
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal has clarified that a bankrupt individual cannot claim ongoing business necessity for international travel based on a contractual obligation that has fully expired, even if the contract contained a "parallel run" clause. The judgment underscores that procedural rigidity must yield to substantive justice only when the underlying commercial basis remains viable.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Sunil Surendrabhai Kakkad, was declared bankrupt by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Ahmedabad, on 12.09.2025, following admission of personal insolvency proceedings on 29.04.2024. The Adjudicating Authority imposed a blanket restriction on his travel abroad. The appellant sought permission to travel to the U.A.E. for 15 days each month between October 2025 and March 2026 to fulfill a business contract with Hypermax General Trading Company LLC.
Key Facts
- The appellant was granted interim travel permission by the Gujarat High Court between March 2025 and August 2025.
- On 10.02.2025, Hypermax issued a Purchase Order (Annexure E) for ERP and IT system implementation, with a stated duration of "13 months plus six months."
- The Purchase Order specified two distinct deliverables:
- Item 1: Implementation of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) from 11.02.2025 to 10.03.2026 (13 months)
- Item 2: Parallel run for six months, with monthly payment of 2,000 AED
- Total contract value: 51,000 AED (39,000 AED for ERP + 12,000 AED for parallel run)
- The appellant was required to remain in the U.A.E. for a minimum of 15 days per month.
- The appellant filed IA No.1178(AHM)2025 on 15.10.2025 seeking monthly travel permission until March 2026.
- The Adjudicating Authority rejected the application on 12.02.2026.
- The appellant filed Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.349 of 2026, seeking permission to travel until September 2026.
Procedural History
- 29.04.2024: Personal insolvency proceedings admitted against the appellant.
- 10.02.2025: Purchase Order issued by Hypermax General Trading Company LLC.
- 12.09.2025: NCLT declared appellant bankrupt and imposed travel restriction.
- 15.10.2025: IA No.1178(AHM)2025 filed seeking monthly travel permission.
- 12.02.2026: Adjudicating Authority rejected the application.
- 19.01.2026: NCLAT disposed of Appeal No.118 of 2026, directing expeditious disposal of IA No.1178.
- 28.03.2026: Appeal No.349 of 2026 filed before NCLAT.
- 04.05.2026: Judgment delivered by NCLAT.
The Parties' Positions
Appellant: Argued that the "parallel run for six months" was a separate, subsequent phase commencing after the 13-month ERP implementation, extending the contractual obligation until September 2026. He emphasized his past compliance with travel conditions and the economic necessity of completing the contract.
Bankruptcy Trustee: Contended that the entire contractual period, including the "parallel run," was concurrent and ended on 10.03.2026. The appellant’s prayer for travel until March 2026 had lapsed, and the new prayer for travel until September 2026 was not part of the original application and lacked legal basis.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought: (1) quashing of the Adjudicating Authority’s order dated 12.02.2026; (2) permission to travel abroad for 15 days each month from February to September 2026; and (3) a declaration that his past compliance negated any flight risk.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the phrase "13 months plus six months" in a purchase order under personal insolvency proceedings denotes a sequential extension of contractual obligations, or whether it refers to a concurrent, overlapping period of performance.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The appellant relied on the explicit wording of the Purchase Order and the Jonty Chhag judgment from the Punjab & Haryana High Court, arguing that courts must adopt a justice-oriented approach and not dismiss applications on technical grounds when the underlying commercial purpose persists. He emphasized that the "parallel run" was a distinct, post-implementation phase necessary for system stabilization, and that his travel was essential to fulfill contractual obligations. He also noted his consistent return to India and full cooperation with the Bankruptcy Trustee.
For the Respondent
The Bankruptcy Trustee contended that the Purchase Order’s structure and pricing indicated a single, integrated project: the ERP implementation and its parallel support were performed simultaneously. The total amount of 51,000 AED was paid monthly throughout the 13-month period, with no separate payment schedule for a six-month extension. The Trustee argued that the appellant’s own pleading in paragraph 10 of the application admitted the duration was "13 months," undermining his current claim. Further, the prayer for travel beyond March 2026 was not part of the original application and could not be entertained as an amendment in appeal.
The Court's Analysis
The NCLAT undertook a detailed textual and contextual analysis of the Purchase Order. The Tribunal noted that the document explicitly stated the duration for Item 1 as "11/02/2025 to 10/03/2026" and Item 2 as "parallel run for six months," with both items listed under the same total value and monthly payment structure. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s interpretation that the six-month period commenced after the 13-month term, stating that such an interpretation would render the term "parallel" meaningless.
"The expression 'parallel run for six months' leaves no room for doubt that the said work was also to carry out simultaneously."
The Court emphasized that the contractual obligations were interdependent: ERP implementation could not be completed without the concurrent IT system support. The monthly payments of 2,000 AED for the "parallel run" were not deferred but paid concurrently with the 3,000 AED for ERP, confirming simultaneous performance.
The Tribunal also rejected the appellant’s reliance on Jonty Chhag, distinguishing it on grounds that the petitioner in that case had a live, ongoing trial with no expiry of the underlying cause of action. Here, the contractual basis for travel had expired on 10.03.2026, rendering the original justification obsolete. The Court held that while appellate courts may consider subsequent events, they cannot invent new grounds for relief that were neither pleaded nor substantiated before the Adjudicating Authority.
The Court further observed that the appellant’s own admission in paragraph 10 of the application - that the duration was "13 months" - constituted a clear estoppel against his current claim. The NCLAT affirmed that the rejection of the IA did not preclude a fresh application, provided a new, valid basis arises.
The Verdict
The appeal was dismissed. The NCLAT upheld the Adjudicating Authority’s order dated 12.02.2026 rejecting travel permission. The Court held that the contractual obligation under the Purchase Order expired on 10.03.2026, and the appellant’s request for travel beyond that date lacked legal foundation. The appellant is not barred from filing a fresh application before the Adjudicating Authority if a new, substantiated business necessity arises, but the present appeal, based on a lapsed contract, stands dismissed.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Contractual Duration Must Be Interpreted Textually, Not Speculatively
- Practitioners must analyze contract language holistically: terms like "parallel run," "support period," or "warranty phase" must be read in context of payment schedules, deliverables, and timelines.
- A claim for travel based on a contract cannot survive if the contractual period has ended, even if the business outcome remains desirable.
Fresh Applications Are Permitted, But Not as Amendments in Appeal
- A bankrupt may file a new application before the Adjudicating Authority if a new commercial opportunity arises, but cannot expand the scope of relief in an appeal beyond what was originally prayed for.
- Appellate tribunals will not entertain new grounds for relief not raised before the lower forum unless exceptional circumstances justify it.
Travel Permissions Are Conditional on Active, Unexpired Obligations
- Courts will not grant travel permissions based on speculative future business prospects.
- Past compliance with travel conditions does not create a right to future permissions; each request must be independently justified by a live contractual or legal obligation.
The "Justice-Oriented" Approach Has Limits
- While courts are encouraged to avoid hyper-technicality, they cannot override the plain terms of a contract or invent obligations that do not exist.
- The Jonty Chhag principle applies only when the underlying cause of action remains active and unexpired.






