Section 111(g) Transfer of Property Act | Denial of Landlord’s Title Can Be Inferred from Conduct & Revenue Records Without Express Pleading: Bombay HC Aurangabad Bench

The Bombay High Court has clarified that a landlord may successfully seek eviction under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, by proving denial of title through conduct and documentary evidence, even when such denial is not explicitly pleaded in the plaint, provided the tenant had full opportunity to meet the case.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The dispute arose between the Nagapur Masjid Trust (plaintiff), a religious charitable trust registered in 1970, and the Late Kakasaheb Mhaske Medical Foundation (defendant), a medical and educational trust registered in 1984. The plaintiff owned land at Nagapur, Ahmednagar, bearing Survey No.144, classified as Deosthan Inam Class-III land. On 22.05.1992, the Charity Commissioner sanctioned the lease of this land to the defendant trust for 99 years. A registered lease deed was executed on 01.07.1992, permitting use of the land solely for educational and charitable purposes, with strict prohibitions against non-agricultural use, construction without permission, sub-leasing, and commercial activity.

Key Facts

• The lease deed (Exh.322) contained ten specific conditions, including: no sub-leasing, no commercial use, no construction without consent, and no transfer of interest.
• The defendant trust received Rs.50,000 as donation from the plaintiff at the time of lease execution, as directed by the Charity Commissioner.
• On 21.08.2004, the plaintiff issued a legal notice terminating the lease, alleging breaches including sub-leasing to a credit co-operative society, running a canteen and hospital, profiteering, and misuse of land.
• The defendant replied on 02.09.2004, denying all allegations and attributing the notice to ill-will following rejection of employment requests for the plaintiff’s relatives.
• The deadline for vacating expired on 30.11.2004. The plaintiff passed a resolution on 17.12.2004 to initiate litigation.
• On 27.07.2005, the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No.273/2005 seeking possession, accounts, mesne profits, and fixation of standard rent.
• The plaintiff produced documents showing that the defendant had applied to the State Government to delete the land from Deosthan Inam Class-III category, a process only an owner could initiate.
• The State Government issued an order on 04.12.2001, and the District Collector on 24.03.2006, resulting in mutation entries (No.9202) that removed the plaintiff’s name from the ownership column and recorded the defendant as the holder.
• The defendant also executed a mortgage deed (produced in evidence) over the leased property and its constructions, without the plaintiff’s consent, and presented itself as owner in applications to the Municipal Corporation.
• The 7/12 revenue extracts showed the defendant’s name in the ownership column, despite the lease deed clearly vesting ownership in the plaintiff.

Procedural History

• 01.07.1992: Registered lease deed executed between plaintiff and defendant.
• 21.08.2004: Legal notice of termination issued by plaintiff.
• 02.09.2004: Defendant’s reply denying breaches.
• 27.07.2005: Civil Suit No.273/2005 filed by plaintiff.
• 15.03.2017: Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Ahmednagar, dismissed the suit, holding no breach of lease terms and no denial of title.
• 10.10.2018: District Judge (Appellate), Ahmednagar, allowed the appeal, holding that the defendant’s conduct constituted denial of title under Section 111(g) TP Act, and decreed possession.
• 16.07.2025: Bombay High Court admitted Second Appeal on six substantial questions of law.
• 08.05.2026: Judgment delivered by the High Court.

The Parties' Positions

Appellants (Defendants): Argued that the Appellate Court erred in granting possession on the unpleaded ground of denial of title. They contended that their actions - such as mutation entries and mortgage - were administrative necessities and did not amount to claiming ownership. They relied on Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and Ram Sarup Gupta to assert that courts cannot grant relief beyond pleadings.

Respondents (Plaintiffs): Contended that the defendant’s conduct - applying for land reclassification, securing mutation entries in its own name, mortgaging the property, and presenting itself as owner to municipal authorities - clearly demonstrated denial of the plaintiff’s title. They argued that the pleadings, though not using the phrase "denial of title," sufficiently covered the issue through allegations of unauthorized land conversion and revenue record manipulation.

Relief Sought

The plaintiff sought: (1) possession of the suit property, (2) accounts of profits, (3) mesne profits, and (4) fixation of standard rent. The Appellate Court granted possession. The defendant sought reversal of the Appellate Court’s decree and restoration of the trial court’s dismissal.

The Legal Issue

The central question was whether a decree for eviction under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act can be granted on the ground of denial of title when such denial is not expressly pleaded in the plaint, but is inferred from the tenant’s conduct and documentary evidence, and the parties had full opportunity to address it during trial.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant

The appellants contended that the Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting possession based on a ground - denial of title - that was neither pleaded nor framed as an issue. They relied on Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and Ram Sarup Gupta, emphasizing that courts cannot grant relief on unpleaded grounds, even if evidence exists, because it deprives the opposing party of a fair opportunity to meet the case. They argued that the defendant’s actions - mutation entries and mortgage - were routine administrative steps permitted under the lease and did not constitute a legal denial of title. They further submitted that no notice under Section 111(g) was given specifically for denial of title, rendering the decree invalid.

For the Respondent

The respondents argued that the plaint’s allegations - that the defendant applied to change the land’s classification from Deosthan Inam Class-III (a status only an owner can seek), secured mutation entries in its name, and mortgaged the property - collectively amounted to an implicit denial of the plaintiff’s title. They cited Sushilkumar Kamalnarayan Jaiswal v. Awtarsingh Taneja and Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, asserting that when parties lead evidence on an issue without objection and the court finds it was understood by both sides, technical deficiencies in pleadings do not vitiate the decree. They emphasized that the defendant admitted the mortgage deed and did not challenge the evidence on mutation entries, indicating full awareness of the case.

The Court's Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed review of the pleadings, evidence, and binding precedents on the doctrine of pleadings and evidence. It acknowledged the general rule that courts cannot grant relief beyond the pleadings, as established in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and Ram Sarup Gupta. However, it emphasized that pleadings must be construed liberally, not pedantically, to prevent injustice on technical grounds.

"The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise."

The Court found that while the plaint did not use the phrase "denial of title," it clearly alleged that the defendant, without authority, applied to the State Government to delete the land from Deosthan Inam Class-III - a process legally permissible only by the owner. The written statement denied that the land remained Inam Class-III, thereby implicitly asserting control over the land’s classification. The subsequent conduct - mutation entries removing the plaintiff’s name, mortgage execution without consent, and municipal applications as owner - collectively formed a pattern inconsistent with a mere lessee.

The Court held that the plaintiff’s evidence on these points was not objected to by the defendant, who was cross-examined on the mortgage deed and admitted his signature. The trial court had already considered the evidence on denial of title, and the defendant had ample opportunity to rebut it. The Appellate Court’s reversal of the trial court’s finding on this point did not introduce a new issue but corrected an erroneous appreciation of existing evidence.

Regarding the notice under Section 111(g), the Court rejected the appellant’s argument that a separate notice for denial of title was required. It held that the notice dated 21.08.2004, which cited multiple breaches including unauthorized use and conversion of land, was sufficiently broad to cover forfeiture under Section 111(g)(2). The phrase "and in any of these cases" in Section 111(g) makes notice mandatory for all sub-clauses, and the notice’s language clearly expressed intent to terminate the lease due to breach, including conduct tantamount to denial of title.

"The only essential condition is to terminate / determine the lease so as to claim back possession. There is no requirement of law that the notice has to indicate the specified sub-clauses of Section 111(g)."

The Court concluded that the Appellate Court’s findings were grounded in the pleadings, supported by evidence, and did not violate the principle of fair trial.

The Verdict

The Second Appeal was dismissed. The decree of possession granted by the Appellate Court dated 10.10.2018 was upheld. The Court directed that possession of the suit property, already delivered to the plaintiffs, shall remain with them. The status quo shall be maintained for eight weeks from the date of judgment to allow for orderly transition.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Pleadings Must Be Interpreted Substantively, Not Formally

• Practitioners must now argue that allegations of unauthorized land reclassification, revenue record manipulation, or mortgage of leased property can constitute an implied denial of title under Section 111(g) TP Act, even without the exact phrase "denial of title."
• Courts will examine the cumulative effect of conduct and documentary evidence to determine whether the tenant’s actions were inconsistent with a lessee’s role.

Evidence Without Objection Can Validate Unpleaded Grounds

• If a party leads evidence on a factual issue and the opposing party cross-examines without objecting, the court may treat the matter as tried by consent.
• This applies even if no formal issue was framed, provided there is no prejudice or surprise.

Notice Under Section 111(g) Need Not Specify Sub-clauses

• A general notice of termination citing breaches of lease conditions suffices to trigger forfeiture under Section 111(g), even if the breach includes denial of title.
• The notice need not enumerate the specific sub-clause (g)(1), (g)(2), or (g)(3) under which forfeiture is sought.

Documentary Evidence Trumps Oral Denials

• Mutation entries, mortgage deeds, and government applications submitted by a tenant are powerful indicators of title denial.
• Courts will give greater weight to official records than to blanket denials in written statements.

Burden of Proof Shifts to Tenant to Justify Conduct

• Once a landlord establishes that a tenant has acted as an owner (e.g., applied for land reclassification, secured mutation), the burden shifts to the tenant to prove such actions were authorized under the lease.
• Silence or failure to challenge such documents during trial may be construed as acquiescence.