
The Bombay High Court has delivered a landmark judgment clarifying that acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (L.A. Act) lapse by operation of law if the declaration under Section 6 is not issued within one year of the Section 4 notification. The Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to recalculate compensation for unacquired land, possession of which was taken by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (BMC) in 1960, shifting the notification date to 26.08.2011 to balance the rights of landowners and public interest.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, landowners in Borla and Deonar, Mumbai, owned approximately 50 acres of land. In 1958, the State issued a notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act for acquisition of their lands for the benefit of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (BMC). On 14.10.1960, the petitioners and BMC executed an agreement fixing compensation at Rs. 4.25 per square yard. The BMC took possession of the lands, including unacquired portions, in 1960.
Key Facts
1958: Notification under Section 4 L.A. Act issued.
14.10.1960: Agreement executed; BMC took possession of lands.
1976 & 1978: Fresh agreements executed, superseding earlier ones, with compensation fixed at Rs. 40 per square yard.
1979: Petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 1385 of 1979 seeking land acquisition awards. The Court directed BMC to declare awards within six months.
1988: Last award declared, granting compensation at Rs. 350 per square yard, superseding the Rs. 40 rate.
1993: Petitioners sent a letter to BMC seeking acquisition of remaining 9295.25 sq.mtrs of unacquired land.
1996: Petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 109 of 1996, seeking acquisition of unacquired land. The Court directed BMC to acquire the land within one year and rejected BMC’s contention to restrict compensation to Rs. 40 per square yard.
08.12.1999: Notification under Section 4 L.A. Act issued (published on 23.12.1999).
05.01.2001: Declaration under Section 6 L.A. Act issued (published on 18.01.2001).
30.08.2001: SLAO passed an award granting compensation at Rs. 5,000 per sq.mtr (50% of ready reckoner value).
2005: BMC challenged the award in Writ Petition No. 11 of 2006, arguing incorrect compensation calculation.
14.08.2008: High Court set aside the award and directed SLAO to pass a fresh award.
2008-2011: Petitioners challenged the order before the Supreme Court, raising the issue of lapsing of acquisition due to delayed Section 6 declaration.
05.04.2011: Supreme Court disposed of Civil Appeal No. 1115 of 2010, reserving liberty for parties to raise all issues before the SLAO.
13.05.2011 & 18.05.2011: Petitioners filed applications before SLAO, claiming lapsing of acquisition and seeking fresh notification.
19.07.2011: SLAO rejected the applications, holding that the issue had already been decided by the High Court and Supreme Court.
26.08.2011: Present Writ Petition No. 1755 of 2011 filed, challenging the SLAO’s order and seeking a declaration that the acquisition had lapsed.
Procedural History
1979: Writ Petition No. 1385 of 1979 filed; disposed of on 23.08.1979 with direction to declare awards.
1996: Writ Petition No. 109 of 1996 filed; disposed of on 04.12.1996 with direction to acquire unacquired land within one year.
1997: BMC filed Appeal No. 1022 of 1997 against the 1996 order; dismissed as infructuous on 22.06.2004.
2001: SLAO passed award on 30.08.2001.
2006: BMC filed Writ Petition No. 11 of 2006 challenging the award; disposed of on 14.08.2008.
2008: Petitioners filed SLP (Civil) No. 23894 of 2008 before Supreme Court; disposed of on 05.04.2011 with liberty to raise all issues before SLAO.
2011: Petitioners filed applications before SLAO on 13.05.2011 and 18.05.2011; rejected on 19.07.2011.
26.08.2011: Present writ petition filed.
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought:
Quashing of the SLAO’s order dated 19.07.2011.
A declaration that the acquisition had lapsed due to the Section 6 declaration being issued beyond one year of the Section 4 notification.
Direction to the SLAO to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings, preferably under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
The Legal Issue
The central question was:Whether the acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act lapse if the declaration under Section 6 is not issued within one year of the notification under Section 4, and if so, what are the consequential reliefs available to the landowners?
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioners
Lapsing of Acquisition: Relied on Section 6 proviso (ii) of the L.A. Act and Supreme Court judgments in Vijay Narayan Thatte v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 9 SCC 92, and Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar, (2012) 12 SCC 443, to argue that the Section 6 declaration issued beyond one year of the Section 4 notification rendered the acquisition void.
Constitutional Right: Contended that the BMC’s inaction violated the petitioners’ right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution, which the Supreme Court has recognized as a human right in Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, (2025) 7 SCC 580.
Shifting Notification Date: Cited Supreme Court judgments (Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44; Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, (2005) 13 SCC 477) to argue that the Court could shift the date of the Section 4 notification to balance the interests of landowners and public utility.
Unsustainable Contentions: Argued that BMC’s reliance on Section 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act) was unsustainable, as the acquisition was undertaken under the L.A. Act, and no such stand was taken in earlier proceedings.
For the Respondents
Res Judicata: Contended that the issue of lapsing of acquisition was already considered and rejected by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 11 of 2006 and confirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1115 of 2010.
Delay by Petitioners: Argued that the petitioners’ challenge to the SLAO’s order dated 19.07.2011 caused further delay in passing the award.
Agreed Compensation: Submitted that the petitioners were bound by the agreements fixing compensation at Rs. 40 per square yard, and could not claim higher amounts.
MRTP Act Applicability: Contended that Section 126 of the MRTP Act applied, under which the acquisition process starts directly at the declaration stage, obviating the need for a Section 4 notification.
The Court's Analysis
Lapsing of Acquisition:
The Court relied on the proviso to Section 6 of the L.A. Act, which mandates that a declaration under Section 6 must be issued within one year of the notification under Section 4. Failure to comply renders the declaration void, and the acquisition lapses by operation of law.
The Court cited Vijay Narayan Thatte and Anil Kumar Gupta, where the Supreme Court held that the proviso is mandatory and no estoppel or judicial order can revive a lapsed acquisition.
The Court noted that the Section 4 notification was issued on 08.12.1999 (published on 23.12.1999), while the Section 6 declaration was issued on 05.01.2001 (published on 18.01.2001), clearly beyond the one-year period.
Judicial Precedents on Shifting Notification Date:
The Court observed that in cases where acquisition lapses but the land has been utilized for public purposes, the Supreme Court has allowed shifting the date of the Section 4 notification to balance the interests of landowners and public utility.
Cited judgments:
Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory: Directed shifting of notification date to ensure adequate compensation.
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz: Held that only High Courts (under Article 226) and the Supreme Court (under Article 32/142) can shift the notification date, not the SLAO or State Government.
Rejection of BMC’s Contentions:
Section 126 MRTP Act: The Court rejected BMC’s reliance on Section 126 MRTP Act, noting that the L.A. Act was the governing statute for the acquisition, and the MRTP Act was enacted after possession was taken in 1960.
Agreed Compensation: The Court held that the 1988 award granting compensation at Rs. 350 per square yard superseded the earlier agreements fixing compensation at Rs. 40 per square yard.
Constitutional Right to Property:
The Court emphasized that Article 300-A guarantees the right to property, which the Supreme Court has recognized as a human right (Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz).
The petitioners had been deprived of compensation for over 50 years, despite the BMC taking possession of their land in 1960.
“The Latin Maxim, dura lex sed lex meaning ‘the law is hard but it is the law’, applies to the facts of the present case.”
The Verdict
The Court allowed the writ petition and issued the following directions:
Quashed the SLAO’s order dated 19.07.2011.
Declared that the Section 6 declaration issued beyond one year of the Section 4 notification was void, and the acquisition had lapsed.
Shifted the date of the Section 4 notification to 26.08.2011 (the date of filing the present writ petition) to balance the interests of the parties.
Directed the SLAO to calculate compensation based on the market value as on 26.08.2011 and pass a fresh award within three months.
Directed disbursement of awarded compensation to the petitioners within four weeks of the award, adjusting any amounts already deposited with the Court.
Granted the petitioners all statutory benefits available under law.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Mandatory Compliance with Section 6 Proviso
Land acquisition authorities must strictly comply with the one-year timeline under Section 6 proviso (ii) of the L.A. Act. Failure to do so renders the acquisition void ab initio, and no judicial order can revive it.
Practitioners should scrutinize the dates of Section 4 notifications and Section 6 declarations in ongoing acquisition proceedings to identify lapses.
Shifting Notification Date: A Balancing Tool
High Courts and the Supreme Court have the power under Articles 226 and 32/142 to shift the date of the Section 4 notification where acquisition lapses but the land has been utilized for public purposes.
This power is not available to SLAOs or State Governments, as clarified in Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz.
Courts may adopt this approach to avoid grave inconvenience to the public while ensuring adequate compensation for landowners.
Constitutional Right to Property: A Human Right
Article 300-A is not merely a statutory right but a human right, as reiterated by the Supreme Court. Landowners deprived of compensation for decades are entitled to prompt and fair recompense.
Public authorities cannot adopt intransigent approaches to delay compensation, especially when possession was taken long ago (e.g., in 1960 in this case).
Practitioners should invoke Article 300-A in cases of prolonged deprivation of property rights, citing Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah.
Procedural Safeguards for Landowners
Landowners should document all correspondence with acquisition authorities (e.g., the 12.02.1993 letter in this case) to establish inaction or delay.
Surveyors may be appointed to identify unacquired land, as done in Writ Petition No. 109 of 1996.
Courts may direct expeditious acquisition where authorities fail to act, as seen in the 1996 order directing acquisition within one year.






