Case Law Analysis

Order XII Rule 6 CPC | Admissions of Tenancy and Rent Payment Sustain Decree; Suit for Eviction Constitutes Notice to Quit : Delhi HC

The Court held that admissions of tenancy and rent payment in a written statement sustain a possession decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, removing the need for separate tenancy proof, and that an eviction suit itself is a valid notice to quit, simplifying landlord recovery.

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Sep 25, 2026, 6:20 PM(Updated: Nov 3, 2026)
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Order XII Rule 6 CPC | Admissions of Tenancy and Rent Payment Sustain Decree; Suit for Eviction Constitutes Notice to Quit : Delhi HC

The Delhi High Court dismissed a second regular appeal challenging a decree for possession, holding that admissions in the defendant's written statement regarding payment of rent and tenancy were sufficient to sustain relief under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, and that no substantial question of law arose in the appeal.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The dispute arose from a suit for possession and mesne profits filed by Manju Khanna (respondent) against M/S RO NUK INDUSTRIES LTD (appellant) concerning premises bearing No. 4405/2, Kothi No. 5, First Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi, admeasuring about 1,000 square feet. The plaintiff claimed ownership via a sale deed and alleged that the defendant had been inducted as a tenant under a lease agreement dated 29.07.1986 at a monthly rent of Rs.9,000/-.

Key Facts

  • The lease agreement dated 29.07.1986 was executed between the parties for the suit property at a monthly rent of Rs.9,000/-.
  • The plaintiff stated she had desired to recover possession since 1992 and had sent a letter dated 17.01.1992 seeking enhancement of rent, but the defendant continued to pay Rs.9,000/- per month as rent.
  • On 07.08.2003, the plaintiff served a legal notice terminating the tenancy and calling upon the defendant to hand over possession.
  • The suit, instituted as Civil Suit No. 1534/2016 (Old No. 157/2016), sought possession and damages at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per day with effect from 01.09.2003, together with interest at 18% per annum.
  • The defendant, in its written statement, admitted that it had been inducted as a tenant in the suit premises on the basis of an oral agreement with Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna, husband of the plaintiff, who represented himself as the owner and to whom the rent of Rs.9,000/- per month was regularly paid.
  • The defendant further admitted that it had been paying the monthly rent of Rs.9,000/- to the plaintiff, though asserted to be intended for the husband.
  • The defendant claimed that the parties had agreed to permanent possession and that the rent of Rs.9,000/- per month included a component towards refundable security, to be paid for 20 years as EMI towards sale consideration.
  • The plaintiff had prepared a bank draft dated 08.02.2016 for Rs.19,50,000/- drawn on HDFC Bank, intended to return the amount taken over the years for obtaining possession.
  • Issues were framed on 05.04.2004 and additional issues on 14.12.2007.
  • An application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC dated 03.05.2016 was filed by the plaintiff seeking a decree of possession on the basis of admissions.

Procedural History

  • 05.04.2004: Issues framed in the suit.
  • 14.12.2007: Additional issues framed regarding court fees, jurisdiction, and bar under Benami Transactions Act.
  • 03.05.2016: Plaintiff filed Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC seeking decree of possession on admissions.
  • 07.11.2016: Learned Civil Judge passed judgment/order upholding the decree of possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, finding the admissions in the written statement sufficient to disentitle the defendant from resisting the claim.
  • 07.11.2016: The civil judge also held that the challenge to title under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act was unavailable and that the defence of perpetual lease was barred under the Registration Act, 1908 and Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
  • 34. Aggrieved, the defendant/appellant preferred Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 48/2019) challenging the judgment on possession dated 07.11.2016.
  • 23.09.2026: The High Court pronounced judgment dismissing the second regular appeal.

Parties' Positions

Appellant (Defendant): Contended that the civil judge had erroneously treated admissions as existing when none were present, denied execution of the lease deed, denied service of the legal notice dated 07.08.2003, asserted that the suit was barred under the Benami Transactions Act, and argued that the plaintiff had concealed documents evidencing perpetual possession rights.

Respondent (Plaintiff): Maintained that the defendant's written statement contained clear admissions of tenancy and payment of rent, that the suit for eviction itself constituted notice to quit, and that the decree of possession was correctly passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

Relief Sought

The appellant sought to set aside the judgment dated 07.11.2016, to have the suit dismissed, and to recover possession of the suit premises (or alternatively, to deny the plaintiff's claim). The respondent sought upholding of the decree for possession and determination of mesne profits after evidence.

The central question was whether any substantial question of law arises in the second regular appeal, particularly regarding the sufficiency of admissions in the written statement to sustain a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and whether the suit for eviction itself constitutes a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant

The appellant argued that the civil judge had erred in finding admissions in the written statement, contending that no clear, unambiguous or specific admission regarding execution of the lease deed dated 29.07.1986 existed on record. It asserted that the defendant had never admitted execution of the lease deed with the plaintiff or her husband, and that the alleged admissions were vague and contradicted by the defence of perpetual possession. The appellant further submitted that the suit was barred under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, that the plaintiff lacked locus standi, and that the legal notice dated 07.08.2003 had not been served, a fact requiring evidence.

For the Respondent

The respondent relied on the defendant's written statement, which expressly admitted induction as a tenant on the basis of an oral agreement with Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna, husband of the plaintiff, who represented himself as the owner and to whom the rent of Rs.9,000/- per month was regularly paid. It emphasized that the defendant had admitted paying the monthly rent of Rs.9,000/- to the plaintiff, albeit asserted to be for the husband. The respondent argued that these admissions were sufficient to disentitle the defendant from resisting the claim for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, and that the institution of the suit itself amounted to a notice to quit, rendering service of the legal notice unnecessary.

The Court's Analysis

The Court examined the written statement and found that the defendant had clearly admitted its induction as a tenant in the suit premises and the regular payment of rent of Rs.9,000/- per month to the plaintiff. It held that such admissions, even if the payment was asserted to be for the husband, were sufficient to establish a landlord-tenant relationship and to disentitle the defendant from resisting the claim for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court further observed that the challenge to the plaintiff’s title under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was unavailable in view of the doctrine of estoppel against a tenant, relying on Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. v. Kavita P. Lalwani, 191 (2012) DLT 594. Regarding the defence of a perpetual lease, the Court noted that any right to continue in possession for a term exceeding one year could be created only through a registered instrument contemplated under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; since no such registered document existed, the contention was patently barred. The Court also held that the suit for eviction itself constitutes a notice to quit upon the tenant, citing M/s Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF), (2008) 2 SCC 728, and therefore the alleged non-service of the legal notice dated 07.08.2003 did not affect the validity of the termination. Finally, the Court considered whether any substantial question of law arose in the second regular appeal and concluded that the impugned judgment correctly applied the law to the admissions on record, leaving no room for a substantial question of law.

"There is no substantial question of law that has arisen, in the present Appeal."

The Verdict

Upholding the decree for possession dated 07.11.2016, the Court dismissed the second regular appeal and affirmed that the defendant’s admissions of tenancy and rent payment sustained the possession decree. The Court directed that the claim for mesne profits be determined after recording of evidence, and held that no substantial question of law arose in the appeal.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Admissions Under Order XII Rule 6 CPC

Practitioners must ensure that any admission of tenancy and rent payment in the written statement is clear and unambiguous, as such admissions can sustain a decree for possession without the need for further evidence. Vague or contradictory statements may be insufficient to disentitle a defendant from resisting a claim.

Notice to Quit in Eviction Suits

The institution of a suit for eviction itself amounts to a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, rendering separate service of a legal notice unnecessary for the purpose of terminating a tenancy. This principle simplifies eviction proceedings where the tenant’s tenancy is admitted.

Bar on Perpetual Lease Claims

Claims of permanent or perpetual possession based on oral agreements are unenforceable in the absence of a registered instrument under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Parties seeking to secure long-term possession must execute a registered lease or sale deed to avoid the defence being struck down as barred.

Case Details

M/S RONUK INDUSTRIES LTD vs MANJU KHANNA

2026:DHC:8194
PDF
Court
Delhi High Court
Date
2026-09-23
Case Number
RSA-48/2019
Bench
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
Counsel
Pet: Rajesh Baweja, Anjali Gupta, Poonam Kandari
Res: Gaurav Chauhan

Frequently Asked Questions

Under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, a decree may be passed on admissions if the admissions are clear, unambiguous and sufficient to disentitle the opposing party from resisting the claim, as held in the judgment.
Section 116 estops a tenant from denying the landlord’s title at the time of the commencement of the tenancy; the judgment held that such challenge is unavailable in view of estoppel against a tenant.
No. The judgment clarified that any right to continue in possession for a term exceeding one year must be created through a registered instrument under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; an oral agreement for perpetual lease is therefore barred.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.