The Rajasthan High Court has granted interim relief to contractual employees, restraining their termination upon attaining 60 years and extending their retirement age to 62 years, aligning their service conditions with regular employees. This order, grounded in the State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Sharma precedent, underscores the principle of parity in retirement benefits between contractual and regular employees under the Rajasthan Contractual Hiring to Civil Posts Rules, 2022.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Inder Pal, a 59-year-old Ayurved Officer working at Primary Health Centre (PHC) Ajeetpura, District Hanumangarh, challenged the impending termination of his services upon attaining 60 years. His contractual engagement, governed by the Rajasthan Contractual Hiring to Civil Posts Rules, 2022 (hereinafter, Rules of 2022), stipulated retirement at 60 years. However, the petitioner contended that regular Ayush Doctors, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Sharma, were entitled to retire at 62 years, creating an arbitrary disparity.
Key Facts
- The petitioner was engaged on a contractual basis under the Rules of 2022, which fixed the retirement age at 60 years
- Regular Ayush Doctors, governed by separate service rules, had their retirement age extended to 62 years pursuant to the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Sharma (SLP(C) Nos. 14308-14318/2022)
- The petitioner’s appointment order (Annexure-10) reflected a contractual period extending till 14.05.2028
- The petitioner sought parity in retirement age, arguing that contractual employees should not be deprived of benefits extended to regular employees performing identical roles
Procedural History
- 16.02.2026: A Co-ordinate Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, in Dayaram Saran v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (SBCWP No. 2563/2026), issued notices and granted interim relief, restraining termination of the petitioner’s services until further orders or attainment of 62 years, whichever was earlier
- 29.06.2026: The present writ petition (SBCWP No. 12176/2026) was filed, seeking similar relief on grounds of parity with the Dayaram Saran order
- 29.06.2026: The High Court issued notices to the respondents, returnable within four weeks, and granted interim relief restraining termination of the petitioner’s services until further orders or attainment of 62 years
- The matter was directed to be connected with SBCWP Nos. 2563/2026, 12177/2026, and 12193/2026
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought:
- A direction restraining the respondents from terminating his services upon attaining 60 years
- Extension of retirement age to 62 years, on par with regular Ayush Doctors
- Interim relief pending final disposal of the writ petition
The Legal Issue
The central question before the Court was whether contractual employees, governed by the Rules of 2022, were entitled to the same retirement age extension (from 60 to 62 years) as regular employees, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Sharma and the principle of non-discrimination in service conditions.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
- The petitioner relied on the order dated 16.02.2026 in Dayaram Saran v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., wherein the High Court had prima facie accepted the argument for parity between contractual and regular employees
- It was contended that the Rules of 2022 did not justify differential treatment in retirement age, especially when the Supreme Court had already extended the benefit to regular employees
- The petitioner argued that the contractual period, as reflected in Annexure-10, was coterminous with the extended retirement age, and termination at 60 years would be arbitrary and discriminatory
For the Respondents
(Note: The judgment does not record the respondents’ arguments, likely because the matter was disposed of at the notice stage with interim relief.)
The Court's Analysis
The Court, relying on the Co-ordinate Bench’s order in Dayaram Saran, adopted a prima facie view that contractual employees should not be subjected to discriminatory treatment in retirement age. The analysis hinged on the following principles:
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Principle of Parity: The Court observed that the Rules of 2022 did not inherently preclude contractual employees from availing benefits extended to regular employees. The Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Sharma had already established that Ayush Doctors, irrespective of their mode of engagement, were entitled to retire at 62 years. The Court reasoned that denying the same benefit to contractual employees would create an unreasonable classification.
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Interim Relief as Equitable Measure: The Court noted that the petitioner’s appointment order explicitly reflected a contractual period extending beyond 60 years. Terminating his services at 60, while regular employees continued till 62, would result in irreparable prejudice. The grant of interim relief was thus justified to maintain the status quo until final adjudication.
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Judicial Precedent: The Court placed reliance on the Co-ordinate Bench’s order in Dayaram Saran, which had already issued notices and granted interim relief on identical grounds. This consistency reinforced the prima facie validity of the petitioner’s claim.
"The above legal position is not in dispute. The only issue in the present writ petition is that though the petitioner is working on contractual basis with a maximum period of service till the age of 60 years, however, since the age of retirement of the regular employees has been increased to 62 years, this Court, prima facie, feels that such benefit shall also be extended to such employees though working on contractual basis."
The Verdict
The Court granted interim relief to the petitioner, restraining the respondents from terminating his services upon attaining 60 years. The operative directions were:
- The respondents were restrained from terminating the petitioner’s services until further orders or until he attains the age of 62 years, whichever is earlier
- Notices were issued to the respondents, returnable within four weeks
- The matter was connected with SBCWP Nos. 2563/2026, 12177/2026, and 12193/2026 for joint adjudication
What This Means For Similar Cases
Contractual Employees Can Claim Parity in Service Benefits
This judgment reinforces the principle that contractual employees cannot be arbitrarily deprived of benefits extended to regular employees, particularly when the underlying service conditions are identical. Practitioners should note:
- Statutory Interpretation: Courts are likely to interpret service rules liberally to avoid discriminatory outcomes. Where a benefit (e.g., retirement age extension) is granted to regular employees, contractual employees may successfully argue for parity, especially if the contractual terms align with the extended period
- Interim Relief: Petitioners can seek interim relief to prevent irreparable prejudice, such as premature termination, pending final adjudication. The Court’s willingness to grant such relief underscores the urgency of addressing discriminatory practices
The Burden of Justifying Differential Treatment Lies on the State
- The respondents failed to demonstrate any rational basis for denying the retirement age extension to contractual employees. This shifts the burden of proof onto the State to justify differential treatment under service rules
- Practitioners should challenge arbitrary classifications in service conditions, particularly where contractual and regular employees perform identical roles and functions
Strategic Litigation for Service Matters
- Connecting Matters: The Court’s direction to connect multiple writ petitions (SBCWP Nos. 2563/2026, 12177/2026, and 12193/2026) suggests a trend toward consolidating similar service disputes for efficient adjudication. Practitioners should consider filing joint petitions or seeking consolidation to strengthen their claims
- Reliance on Co-ordinate Bench Orders: Where a Co-ordinate Bench has already granted interim relief on identical grounds, petitioners can cite such orders to bolster their claims for parity or non-discrimination
