
The Chhattisgarh High Court has reaffirmed that the consent of a minor is legally irrelevant in cases of sexual offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and that school records constitute conclusive proof of age when properly authenticated. This judgment underscores the absolute protection afforded to children under the POCSO Act and reinforces the evidentiary weight of official educational documents in establishing minority.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, accused of sexually exploiting his minor sister-in-law, was convicted by the Special POCSO Court under multiple provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the POCSO Act. The prosecution alleged that the accused, residing in the same household as the victim, enticed her away from her parental home on 07.07.2021 under the false promise of marriage, took her to Punjab, and subjected her to repeated sexual intercourse over a period of nine months, resulting in pregnancy.
Key Facts
- The victim, born on 08.10.2004, was 16 years and 8 months old on 07.07.2021 and 17 years and 6 months old on 14.04.2022, the date of her recovery
- The victim’s school admission register (Ex. P/36C) recorded her date of birth as 08.10.2004, with admission to Class I on 29.06.2010
- A progress report (Ex. P/6) from the same school corroborated the date of birth
- The victim was recovered on 14.04.2022 and found to be pregnant; sonography (Ex. P/29 and Ex. P/38) confirmed gestational age consistent with the timeline of cohabitation
- Medical examination (Ex. P/17) confirmed pregnancy but found no external injuries or signs of recent sexual intercourse
- The First Information Report (Ex. P/02) was lodged by the victim’s father (PW-03) on 14.04.2022
- The accused was arrested on 14.04.2022 and remained in custody since then
- The victim’s mother (PW-02) and father (PW-03) testified that she was a minor at the time of the incident
- The victim’s elder sister (PW-04), who is married to the accused, corroborated his presence in the household and the victim’s departure
- The accused examined himself as DW-02 and one other witness (DW-01), but produced no documentary evidence to rebut the prosecution’s case
Procedural History
- 07.07.2021: Victim taken away from parental home by the accused
- 14.04.2022: FIR registered at Police Station Kedar, Sarangarh; victim recovered; accused arrested
- 18.04.2022: Victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex. P/25)
- 28.10.2023: Special POCSO Court, Sarangarh, convicted the accused under:
- Section 363 IPC (kidnapping) - 3 years rigorous imprisonment
- Section 366 IPC (inducing minor for illicit intercourse) - 5 years rigorous imprisonment
- Section 376(2)(n) IPC - 20 years rigorous imprisonment
- Section 376(2)(f) IPC - 20 years rigorous imprisonment
- Section 5(n) POCSO Act - 20 years rigorous imprisonment
- Section 5(j)(ii) POCSO Act - 20 years rigorous imprisonment
- Section 313 IPC (causing miscarriage) - acquitted due to lack of evidence
- All sentences directed to run concurrently
- 28.03.2023: Appeal filed under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. before the Chhattisgarh High Court
- 04.05.2026: Judgment delivered by the Division Bench
Relief Sought
The appellant sought acquittal on all charges, arguing that the victim was a major, the relationship was consensual, and the prosecution failed to prove age or lack of consent. He also challenged the sufficiency of school records as proof of age and the absence of medical corroboration for sexual assault.
The Legal Issue
The central questions were: (1) Whether the victim was a minor under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act on the date of the offence, and whether school records constitute conclusive proof of age; and (2) Whether the consent of a minor, even if voluntarily given, negates the offences of kidnapping, sexual assault, or aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act and IPC.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The appellant’s counsel contended that the victim was a major, citing her own testimony that she believed herself to be over 18 and her alleged employment in a company requiring adult workers. He argued that the school admission register (Ex. P/36C) was unreliable because the Head Master (PW-13) admitted he did not make the original entry and that the date of birth may have been approximated. He further submitted that the absence of injuries, birth certificate, or hospital records rendered the age determination speculative. Regarding the sexual offences, he argued that the victim had willingly left home, lived with the accused for months without resistance, and that the relationship was based on mutual affection and a promise of marriage, thereby negating the ingredients of kidnapping and rape.
For the Respondent/State
The State countered that the school admission register, maintained in the regular course of official duties, was admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and conclusive under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana. The prosecution emphasized that the victim’s testimony, corroborated by her parents and the fact of pregnancy, established the offences beyond reasonable doubt. It was argued that under the POCSO Act, the consent of a minor is legally irrelevant, and any sexual act with a person below 18 constitutes aggravated penetrative sexual assault, regardless of apparent willingness. The absence of injuries was explained as consistent with prolonged coercion and psychological control, not absence of assault.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a meticulous re-appreciation of the evidence and applied settled legal principles governing age determination and sexual offences against minors. It held that the school admission register (Ex. P/36C), duly proved by the Head Master (PW-13), was conclusive proof of the victim’s age under Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana. The Court observed:
"The highest rated option available under Rule 12(3) is the date of birth recorded in the school first attended. In the absence of any material to show fabrication or manipulation, such an entry, maintained in the ordinary course of official duties, is conclusive proof of age."
The Court rejected the defence’s contention that the victim’s subjective belief about her age or the absence of a birth certificate undermined the documentary evidence. It noted that the victim, being a minor, lacked legal understanding of the terms "major" and "minor," and her statements on this issue were not determinative.
On the issue of consent, the Court held unequivocally:
"The legislative intent behind the POCSO Act is to afford absolute protection to children from sexual exploitation. Consent, however voluntary, is legally impermissible and irrelevant when the victim is below eighteen years of age."
The Court distinguished S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras to clarify that even if the accused did not physically force the victim away, his prior inducement and prolonged retention of the minor constituted kidnapping from lawful guardianship under Section 361 IPC. The Court emphasized:
"The accused, being a brother-in-law residing in the same household, occupied a position of trust. His act of taking the minor away and keeping her in another state for months, under the guise of marriage, amounts to a gross abuse of that trust and satisfies the ingredients of kidnapping and aggravated penetrative sexual assault."
Regarding medical evidence, the Court relied on Sham Singh v. State of Haryana and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, holding that absence of injuries does not negate sexual assault, particularly in cases of prolonged cohabitation where fear or psychological control may suppress resistance. The fact of pregnancy, confirmed by sonography reports (Ex. P/29 and Ex. P/38), was held to be a powerful incriminating circumstance, unexplained by the defence.
The Court found the victim’s testimony natural, consistent, and free from material contradictions. It was corroborated by her mother, father, sister, and the documentary and medical evidence. The defence’s plea of false implication due to family dispute was dismissed as bald and unsubstantiated.
The Verdict
The appeal was dismissed. The conviction and sentence awarded by the Special POCSO Court on 28.10.2023 were affirmed. The appellant shall serve a total sentence of 20 years rigorous imprisonment, with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- under each of the POCSO and IPC provisions, all sentences to run concurrently. The appellant, who has been in custody since 14.04.2022, shall continue to serve the sentence. The Court directed the Registry to send a certified copy of the judgment to the concerned jail authorities and to transmit the original record to the trial court for necessary action. The appellant is at liberty to file a special leave petition before the Supreme Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Consent of a Minor Is Legally Meaningless
- Practitioners must argue that any sexual act with a person below 18 under the POCSO Act is automatically aggravated penetrative sexual assault, irrespective of apparent consent
- Defence arguments based on "mutual love" or "promise of marriage" are legally untenable and must be rebutted with statutory provisions and Supreme Court precedents
- Courts are bound to treat the victim’s consent as irrelevant under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act
School Records Are Conclusive Proof of Age
- School admission registers, even if not authored by the examining witness, are admissible and conclusive under Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice Rules
- The burden shifts to the defence to prove fabrication or manipulation - mere suggestion of approximation is insufficient
- In the absence of a birth certificate, hospital record, or Aadhaar, school records are the primary and preferred evidence for age determination
- Prosecution must ensure such records are properly certified and the custodian of records is examined to establish authenticity
Medical Absence of Injuries Does Not Weaken Prosecution
- Absence of physical injuries or signs of recent intercourse cannot be used to discredit allegations of sexual assault in prolonged custody cases
- Pregnancy, even without DNA confirmation, is a strong corroborative circumstance
- Courts must avoid applying standards of forensic evidence from adult rape cases to POCSO cases, where psychological coercion is common
- The Supreme Court’s directive in Sham Singh - that seeking corroboration adds insult to injury - must guide judicial approach






