The Bombay High Court has clarified that the authority to impose major penalties, including termination of service, under the Maharashtra Private Security Guards Scheme is exclusively vested in the Chairman and cannot be delegated to subordinate officers. This ruling reinforces the principle of statutory compliance in administrative action and provides immediate relief to security guards facing abrupt termination.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, private security guards employed by licensed agencies in Maharashtra, received termination notices dated 27 February 2026 issued by Respondent No.4-Inspector. The notices invoked Clause 32(4)(d) of The Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 2002, which permits termination after one month’s notice. The petitioners challenged the legality of the order on the ground that only the Chairman of the Regulatory Board, and not an Inspector, possesses the statutory authority to impose such a penalty.
Key Facts
- The petitioners were employed under licensed private security agencies regulated under The Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1981
- The Scheme, framed under Section 10 of the 1981 Act, contains detailed provisions for discipline and penalties under Clause 32
- Clause 32(4) explicitly states: "The Chairman may, after giving the security guard an opportunity of being heard, impose any of the following penalties... (d) termination of service"
- The impugned order dated 27.02.2026 was issued by Respondent No.4-Inspector, who is not the Chairman
- The notice provided a one-month period for termination, with the deadline set for 27.03.2026
- On 24.03.2026, petitioners served a legal notice on Respondent No.2-Board, which was acknowledged and marked 'X' for identification
- The termination was scheduled to take effect the day after the hearing
Procedural History
- 27.02.2026: Inspector issued termination order under Clause 32(4)(d)
- 24.03.2026: Petitioners served legal notice on the Board; acknowledgment received
- 26.03.2026: Writ Petitions No. 3881 of 2026 and No. 3821 of 2026 (NOB) filed before Bombay High Court seeking stay of termination
- 26.03.2026: Urgent hearing conducted by Division Bench
- 26.03.2026: Court granted ad interim relief pending final hearing
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought immediate stay of the termination order dated 27.02.2026, declaration that the order is ultra vires Clause 32(4) of the Scheme, and directions to reinstate services pending final adjudication.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Clause 32(4) of the Maharashtra Private Security Guards Scheme, 2002 permits an Inspector to impose the penalty of termination, or whether this power is exclusively reserved for the Chairman as expressly stated in the text.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that Clause 32(4) uses the word "shall" and explicitly vests the power to impose termination in the "Chairman". The use of specific language excludes delegation to subordinate officers. Reliance was placed on State of U.P. v. Mohd. Noor to emphasize that statutory powers cannot be exercised by unauthorized persons. The urgency was underscored by the imminent termination date.
For the Respondent
The State, through its Panel Counsel, did not contest the jurisdictional defect. The counsel acknowledged that the order was issued by an officer not designated under Clause 32(4) and conceded that the Chairman alone possesses the authority. No substantive defense of the order was advanced.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the plain language of Clause 32(4), which states: "The Chairman may, after giving the security guard an opportunity of being heard, impose any of the following penalties..." The phrase "The Chairman may" is unambiguous and leaves no room for interpretation or delegation. The Court noted that the Scheme, being a statutory instrument framed under a regulatory Act, must be strictly construed.
"The power to impose a major penalty such as termination of service is not a routine administrative function but a statutory power conferred exclusively on the Chairman. To permit an Inspector to exercise this power would be to subvert the legislative intent behind the Scheme."
The Court further observed that the Respondents had not cited any provision authorizing delegation of this power, nor had they shown that the Chairman had delegated authority under any lawful mechanism. The absence of such delegation rendered the order void ab initio.
The Court also considered the urgency of the matter, noting that the termination was scheduled to take effect within 24 hours of the hearing. The petitioners had no meaningful recourse if the order were implemented before judicial review.
The Verdict
The petitioners succeeded. The Court set aside the termination order dated 27.02.2026 and directed the Respondents not to give effect to it until the next hearing. The Court ordered that the petitioners remain in service pending final disposal of the writ petitions. The matter was listed for further hearing on 10 April 2026.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Statutory Powers Cannot Be Delegated Without Express Authority
- Practitioners must verify the exact statutory provision conferring penalty powers before challenging administrative orders
- Any order issued by an officer not expressly named in the statute is void, regardless of the officer’s rank or seniority
- In service matters governed by schemes, literal compliance with the text is mandatory
Urgent Relief Is Available for Imminent Termination
- Courts will grant ad interim stays where termination is imminent and the legal defect is apparent on the face of the order
- A notice of termination coupled with a clear statutory violation constitutes sufficient grounds for urgent relief
- Affidavits of service and acknowledgment letters can expedite interim relief
Delegation Requires Explicit Authorization
- Delegation of statutory powers is permissible only if the parent statute or scheme expressly permits it
- General administrative delegation rules do not override specific statutory language
- Where a statute names a specific authority (e.g., "Chairman"), no inference of delegation to subordinates is permissible
