The Chhattisgarh High Court has reaffirmed that courts must exercise discretion under Order 7 Rule 11(c) CPC with a justice-oriented approach, rejecting plaints only when there is clear evidence of deliberate evasion of court fees. This ruling underscores the procedural safeguards available to litigants who act in good faith.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The original plaintiff, Bhagwat Shukla, filed Civil Suit No. 17-A/2019 seeking declaration that two gift deeds dated 16.07.2018 were null and void, and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The suit involved immovable property located in Nandani Nagar, Ahiwara, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. The defendants, Tarkeshwari Shukla and Alka Shukla, are the daughters of the original plaintiff and claim title under the impugned gift deeds.
Key Facts
- The suit was filed on the basis of alleged undue influence and lack of consideration in the execution of the gift deeds.
- The court fee paid by the original plaintiff was Rs. 1,52,000, while the requisite fee as per the Chhattisgarh Court Fees Act was Rs. 3,04,000.
- The defendants filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(c) CPC challenging the insufficiency of court fee.
- The original plaintiff, Bhagwat Shukla, passed away on 10.03.2024 during the pendency of the suit.
- The appellant, Siddharth Shukla, grandson of the original plaintiff, was substituted as plaintiff on 24.04.2024.
- On 24.04.2024, the substituted plaintiff filed an application under Section 149 CPC seeking permission to deposit 50% of the deficient court fee (Rs. 1,52,000) immediately and the balance later, prior to adjudication.
Procedural History
- 16.07.2018: Execution of the two impugned gift deeds.
- 2019: Civil Suit No. 17-A/2019 filed by Bhagwat Shukla.
- 07.02.2024: Trial Court held that court fee was insufficient and granted one month to pay the balance.
- 24.04.2024: Substitution of plaintiff; application under Section 149 CPC filed seeking partial payment with time for balance.
- 15.05.2024: Trial Court rejected the Section 149 application but granted 15 days to pay full court fee.
- 22.10.2024: Fixed for hearing; plaintiff sought further time.
- 04.11.2024: Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(c) CPC for failure to pay court fee despite multiple extensions.
- 04.11.2024: Appeal filed before the High Court under Section 96 CPC.
- 15.04.2026: Judgment delivered by the Division Bench.
The Parties' Positions
Appellant (Siddharth Shukla): Argued that the failure to pay the full court fee was not willful. He demonstrated willingness to pay half the fee immediately and sought reasonable time for the remainder. He emphasized the familial relationship between parties and absence of mala fide.
Respondents (Tarkeshwari and Alka Shukla): Contended that the plaintiff had been granted multiple opportunities over seven months and failed to comply. They argued that Order 7 Rule 11(c) is mandatory and non-compliance warrants rejection.
Respondent State (Collector, Durg): Supported the trial court’s decision on technical grounds, asserting that court fee compliance is a statutory precondition.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought setting aside of the order dated 04.11.2024 rejecting the plaint, restoration of the suit, and an opportunity to pay the full court fee in installments with final deadline.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Order 7 Rule 11(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure mandates automatic rejection of a plaint upon non-payment of court fee, or whether the court retains discretion to extend time when the default is not willful and the litigant demonstrates bona fide intent to comply.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
Learned counsel relied on Raju Thomas and Others v. Devu and Others (2019) 14 SCC 611 to argue that courts must adopt a pragmatic approach. He emphasized that the substituted plaintiff had moved an application under Section 149 CPC, offered to pay 50% of the fee immediately, and sought only reasonable time for the balance. He contended that the trial court’s refusal to consider the substitution of parties and the genuine intent to pay rendered the rejection unjust and contrary to the spirit of procedural justice.
For the Respondent
Counsel for respondents argued that the trial court had granted three separate extensions over seven months, and the plaintiff’s failure to pay despite ample opportunity constituted deliberate non-compliance. They asserted that Order 7 Rule 11(c) is a mandatory provision and that courts have no power to condone non-payment unless the statute explicitly permits it. They further contended that allowing partial payment would set a precedent undermining statutory compliance.
The Court's Analysis
The Division Bench undertook a detailed examination of Order 7 Rule 11(c) and Section 149 CPC, noting that the former permits rejection only if the plaintiff, after being directed by the court, fails to supply the requisite stamp paper. The latter, however, explicitly confers discretionary power on the court to allow payment of deficient court fee at any stage.
"The provision contained under Order 7 Rule 11(c) of the CPC confers discretionary power upon the Court to extend the time for payment of deficit court fee if sufficient cause is shown. The said provision is intended to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it on technical grounds."
The Court observed that the trial court had initially granted time for payment, then rejected the Section 149 application without considering the substitution of parties or the plaintiff’s willingness to pay half the fee. The Court emphasized that the Supreme Court in Raju Thomas had held that a mistake by counsel, absent mala fide, cannot justify rejection of a plaint.
The Bench noted that the plaintiff’s conduct - filing a Section 149 application, offering immediate partial payment, and seeking only a reasonable extension - demonstrated bona fide intent. The fact that the original plaintiff had died during litigation and the grandson was substituted further mitigated any suggestion of deliberate delay.
The Court rejected the trial court’s "hyper-technical" approach, stating that procedural rules must serve justice, not obstruct it. It held that the trial court’s failure to appreciate the discretionary nature of Section 149 CPC and the equitable considerations under Order 7 Rule 11(c) amounted to an error of law.
The Verdict
The appeal was allowed. The impugned order dated 04.11.2024 rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(c) CPC is set aside. The suit is restored to the original number and remanded to the trial court for disposal in accordance with law. The appellant is granted a final opportunity to deposit the entire court fee of Rs. 3,04,000 on or before 17.06.2026. If the fee is not paid by that date, the trial court may proceed to dismiss the suit. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 17.06.2026.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Bona Fide Conduct Overrides Technical Non-Compliance
- Practitioners must now argue that Section 149 CPC provides a statutory safety valve for genuine litigants who act in good faith.
- Courts must examine the totality of conduct - including applications filed, partial payments made, and reasons for delay - before rejecting a plaint.
- Mere non-payment, without proof of willful default, cannot justify rejection under Order 7 Rule 11(c).
Substitution of Parties Does Not Invalidate Relief Under Section 149 CPC
- When a plaintiff dies during litigation, the substituted party inherits the right to seek condonation of court fee deficiency.
- The court must treat the substituted plaintiff’s application under Section 149 CPC as a continuation of the original litigant’s intent.
- Delay caused by succession or substitution cannot be equated with mala fide evasion.
Discretion Must Be Exercised Judicially, Not Mechanically
- Trial courts are cautioned against adopting mechanical or hyper-technical interpretations of procedural rules.
- The phrase "fails to do so" in Order 7 Rule 11(c) must be read in conjunction with the enabling power under Section 149 CPC.
- A litigant’s willingness to pay a substantial portion of the fee, coupled with a request for reasonable time, constitutes sufficient cause for extension.
