
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that in cases involving sexual offences against minors where the victim later attains majority, marries the accused, and voluntarily consents to settlement, the court may quash criminal proceedings if continuation would harm the victim’s welfare and serve no public interest. This ruling redefines the application of inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita in sensitive POCSO matters.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petition seeks quashing of FIR No.22 of 2024, registered at Police Station Kupvi, District Shimla, against petitioners Sant Ram and others under Sections 366-A, 376, 372, 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC, Sections 4, 6 and 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), and Sections 9 and 10 of the Child Marriage Act. The complaint was filed by Santosh Kumar, maternal uncle of the prosecutrix, alleging that the victim’s maternal grandfather, Khem Chand, sold her to petitioners in exchange for money, and that her mother, Reena, encouraged the act.
Key Facts
- The victim, a minor at the time of the alleged incident, was married to petitioner No.1, Sant Ram, after the incident
- The marriage took place in May 2024, shortly after the FIR was registered
- The victim gave birth to a son on 15.10.2024, who is now 1.5 years old
- The victim has since attained majority
- The victim currently resides with her husband and child in village Gonth, Tehsil Kupvi, District Shimla
- The victim has stated on oath that she entered into the marriage voluntarily, without coercion from her family
- She explicitly stated that the FIR arose from a misunderstanding and that she does not wish to pursue prosecution
- The investigating officer confirmed that Sant Ram is the biological father of the child
- The charge sheet was filed, but trial had not commenced
Procedural History
- 19.05.2024: FIR No.22 of 2024 registered at Police Station Kupvi
- 25.06.2024: Charge sheet submitted to Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Shimla
- 05.01.2026: Petition under Section 528 BNSS filed before the High Court seeking quashing of FIR and proceedings
- 10.02.2026: Notice issued to all parties
- 15.03.2026: Victim appeared before the Court and made a sworn statement affirming voluntary marriage and desire to settle
- 20.03.2026: Judgment delivered
The Parties' Positions
Petitioners (Accused): Argued that the victim, now an adult, has voluntarily entered into marriage, borne a child, and expressed unequivocal desire to end the proceedings. They submitted a compromise deed (Annexure P-5) signed by all parties.
Respondent State: Acknowledged the compromise but contended that the offences are heinous and non-compoundable, and public interest must prevail over individual consent.
Respondent No.2 (Victim): Appeared in person, affirmed under oath that she married petitioner No.1 of her own free will, has no grievance against him, and opposes continuation of proceedings.
Relief Sought
Quashing of FIR No.22 of 2024 and all consequential proceedings in Sessions Trial POCSO Act No.09 of 2024, and acquittal of the accused.
The Legal Issue
Can the High Court exercise its inherent power under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita to quash FIRs involving heinous sexual offences against minors when the victim, having attained majority, voluntarily marries the accused, bears a child, and consents to settlement?
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioners relied on Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab to argue that the High Court’s inherent power under Section 528 BNSS permits quashing even in non-compoundable offences if the compromise is genuine, the victim is an adult, and continuation of proceedings would cause greater harm than benefit. They emphasized that the victim’s welfare, her marital status, and the existence of a child make this a personal, not societal, dispute. They cited Dimpey Gujral v. UT Chandigarh to argue that where offences are personal and not of extreme depravity, quashing serves the ends of justice.
For the Respondent/State
The State contended that offences under POCSO and IPC Sections 366-A and 376 are heinous, non-compoundable, and inherently public in nature. They argued that allowing quashing on compromise would undermine deterrence and set a dangerous precedent, especially in cases involving minors. They relied on Narinder Singh to assert that rape and related offences cannot be quashed merely because the victim consents post-majority.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a nuanced examination of the Apex Court’s jurisprudence on quashing under Section 528 BNSS. It acknowledged the general principle laid down in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab that courts must not quash proceedings in cases involving heinous crimes of mental depravity such as rape, murder, or dacoity, as these are not private disputes but crimes against society.
"Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society."
However, the Court distinguished this case on multiple factual grounds. It noted that the victim was not merely a passive recipient of harm but an active participant in the subsequent events: she voluntarily married the accused, bore his child, and now resides with him in a stable domestic arrangement. The Court emphasized that the victim, now an adult, had unequivocally and voluntarily expressed her desire to end the proceedings, free from coercion.
The Court further observed that the offences under Sections 366-A and 376, while serious, were not committed in a manner indicative of predatory or public menace, but arose from a consensual relationship that matured into marriage. The Court held that the continuation of proceedings would not serve justice but would instead inflict further trauma on the victim and destabilize the family unit she has chosen.
The Court also noted the absence of any public interest in prosecution given the victim’s clear stance and the fact that the child’s welfare is now tied to the accused’s presence. It cited Dimpey Gujral to affirm that when offences are personal and the settlement brings peace, quashing is not an abuse of process but an exercise of judicial wisdom.
The Court rejected the State’s argument that public interest must always override individual consent, stating that in this unique context, the victim’s autonomy and welfare constitute the paramount public interest.
The Verdict
The petition succeeded. The High Court quashed FIR No.22 of 2024 registered at Police Station Kupvi, District Shimla, under Sections 366-A, 376, 372, 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC, Sections 4, 6 and 21 of the POCSO Act, and Sections 9 and 10 of the Child Marriage Act. All consequential proceedings in Sessions Trial POCSO Act No.09 of 2024 are set aside. The accused are acquitted of all charges. The Court directed that the victim’s marital status and custody of the child remain undisturbed.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Consent of Adult Victim Can Override Heinous Offence Classification
- Practitioners may now argue that in POCSO cases where the victim attains majority, enters into a consensual marriage with the accused, and bears a child, the court may quash proceedings under Section 528 BNSS if the victim’s consent is voluntary and genuine
- The focus must shift from the nature of the offence alone to the victim’s current circumstances and welfare
- Compromise deeds must be accompanied by sworn affidavits from the victim affirming voluntariness and absence of coercion
Judicial Discretion Must Balance Public Interest and Individual Autonomy
- Courts must avoid rigid application of Narinder Singh in cases where the victim’s life has fundamentally changed post-majority
- The presence of a child and a stable marital union constitutes a material change in circumstances warranting judicial intervention
- Prosecution in such cases may be deemed an abuse of process if it serves no rehabilitative or deterrent purpose
Documentation and Victim Testimony Are Critical
- Sworn statements before the High Court carry decisive weight
- Evidence of cohabitation, child birth, and social integration must be formally recorded
- Legal aid providers and prosecutors must assess victim’s post-offence trajectory before opposing quashing petitions






