The Calcutta High Court has reaffirmed that a conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, may rest solely on the credible testimony of the minor victim, even in the absence of medical or eyewitness corroboration. This judgment reinforces the legal recognition of the psychological trauma endured by child survivors and the necessity of judicial sensitivity in evaluating their evidence.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Dinesh Das, was convicted under Section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act for the penetrative sexual assault of a nine-year-old girl. The incident occurred on 9 August 2016, when the victim, while playing near her home, was lured away by the appellant - who was the maternal uncle of her friend - and assaulted in a ditch beside a railway gate. She was found unconscious with bleeding injuries to her private parts.
Procedural History
- 9 August 2016: Victim found unconscious; father lodged FIR at Dhantala Police Station.
- 11 August 2016: Statement of victim recorded by lady police officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
- 16 August 2016: Statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. recorded before Magistrate.
- January 2017: Charges framed by Sessions Court.
- 16 February 2017: Trial Court convicted appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
- 24 February 2026: Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought setting aside of the conviction and sentence, arguing material contradictions in witness statements, failure of the victim to name him during medical examinations, and excessive punishment. In the alternative, he sought reduction of sentence.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act can be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a minor victim, particularly when no medical evidence directly links the accused to the assault and the victim’s initial disclosures were not recorded by medical personnel.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The appellant’s counsel contended that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt due to:
- The victim’s failure to name the appellant during medical examinations at three hospitals.
- Contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the sequence of events.
- The absence of any independent eyewitness or forensic evidence.
- Reliance on the victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as the sole direct evidence, which was allegedly vulnerable to suggestion.
For the Respondent/State
The State argued that:
- The victim’s testimony was consistent across her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and her deposition in court.
- The medical evidence confirmed injuries consistent with penetrative sexual assault.
- The victim’s age and trauma rendered her unable to articulate details to medical staff immediately after the incident.
- The appellant’s silence during examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. further indicated guilt.
- The testimony of family members and villagers corroborated the victim’s account of being taken away and found injured.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the evidentiary value of the victim’s testimony in light of established jurisprudence under the POCSO Act. It emphasized that the law does not require corroboration of a child victim’s testimony, as such a requirement would defeat the purpose of the statute, which is designed to protect vulnerable witnesses.
"It is unlikely that the victim was at all asked by the medical officer as to who had exactly assaulted her. There is no evidence to this effect. There is no cross-examination by the defence in this regard."
The Court noted that the victim, though only nine years old, provided a clear, consistent, and detailed account of the assault, which was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and later affirmed in court. Her testimony was corroborated by the medical reports confirming injuries consistent with penetrative sexual assault, and by the testimonies of her parents and villagers who found her injured near the railway gate.
The Court further held that the appellant’s response under Section 313 Cr.P.C. - "I do not have anything to say" - when confronted with incriminating circumstances, could be viewed as an admission, though it was not the basis of conviction. The Trial Court’s conclusion was grounded in the cumulative weight of evidence, not on silence alone.
The Court also rejected the argument that minor procedural lapses by the investigating officer - such as failure to record the victim’s disclosure during medical examination - could vitiate the prosecution’s case. It cited State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar and State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal to affirm that technical irregularities do not override substantive proof.
The Verdict
The appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the conviction and life sentence, holding that the prosecution had proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The sole testimony of the minor victim, supported by medical and circumstantial evidence, was sufficient for conviction under the POCSO Act. The sentence was deemed proportionate to the gravity of the crime.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Victim Testimony Is Sufficient Without Medical Corroboration
- Practitioners must not assume that absence of medical evidence or delayed disclosure invalidates a POCSO case.
- Courts are bound to evaluate the credibility of child victims through the lens of trauma, not adult standards of recall.
- Defence arguments based on lack of medical corroboration are legally untenable under settled precedent.
Silence Under Section 313 Cr.P.C. May Be Adverse But Not Conclusive
- While silence during Section 313 examination may be considered, it cannot be the sole basis for conviction.
- Prosecution must still establish guilt through independent evidence.
- Defence counsel should focus on challenging the consistency and voluntariness of the victim’s statements, not merely the absence of physical evidence.
Age and Trauma Justify Delayed or Incomplete Disclosure
- Prosecutors should proactively explain to courts why a child may not name the accused during medical examinations.
- Medical officers should be questioned on whether they asked the child to identify the perpetrator - failure to do so does not imply fabrication.
- Courts must reject arguments that treat child victims as unreliable witnesses due to age or emotional shock.
