Section 22 Specific Relief Act | Specific Performance of Undivided Share Mandates Partition Claim: Bombay HC

Bombay High Court rules that a suit for specific performance of an undivided share in immovable property must include a claim for partition under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court also held that contingent contracts become void upon withdrawal of the underlying litigation, and blanket injunctions require precise property description to be valid.

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Jun 18, 2026, 6:26 PM(Updated: Nov 3, 2026)
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Section 22 Specific Relief Act | Specific Performance of Undivided Share Mandates Partition Claim: Bombay HC

The Bombay High Court has clarified a critical procedural requirement in suits for specific performance of undivided shares in immovable property: Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates a claim for partition and separate possession when the subject matter is an undivided share. The Court upheld the rejection of an interim injunction application, holding that the absence of such a claim rendered the relief unsustainable, even where the plaintiff had a prima facie case of entitlement to the property. The judgment underscores the interplay between contingent contracts, title disputes, and procedural compliance in property litigation.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The appellants, Mrs. Surinder Kaur J. Chhabara and Mr. Yashwant Baburao Sawant, filed a suit for specific performance of two agreements for sale executed by late Merwan Feroz Cama in their favour. The agreements pertained to undivided shares in land bearing Survey Nos. 236 and 238 in Pune:

  • Agreement dated 22.05.2012: For an undivided share of 40,000 sq. ft. (approximately 40 R) in favour of Plaintiff No. 1, for a consideration of Rs. 1.60 lakhs.

  • Agreement dated 18.10.2013: For an undivided share of 1 H 20 R in favour of Plaintiff No. 2, for a consideration of Rs. 30 lakhs.

The plaintiffs’ case rested on the following key assertions:

  • Late Merwan Feroz Cama was entitled to a 12.5% undivided share in the larger land, derived from his mother, late Mackly Feroz Cama, who held a 25% share as a tenant-in-common with her husband, late Feroz Mancherji Cama.

  • Feroz Cama had executed a Release Deed dated 26.08.2008, transferring his 37.5% undivided share to Merwan Cama, which was duly registered and mutated in revenue records vide Mutation Entry No. 26757 dated 14.08.2010.

  • The plaintiffs alleged that Defendant No. 2 (Ganesh Construction Company) and Defendant No. 3 (Emblem Realty LLP) colluded with Defendant No. 1(d) (CA Arun Mehta, the alleged executor of Merwan Cama’s Will) to fraudulently withdraw Regular Civil Suit No. 4915 of 2012, which sought a declaration of Merwan Cama’s ownership rights. The withdrawal was allegedly secured through settlement agreements for a consideration of Rs. 20 crores.

Key Facts

  • Ownership History:

    • The larger land was originally owned by Mancherji Firozshah Cama and Bachchubai Ardeshir Khusroji Wadia as tenants-in-common, each holding a 50% share.

    • Gift Deed dated 12.09.1947: Mancherji Cama gifted his 50% share to his son, Feroz Mancherji Cama, and daughter-in-law, Mackly Feroz Cama, as joint tenants.

    • Gift Deed dated 07.07.1953: Bachchubai gifted her 50% share to her son, Khusro Ardeshir Wadia.

    • Upon Mackly Cama’s death on 03.07.1950, her 25% share devolved equally upon Feroz Cama and Merwan Cama, giving Feroz Cama a 37.5% share and Merwan Cama a 12.5% share.

  • Subsequent Transactions:

    • Indenture dated 25.05.1989: Feroz Cama and Khusro Wadia sold portions of the land to Ganesh Construction Company, which was recorded in revenue records vide Mutation Entry No. 15829 dated 18.10.1995.

    • Correction Deed dated 31.01.2012: Confirmed the equal undivided share of Feroz Cama in the larger land.

    • Deed of Conveyance dated 19.12.2023: Ganesh Construction Company sold the entire land to Emblem Realty LLP for Rs. 174 crores.

  • Litigation Trail:

    • RCS No. 4915 of 2012: Filed by Merwan Cama seeking a declaration of ownership based on the Release Deed dated 26.08.2008. An interim injunction was granted against Defendant No. 2, restraining the creation of third-party rights.

    • 11.12.2023: Legal heirs of Merwan Cama filed an application to withdraw RCS No. 4915 of 2012, citing a settlement outside court.

    • 27.02.2023: Merwan Cama’s Will was registered at 11:14 a.m., appointing Defendant No. 1(d) as executor. Two minutes prior, a Power of Attorney was registered in favour of Defendant No. 1(d), which explicitly prohibited the sale of properties without Merwan Cama’s consent.

    • Special Civil Suit No. 1195 of 2024: Filed by the plaintiffs seeking specific performance of the agreements dated 22.05.2012 and 18.10.2013.

    • Exhibit-5: Interim application seeking injunction against Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 from creating third-party rights or developing the suit property.

    • 03.02.2026: Trial Court rejected the interim application, leading to the present appeal.

Procedural History

  • 15.03.2019: Mutation Entry No. 26757 recorded Merwan Cama’s name in revenue records based on the Release Deed dated 26.08.2008.

  • 2010: Merwan Cama filed a suit challenging the validity of the Release Deed, which was renumbered as RCS No. 4915 of 2012.

  • 2012: Interim injunction granted in RCS No. 4915 of 2012 against Defendant No. 2.

  • 11.12.2023: Application filed to withdraw RCS No. 4915 of 2012.

  • 22.05.2012 and 18.10.2013: Agreements for sale executed by Merwan Cama in favour of the plaintiffs.

  • 19.12.2023: Ganesh Construction Company sold the land to Emblem Realty LLP.

  • 2024: Plaintiffs filed Special Civil Suit No. 1195 of 2024 for specific performance.

  • 03.02.2026: Trial Court rejected the interim application (Exhibit-5).

  • 17.06.2026: Present appeal heard and dismissed by the Bombay High Court.

The Parties' Positions

Plaintiffs/Appellants:

  • Contended that Merwan Cama’s 12.5% undivided share devolved upon him by inheritance and was further augmented by the Release Deed dated 26.08.2008.

  • Argued that the withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012 was fraudulent, as Defendant No. 1(d) acted beyond his authority as executor and colluded with Defendants Nos. 2 and 3.

  • Relied on the Review Petition order, which prima facie acknowledged Merwan Cama’s undivided share in the property.

  • Submitted that the agreements for sale were not contingent contracts but valid transfers of Merwan Cama’s rights.

Defendants/Respondents:

  • Defendant No. 1(d): Claimed he acted as the executor of Merwan Cama’s Will and had no privity of contract with the plaintiffs. Argued that the Will did not require probate under Section 213 read with Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, as the deceased was a Parsi and the property was outside India.

  • Defendant No. 2: Contended that the agreements for sale were contingent contracts dependent on the success of RCS No. 4915 of 2012. With the withdrawal of the suit, the contracts became void and unenforceable. Relied on the Indenture dated 25.05.1989 and subsequent documents to assert its title.

  • Defendant No. 3: Argued that it was a bona fide purchaser for value (Rs. 174 crores) and had no privity of contract with the plaintiffs. Emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act, which requires a claim for partition when seeking specific performance of an undivided share.

Relief Sought

The plaintiffs sought:

  • A temporary injunction restraining Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 from creating third-party rights or developing the suit property.

  • Specific performance of the agreements dated 22.05.2012 and 18.10.2013.

  • A declaration that the withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012 was fraudulent and void.

The central question was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an interim injunction for specific performance of agreements pertaining to an undivided share in immovable property, in the absence of a claim for partition and separate possession under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Additionally, the Court had to determine whether the agreements for sale were contingent contracts rendered void by the withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012, and whether the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of entitlement to the suit property.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellants/Petitioners

  • Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act permits amendment of the plaint to include a claim for partition, and the absence of such a claim at the interim stage is not fatal.

  • The Review Petition order prima facie acknowledged Merwan Cama’s undivided share in the property, which the defendants cannot now deny.

  • The withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012 was fraudulent, as Defendant No. 1(d) acted without obtaining Letters of Administration and colluded with Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for a consideration of Rs. 20 crores.

  • The Release Deed dated 26.08.2008 and Mutation Entry No. 26757 established Merwan Cama’s title, which devolved upon the plaintiffs.

  • The property was held as tenants-in-common, not joint tenants, and thus Merwan Cama’s share could not be extinguished by survivorship.

  • Relied on Babu Lal vs. M/s. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 525 to argue that the relief of partition is not mandatory in every case.

For the Respondents

  • Defendant No. 3: Contended that Section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act is mandatory and prohibits the grant of relief unless partition is specifically claimed. The agreements pertained to an undivided share, making the relief of partition essential.

  • The agreements for sale were contingent contracts dependent on the success of RCS No. 4915 of 2012. With the withdrawal of the suit, the contracts became void and unenforceable.

  • Merwan Cama’s claim was based on the Release Deed dated 26.08.2008, which was challenged as fraudulent. The Indenture dated 25.05.1989 and subsequent documents prima facie established Defendant No. 2’s title.

  • The plaintiffs suppressed material facts, including the development agreement dated 21.07.1981, Indenture dated 25.05.1989, and Mutation Entry No. 15829, which were adverse to their case.

  • The Gift Deed dated 12.09.1947 created a joint tenancy, not a tenancy-in-common, and upon Mackly Cama’s death, Feroz Cama became the sole owner of the 50% share.

  • Defendant No. 1(d) acted as the Administrator of Merwan Cama’s estate, not as an executor, and no probate was required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

The Court's Analysis

The Court conducted a detailed examination of the legal and factual matrix, focusing on the following key aspects:

  1. Description of the Suit Property:The plaint described the suit properties as undivided shares (40 R and 1 H 20 R) out of the larger land but failed to specify whether they were part of Survey No. 236, Survey No. 238, or both. The Court held that Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 mandates a sufficient description of the property to identify it. The absence of such description rendered the injunction sought a blanket injunction, which could not be granted.

  2. Mandatory Nature of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act:The Court emphasized that Section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act provides that no relief shall be granted unless it has been specifically claimed. Since the plaintiffs sought specific performance of an undivided share, the relief of partition and separate possession was mandatory. The Court relied on Babu Lal vs. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. to clarify that while the relief of partition is not always mandatory, it becomes essential when the subject matter is an undivided share. The Court held:

    "The provisions of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act permits the Plaintiffs to seek the relief of partition and separate possession in an appropriate case and provides that no relief shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed. As the claim of specific performance was qua undivided share of the subject property, this was an appropriate case in which the relief for partition and separate possession ought to have been claimed, without which no relief of injunction could be granted."

  3. Contingent Contracts and Withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012:The Court held that the agreements for sale were contingent contracts dependent on the success of RCS No. 4915 of 2012. The withdrawal of the suit rendered the contracts void and unenforceable. The Court noted:

    "Being contingent contracts, the withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012 deals a crushing blow to the Plaintiffs’ claim to the suit property. Whether there was fraudulent withdrawal of the suit is subject matter of an independent restoration application filed by the Plaintiffs for restoring RCS No. 4915 of 2012. In the present proceedings, pending the adjudication of the issues in the restoration application, the Trial Court could not have ventured into the aspect of fraudulent withdrawal of the suit and has rightly declined to do so."

  4. Prima Facie Title of Merwan Cama:The Court examined the documents on record and held that Merwan Cama did not have prima facie title to the suit property at the time of executing the agreements. The Indenture dated 25.05.1989, Mutation Entry No. 15829, and subsequent documents established Defendant No. 2’s title. The Court observed:

    "The Trial Court has considered the documents placed on record to arrive at a finding that, at the time of execution of the Agreements dated 22nd May 2012 and 18th October 2013, Merwan Cama was not having title in respect of the suit property. The withdrawal of R.C.S. No. 4915 of 2012 puts an end to any claim for ownership of the subject property by Merwan Cama and resultantly of the Plaintiffs and unless the claim is revived, no injunction could have been granted against the Defendants."

  5. Fraudulent Withdrawal and Settlement Agreements:The Court noted that the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding fraudulent withdrawal were more relevant to the restoration application pending before the Trial Court. The Settlement Agreements did not admit Merwan Cama’s title but merely referred to the Release Deed as a "purported Release Deed" for the purpose of settling the dispute. The Court held:

    "The settlement agreements on which much reliance has been placed by Mr. Sharma records that, with an intention to put a quietus to the litigation, the parties have agreed to settle the dispute. The recitals to the Settlement Agreement also record that based on the purported Release Deed dated 26th August 2008, Merwan Cama had filed several proceedings, which also included the R.C.S. 4915 of 2012. Prima facie perusal of the clauses of the Settlement Agreement would indicate that Defendant No. 2 has not accepted that under the Release Deed, Merwan Cama had acquired any right, as it refers to the Release Deed as a `purported Release Deed’ and that only for the purpose of putting a quietus to the litigation, the dispute is settled."

  6. Joint Tenancy vs. Tenancy-in-Common:The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the property was held as tenants-in-common. The Gift Deed dated 12.09.1947 created a joint tenancy, and upon Mackly Cama’s death, Feroz Cama became the sole owner of the 50% share. The Court held:

    "The contention also cannot be accepted for the reason that the Gift Deed executed by Mancherji Cama in favour of Feroz Cama and Mackly Cama gifts the property as joint tenants. Upon death of Mackly Cama, it is Feroz Cama who becomes the owner of the subject property and it is Feroz Cama who had alienated the property in favour of Defendant No. 2 in the year 1989."

The Verdict

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Trial Court’s order dated 03.02.2026 rejecting the interim injunction application. The Court held:

  1. The plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for specific performance, as the agreements for sale were contingent contracts rendered void by the withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012.

  2. The balance of convenience was in favour of the defendants, who claimed title under the Indenture dated 25.05.1989 and subsequent documents.

  3. The plaintiffs did not seek the mandatory relief of partition and separate possession under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, rendering the injunction unsustainable.

  4. The description of the suit property in the plaint was insufficient, and granting an injunction would amount to a blanket injunction on the entire land.

  5. The Trial Court’s discretion was exercised judiciously, and no perversity was demonstrated to warrant interference by the Appellate Court.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Mandatory Claim for Partition Under Section 22 SRA

  • Practitioners must ensure that suits for specific performance of undivided shares in immovable property include a claim for partition and separate possession under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The absence of such a claim is fatal to interim relief, even if the plaintiff has a prima facie case of entitlement.

  • Courts will not grant injunctions that amount to blanket injunctions on entire properties when the subject matter is an undivided share. Specific identification of the share is essential.

Contingent Contracts and Title Disputes

  • Agreements for sale contingent on the outcome of pending litigation (e.g., suits for declaration of title) become void and unenforceable if the litigation is withdrawn or dismissed. Parties must ensure that such contingencies are clearly addressed in the agreement.

  • Prima facie title is a critical factor in interim injunction applications. Plaintiffs must establish their entitlement to the property at the time of executing the agreement, failing which the relief will be denied.

Procedural Compliance and Suppression of Facts

  • Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC mandates a sufficient description of the property in the plaint. Vague descriptions (e.g., "undivided share in Survey Nos. 236 and 238") will lead to rejection of interim relief.

  • Suppression of material facts, such as prior agreements, mutation entries, or litigation history, will be viewed adversely by courts and may result in the dismissal of interim applications.

  • Arguments regarding fraudulent withdrawal of suits are best adjudicated in restoration applications rather than interim injunction proceedings. Courts are reluctant to delve into such issues at the interim stage.

Case Details

Mrs. Surinder Kaur J. Chhabara & Anr. v. Late Merwan Feroze Cama (through Legal Heirs) & Ors.

PDF
Court
High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Date
17 June 2026
Case Number
Appeal from Order No. 476 of 2026
Bench
Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Counsel
Pet: Mr. Sitesh Sharma a/w Mr. Anurag Mishra, Mr. Vijay Upadhyay and Ms. Asha Kanzariya
Res: Mr. Akshay Doctor a/w Mr. Parag Sawant, Ms. C. Gala, Mr. Bhumanyu Singh Champavat i/b P.S. Chambers for Respondent No. 1(d), Mr. Rubin Vakil a/w Ms. Sonam Mhatre, Ms. Soloni Sulakhe, Ms. Declan Fernandez and Ms. Krushika Udeshi i/b Dhaval Vussonji & Associates for Respondent No. 2, Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar i/b Mr. Bishwajeet Mukherjee for Respondent No. 3

Frequently Asked Questions

Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 requires that when a plaintiff seeks specific performance of an agreement pertaining to an undivided share in immovable property, they must also claim partition and separate possession of the share. The Court held that this requirement is mandatory, and the absence of such a claim renders the relief of injunction unsustainable, even if the plaintiff has a prima facie case of entitlement.
Yes. The Court held that if an agreement for sale is contingent on the success of pending litigation (e.g., a suit for declaration of title), the withdrawal or dismissal of the litigation renders the contract void and unenforceable. This principle was applied to the agreements in this case, which became void upon the withdrawal of RCS No. 4915 of 2012.
Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 mandates that the plaint must contain a sufficient description of the property to identify it. The Court held that vague descriptions (e.g., "undivided share in Survey Nos. 236 and 238") are insufficient and may lead to the rejection of interim relief, as granting an injunction without proper description would amount to a blanket injunction on the entire property.
No. The Court clarified that prima facie observations in interim orders (e.g., the Review Petition order acknowledging Merwan Cama’s undivided share) do not survive the final withdrawal or dismissal of the proceedings. Such observations cannot form the basis for granting injunctions in subsequent litigation.
In joint tenancy, co-owners hold property with the right of survivorship, meaning that upon the death of one co-owner, their share automatically passes to the surviving co-owner(s). In tenancy-in-common, co-owners hold distinct shares, and upon death, the share passes to the co-owner’s heirs, not the surviving co-owners. The Court held that the Gift Deed in this case created a joint tenancy, and thus Merwan Cama’s share did not devolve upon him by inheritance upon his mother’s death.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.