
The High Court of Bombay at Goa has reaffirmed that courts have no discretion to refuse a consent decree when parties file lawful compromise terms under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This judgment clarifies a long-standing procedural ambiguity and reinforces the mandatory nature of judicial compliance with statutory compromise provisions.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, ASVAS HOMES LLP, and the respondents, members of the De Souza family, were parties to a civil suit concerning property rights and contractual obligations. The parties reached a mutual agreement on 07.11.2025, reducing their dispute to written Consent Terms, which were filed before the Civil Judge Senior Division 'A' Court at Mapusa.
Procedural History
- 07.11.2025: Parties filed signed Consent Terms in Regular Civil Suit No. 25/2025/A.
- 05.11.2025: Trial Court, despite acknowledging the Consent Terms, refused to pass a decree and directed the plaintiff to lead evidence.
- 18.01.2026: Petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 18 of 2026 before the Bombay High Court at Goa, challenging the Trial Court’s refusal.
- 12.02.2026: Matter heard and disposed of orally by Justice Valmiki Menezes.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of the impugned order and a direction to the Trial Court to pass a decree in accordance with the Consent Terms, invoking Order 23 Rule 3 CPC.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a trial court to refuse to pass a decree when parties have filed lawful, mutually agreed Consent Terms, and whether the court retains discretion to insist on evidence despite such compromise.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner relied on M/s Silver Screen Enterprises v. Devki Nandan Nagpal and Luis Nemesio Menezes v. Agapito Salvador Bento Menezes to argue that Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is mandatory, not directory. The Consent Terms were duly signed, lawful, and unchallenged in validity. The Trial Court’s refusal to pass a decree violated the statutory mandate and undermined the purpose of compromise in civil litigation.
For the Respondent
The respondents, through counsel, waived formal service and conceded that they had no objection to the passing of a decree in terms of the Consent Terms. No substantive counter-argument was advanced, effectively conceding the petitioner’s position.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the language and legislative intent behind Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, emphasizing its mandatory character. The provision states that where a suit is settled by lawful agreement, the court "shall" record the compromise and pass a decree. The word "shall" leaves no room for judicial discretion.
"This is a mandatory provision. It is somewhat surprising that the High Court should have itself helpless under the circumstances of the case to do justice between the parties."
The Court cited M/s Silver Screen Enterprises to underscore that once the validity of the compromise is not disputed, the court’s duty is absolute. The Trial Court’s reliance on procedural skepticism - requiring evidence despite unchallenged consent - was found to be legally untenable.
The Court also referenced its own earlier decision in Luis Nemesio Menezes, which held that courts cannot demand title documents or impose additional conditions beyond the terms of the compromise. The Consent Terms here were not contrary to law, and no third-party rights were implicated.
The Court rejected the notion that courts may treat consent as provisional or require proof of underlying claims. The purpose of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to promote finality, reduce litigation burden, and respect party autonomy.
The Verdict
The petitioner succeeded. The Court held that Order 23 Rule 3 CPC imposes a mandatory duty on courts to pass a decree when lawful Consent Terms are filed and not challenged. The impugned order was quashed, and the Trial Court was directed to pass a decree within one week.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Consent Decrees Are Not Discretionary
- Practitioners must immediately move for decree under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC upon filing valid Consent Terms.
- Trial courts cannot insist on evidence, demand additional documentation, or delay decreeing on grounds of "suspicion" or "prudence."
- Any refusal to pass a decree is appealable as a clear violation of statutory mandate.
Validity of Consent Terms Is Presumed
- The burden shifts to the objecting party to prove illegality, fraud, or coercion in the compromise.
- Courts must not conduct a mini-trial on the merits of the underlying dispute when assessing the validity of consent terms.
- Absent a challenge on grounds of illegality, the terms must be accepted as binding.
Procedural Efficiency Is Mandated
- Courts must dispose of consent decree applications expeditiously.
- Delay tactics, such as adjourning evidence hearings after consent is filed, are now legally impermissible.
- Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is available to enforce compliance with Order 23 Rule 3 CPC.






