The Allahabad High Court has held that an offence under Section 467 IPC, which prescribes a maximum punishment of life imprisonment or ten years but no minimum sentence of seven years, cannot be classified as a "heinous offence" under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Consequently, the Juvenile Justice Board lacked jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary assessment under Section 15 or transfer the case to the Children's Court under Section 18(3). The Court quashed the transfer orders and remanded the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for inquiry as a serious offence.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The revisionist, a juvenile at the time of the alleged offence, was implicated in a case involving fraud and cheating of Rs. 40 lakhs committed against Haji Rafeeq, the owner of Altamash Pvt. Ltd. The FIR was registered on 30.06.2016 at Police Station Khurja Nagar, District Bulandshahr, under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against multiple accused including the revisionist. The revisionist subsequently claimed juvenility, leading to a protracted jurisdictional dispute between the Juvenile Justice Board and the Children's Court over whether the offence was "heinous" warranting trial as an adult.
Key Facts
- 30.06.2016 (21:35 hours): FIR lodged at PS Khurja Nagar, Bulandshahr (Crime No. 483/2016) by Haji Rafeeq alleging fraud/cheating of Rs. 40 lakhs
- 10.05.2022: Juvenile Justice Board, Bulandshahr declared the revisionist a juvenile, assessing his age at the time of offence as 16 years, 9 months, 7 days
- 10.05.2022: Board opined the offence fell under "heinous offence" category and directed preliminary assessment under Section 15 JJ Act, 2015
- 18.05.2022: Board conducted preliminary assessment and ordered transfer of trial to Children's Court under Section 18(3), holding the child ought to be tried as an adult
- 26.08.2022: Mother of juvenile moved application before ACJM, Khurja for separation and transmission of case record to competent court
- 03.02.2023: ACJM, Khurja rejected the application, observing the Board had transferred record to that court for trial
- 20.07.2023: Board held the offence was a "serious offence", not heinous, and that JJB had jurisdiction to conduct trial/inquiry
- 11.05.2026: Board rejected application, holding its order dated 18.05.2022 transferring trial as adult remained valid, binding and beyond its review powers
- 16.07.2026: Children's Court (Special Judge POCSO), Bulandshahr dismissed appeal against Board's order dated 11.05.2026
Procedural History
- 30.06.2016: FIR registered (Crime No. 483/2016) at PS Khurja Nagar, Bulandshahr
- 10.05.2022: JJB declared revisionist juvenile (age: 16 years, 9 months, 7 days); directed preliminary assessment under Section 15
- 18.05.2022: JJB passed transfer order under Section 18(3) to Children's Court
- 26.08.2022: Application filed before ACJM, Khurja for separation of record
- 03.02.2023: ACJM, Khurja rejected application
- 2023: Revisionist filed Application u/s 482 CrPC No. 6596/2023 before Allahabad HC
- 2023: Allahabad HC allowed 482 application, transferred case/trial to Children's Court, directed ACJM to send record to Board/Children's Court
- 20.07.2023: JJB held offence was serious offence, JJB had jurisdiction
- 11.05.2026: JJB rejected application, affirmed validity of 18.05.2022 transfer order
- 16.07.2026: Children's Court dismissed appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 106/2026)
- 2026: Present Criminal Revision No. 4845/2026 filed before Allahabad HC
- 08.10.2026: Arguments reserved
- 27.10.2026: Judgment delivered
Relief Sought
The revisionist sought quashing of the order dated 11.05.2026 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board and the order dated 16.07.2026 passed by the Children's Court, and a direction that the matter be tried by the Juvenile Justice Board as a serious offence under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.
The Legal Issue
The central questions were: (i) Whether an offence punishable under Section 467 IPC, which prescribes imprisonment for life or up to ten years and fine but does not prescribe a minimum sentence of seven years, can be categorized as a "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015; and (ii) Whether the Juvenile Justice Board can oust its own jurisdiction and transfer the matter to the Children's Court merely on the premise that it lacks the power to review or recall its own order, ignoring the mandatory statutory framework governing transfer of proceedings.
Arguments Presented
For the Revisionist
Learned Senior Advocate submitted that Section 467 IPC carries a maximum punishment of life imprisonment or ten years but no minimum sentence of seven years. Relying on Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787, it was contended that such offences fall strictly within the classification of "serious offences" under Section 2(54) of the JJ Act, 2015, not "heinous offences" under Section 2(33). Consequently, the preliminary assessment under Section 15 and transfer under Section 18(3) apply exclusively to heinous offences and were wholly illegal and devoid of jurisdiction in this case.
For the Respondent/State
Learned AGA for the State and counsel for Opposite Party No. 2 supported the impugned orders. They submitted that the Juvenile Justice Board had already conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15 and transferred the case under Section 18(3) vide order dated 18.05.2022, which was never challenged or set aside by any higher court and had attained finality. It was further argued that criminal courts including the JJB have no power to review or recall their own orders under Section 362 CrPC, and therefore the Board could not have reconsidered its earlier transfer order.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by examining the statutory classification of offences under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. Under Section 2(33), "heinous offences" are defined as offences for which the minimum punishment under the IPC or any other law is imprisonment for seven years or more. Section 2(54) defines "serious offences" as those with imprisonment between three to seven years. A bare reading of Section 2(33) makes it clear that a mandatory minimum sentence of at least seven years is a prerequisite for an offence to be termed "heinous."
"In view of the above discussion we dispose of the appeal by answering the question set out in the first part of the judgment in the negative and hold that an offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be an heinous offence. However, in view of what we have held above, the Act does not deal with the 4th category of offences viz. offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years' imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as 'serious offences' within the meaning of the Act and dealt with accordingly till Parliament takes the call on the matter."
Applying Shilpa Mittal, the Court held that Section 467 IPC, which prescribes imprisonment for life or up to ten years and fine but no minimum sentence, does not fall within the definition of "heinous offence" under Section 2(33). Instead, it falls under "serious offence" under Section 2(54).
On the second issue, the Court analysed the doctrine of subject-matter jurisdiction. Citing Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340, Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193, and Harshad Chimanlal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 791, the Court reiterated that a defect of inherent or subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent or procedural waiver; an order passed without inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and coram non judice.
The Court then examined the review jurisdiction of criminal courts under Section 362 CrPC and the principles laid down in Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783, Grindlays Bank Ltd., Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb, and Ganesh Patel. It distinguished between "procedural review" (recall due to lack of inherent jurisdiction, fraud, mistake of court, non-service/death of party) and "substantive review" (review on merits). The bar under Section 362 CrPC applies strictly to substantive review but not to a genuine application for procedural recall where the ground was not available during original proceedings.
Applying these principles, the Court found that under Section 8(1) read with Section 9(2) of the JJ Act, 2015, the Juvenile Justice Board possesses exclusive original jurisdiction over all petty and serious offences. The Children's Court derives jurisdiction to try a juvenile as an adult only upon a valid, lawful transfer order passed under Section 18(3) following a preliminary assessment under Section 15 for a "heinous offence." Since the offence under Section 467 IPC is a serious offence, the Board had no statutory authority to invoke Section 15 or pass a transfer order under Section 18(3).
The Court further held that the Children's Court erred in affirming its jurisdiction. Under Section 19(1) of the Act, the Children's Court has a mandatory statutory duty to independently determine whether there is a need to try the child as an adult. Under Section 19(1)(ii), if the Children's Court concludes there is no need for trial as an adult - which includes cases where the offence itself is non-heinous - it is required to step into the shoes of the Board, conduct the inquiry itself, and pass appropriate orders under Section 18. Alternatively, where the transfer order is fundamentally without jurisdiction, the Children's Court lacks inherent original subject-matter jurisdiction over serious offences and ought to have declined jurisdiction under Section 9(2) read with Section 228(1)(a) CrPC (now Section 251(1)(a) BNSS) and returned the file to the competent Juvenile Justice Board.
The Verdict
The criminal revision was allowed. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned order dated 11.05.2026 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board and the order dated 16.07.2026 passed by the Children's Court. The matter was remanded back to the Juvenile Justice Board, Bulandshahr under Section 9(2) of the JJ Act, 2015. The JJB was directed to register the matter on its own vector and proceed with the inquiry strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed for "serious offences" under Section 14 read with Section 18(1) of the Act, without subjecting the revisionist to any adult trial. The record of the case was directed to be transmitted forthwith from the Children's Court to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Offence Classification Turns on Minimum Sentence, Not Maximum
The judgment reinforces the Shilpa Mittal principle that the classification of an offence as "heinous" under the JJ Act, 2015 depends exclusively on the existence of a statutory minimum sentence of seven years or more. Offences like Section 467 IPC, Section 302 IPC (where minimum is not prescribed but maximum is death/life), and other provisions with only maximum punishments - however severe - remain "serious offences" until Parliament amends the law. Practitioners must scrutinise the statutory text for a prescribed minimum sentence before conceding heinous offence classification.
Jurisdictional Defects Cannot Be Cured by Procedural Finality
The Court's ruling that an order passed without subject-matter jurisdiction is void ab initio and cannot acquire validity through finality or procedural bars (such as Section 362 CrPC) is a critical safeguard. A Juvenile Justice Board cannot transfer a serious offence to the Children's Court and then claim inability to recall the order. Similarly, a Children's Court cannot assume jurisdiction over a serious offence merely because a transfer order exists. Lawyers should challenge jurisdictional defects at the earliest stage but can also raise them at any subsequent stage, including in revision, as lack of inherent jurisdiction is never waived.
Children's Court Has Independent Duty to Verify Heinous Offence Threshold
Under Section 19(1), the Children's Court must independently assess whether the offence qualifies as heinous before exercising jurisdiction. It cannot mechanically accept the Board's transfer order. If the offence is non-heinous, the Children's Court is statutorily obligated to either conduct the inquiry itself as a Board (Section 19(1)(ii)) or return the file to the competent JJB (Section 9(2) read with Section 228(1)(a) CrPC / Section 251(1)(a) BNSS). Practitioners appearing before Children's Courts should insist on this independent judicial application of mind and be prepared to argue the offence classification de novo.
- Actionable Takeaway: In every juvenile case involving offences with life/10-year maximum but no 7-year minimum (e.g., Sections 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC), file a preliminary objection to heinous offence classification citing Shilpa Mittal and this judgment.
- Actionable Takeaway: If a transfer order has already been passed, move an application for recall before the JJB on the ground of lack of inherent jurisdiction (procedural review), which is not barred by Section 362 CrPC.
- Actionable Takeaway: Before the Children's Court, argue that Section 19(1) imposes a mandatory duty to independently determine the need for adult trial; the court cannot defer to the Board's erroneous classification.
