, nor was there any tenancy in favour of the petitioner on that date. Therefore, no accrued right in favour of the respondent under Section 13-B of the 1949 Act could be saved by Section 75.

The Court also agreed with the petitioner's reliance on Patel Narshi Thakershi to the extent that the Rent Controller could not exercise a substantive power of review in the absence of statutory conferment. The order dated 19.07.2021 had already recorded a judicial determination concerning the applicability of the 1995 Act. Instead of availing an appropriate remedy against that order, the landlord sought its reconsideration before the same authority.

The Verdict

The revision petition was allowed. The impugned orders dated 12.08.2021 passed by the Rent Controller, Jagraon in Rent Petition No.5 of 2021, whereby the application filed by the petitioner seeking leave to contest was dismissed and the consequential order of ejectment was passed, are set aside. The ejectment petition filed by the respondent under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is held to be not maintainable. The respondent shall be at liberty to avail such remedy as may be available to him in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Exemption Under Section 3(1)(c) Requires Proof of Construction Completion Date

  • The statutory exemption for newly constructed premises under Section 3(1)(c) of the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 is triggered by the date of completion of construction, not the date of land acquisition
  • The Explanation to Section 3 provides the exclusive statutory method for determining this date: the date of completion as intimated to the concerned authority or of assessment to property tax, whichever is earlier
  • Practitioners must ensure categorical findings on the date of completion are recorded by the Rent Controller; mere evidence of land purchase and subsequent construction is legally insufficient

NRI Special Remedy Under Section 24(3) Is Temporally Limited

  • Section 24(3) of the 1995 Act is available only for premises let out on or prior to 30.11.2013 (the commencement date)
  • For tenancies created after commencement, NRI landlords cannot access the special expedited remedy under Section 24(3)
  • This creates a clear temporal boundary: post-2013 tenancies fall under the general provisions of the 1995 Act, not the NRI-specific provision

Savings Clauses Preserve Accrued Rights, They Do Not Create New Ones

  • Section 75 of the 1995 Act saves rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities already acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed 1949 Act
  • It does not permit the creation of fresh rights under a repealed statute for tenancies that came into existence after repeal
  • Where no proceeding was pending and no tenancy existed on the date of repeal (30.11.2013), Section 13-B of the 1949 Act cannot be invoked

Rent Controllers Lack Inherent Review Jurisdiction

  • A Rent Controller cannot exercise substantive review power over its own judicial orders absent statutory conferment
  • Once a judicial determination is recorded (as on 19.07.2021), the proper remedy lies in appeal or revision, not reconsideration before the same authority
  • Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji remains binding authority on this procedural limitation

Case Details

MANPREET KAUR vs JAI SINGH

2026:PHHC:125165
PDF
Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Date
2026-09-07
Case Number
CR/1884/2021
Bench
DEEPAK GUPTA
Counsel
Pet: Vaibhav Sehgal
Res: Amit Sharma (Kanav)

Frequently Asked Questions

Section 3(1)(c) exempts premises constructed on or after the commencement of the Act (30.11.2013) for a period of fifteen years from the date of completion of construction. The Explanation to Section 3 defines 'date of completion of construction' as the date of completion as intimated to the concerned authority or of assessment to property tax, whichever is earlier. Mere purchase of land is insufficient; the date of completion of the building must be established.
No. Section 24(3) expressly limits the special NRI remedy to premises 'let out by him or her on or prior to the commencement of this Act.' Since the commencement date is 30.11.2013, any tenancy created after that date falls outside the scope of Section 24(3), regardless of the landlord's NRI status.
No. Section 75 saves rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities already acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. It does not create new rights under the repealed Act after the date of repeal. Where no tenancy existed and no proceeding was pending on 30.11.2013, no right under Section 13-B of the 1949 Act can be saved or revived.
No. Following Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273, a Rent Controller cannot exercise a substantive power of review in the absence of statutory conferment. Once a judicial determination is recorded, the proper remedy lies in appeal or revision before a higher forum, not reconsideration before the same authority.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.