The Bombay High Court dismissed a criminal appeal challenging conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC, affirming that dying declarations remain admissible and reliable even when death occurs after a delay due to medical complications, and rejecting challenges to the identity of the accused based on minor IMEI digit variance.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Tahir Khan, was convicted by the Sessions Court, Daman for murdering his roommate and fellow fruit seller, Hasruddin Sarafuddin Shaikh, by assaulting him with a knife on 21.05.2013. The deceased succumbed to injuries on 04.06.2013 due to septicemia with perforative peritonitis. The prosecution case rested entirely on three dying declarations made by the deceased to witnesses.
Key Facts
- The incident occurred on 21.05.2013 when both parties consumed liquor near Girish Bar, Kachigaon in Daman
- At approximately 2:00 a.m. on 22.05.2013, the appellant asked the deceased to lift a bag containing wine and beer
- Upon refusal, the appellant assaulted the deceased with a knife, causing multiple injuries before fleeing
- The deceased was found injured in an abandoned building on the morning of 22.05.2013
- FIR CR No. 20/2013 was registered on 22/05/2013 at Coastal Police Station, Moti Daman under Sections 307 and 504 IPC
- The deceased was treated at Government Hospital, Marward from 22.05.2013 and shifted to J.J. Hospital, Mumbai on 26.05.2013
- The deceased succumbed to injuries on 04.06.2013 at J.J. Hospital, Mumbai
- The offence was initially registered under Section 307 IPC and later converted to Section 302 IPC
- The appellant was arrested on 06.07.2013
- The chargesheet was filed before Judicial Magistrate First Class, Daman
- The case was committed to Court of Sessions, Moti Daman as Sessions Case No. 27/2013
- Charge was framed under Section 302 IPC on 12.10.2015
- P.W. 1 (waiter at Girish Bar) recorded the deceased's statement at Govt. Hospital, Marward on 22.05.2013
- P.W. 2 (Head Constable) recorded the deceased's statement at the hospital on 22.05.2013 at 7:10 a.m.
- P.W. 11 (PSI) recorded a written dying declaration in the presence of a doctor on 22.05.2013
- The post-mortem conducted on 04.06.2013 revealed 59 ante-mortem injuries
- The Sessions Court, Daman convicted the appellant on 24.05.2017 sentencing him to life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/
Procedural History
- 22.05.2013: FIR registered and dying declarations recorded by P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 11
- 04.06.2013: Deceased succumbed to injuries
- 06.07.2013: Appellant arrested
- 12.10.2015: Charge framed under Section 302 IPC
- 24.05.2017: Sessions Court, Daman convicted appellant under Section 302 IPC (life imprisonment and Rs. 500 fine)
- Present Appeal: Filed challenging the conviction and order dated 24.05.2017
- 24.06.2026: Arguments heard
- 22.09.2026: Judgment pronounced
Relief Sought
The appellant sought acquittal by challenging the conviction and sentence, arguing that the dying declarations were inadmissible and unreliable, the identity of the assailant was not established, and the conviction was based on insufficient evidence.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the dying declarations made by the deceased were admissible and reliable under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act despite the deceased not being in expectation of imminent death at the time of recording and succumbing to injuries after a delay due to septicemia, and whether the prosecution had established the identity of the appellant as the assailant named in the dying declarations.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The appellant contended that the dying declarations were inadmissible because: (1) the deceased was not under expectation of imminent death when statements were recorded; (2) the deceased was in a semi-conscious state without medical certification of fitness; (3) the statements were not recorded before a Magistrate; and (4) the delay in death (from 22.05.2013 to 04.06.2013) broke the causal nexus between injuries and death. Regarding identity, the appellant argued that the deceased named the assailant as 'Tahir' or 'Tahir Pathan' while he identified himself as 'Tahir Khan', creating a material discrepancy. The appellant also challenged the CDR/IMEI evidence, asserting that a variance in the last digit of IMEI numbers (3517125040924240 vs 3517125040924247) indicated two distinct devices, undermining the link between the mobile number given by the deceased and the handset recovered from him.
For the Respondent
The State countered that dying declarations require no expectation of imminent death under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, citing Laxman v. State of Maharashtra and Neeraj Kumar v. State of U.P. It argued that the deceased was conscious and talking when statements were recorded (per P.W. 11), making medical certification unnecessary. The State maintained that the dying declarations were consistent, voluntary and free from tutoring, satisfying the tests in Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh. On identity, the State relied on the appellant's own Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement admitting possession of the mobile number. Regarding IMEI evidence, the State relied on Sundar alias Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police to explain that variance in the last digit (Luhn check digit) does not indicate separate devices when the first 14 digits match.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by referencing Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710, which established that expectation of imminent death is not a prerequisite for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The Court emphasized that the key requirement is whether the statement relates to the cause of death or circumstances leading to it, not the declarant's mental state at the time of recording. Applying this principle, the Court found meritless the appellant's contention that the declarations were invalid due to the deceased's semi-conscious state, noting P.W. 11's testimony that the deceased was conscious and talking at the time of recording the written declaration.
On the reliability of the dying declarations, the Court applied the eleven-point test from Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1060. It found the declarations consistent across all three witnesses (P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 11), with the deceased repeatedly naming 'Tahir' as the assailant and describing the incident identically each time. The Court held there was no evidence of tutoring, prompting or imagination, as the declarations were made voluntarily and matched the prosecution's version of events. Crucially, the Court rejected the argument that delay in death invalidates dying declarations, citing Neeraj Kumar v. State of U.P. and Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, which clarify that Section 32 contains no temporal limitation and admissibility depends on whether the statement relates to the cause of death.
Addressing the medical complications argument, the Court relied on Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1960, which holds that where injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and complications like septicemia are a direct result of those injuries, the inflictor remains liable for murder. The Court noted P.W. 6's post-mortem findings that the septicemia which caused death was a direct result of complications from the incised stab injuries, with no independent intervening cause suggested on record.
On the identity challenge, the Court found the appellant's Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement - where he admitted possession of the mobile number - undermined his claim of false implication. The Court held that mere bald assertions of false implication without supporting evidence were insufficient to raise doubt, especially when the dying declarations consistently named 'Tahir' as the assailant.
Regarding the CDR/IMEI evidence, the Court relied on Sundar alias Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police, (2024) 12 SCC 764, which explains that the last digit of an IMEI number is a Luhn check digit calculated from the first 14 digits. Since the first 14 digits matched (351712504092424), the variance in the last digit (0 vs 7) did not indicate two separate devices but rather reflected a new mobile number assigned to the same handset. The Court concluded the prosecution had established a cogent chain: the deceased gave mobile number 7874924397, which was linked to IMEI 3517125040924240, later associated with number 9978556508, and the handset recovered from the appellant bore IMEI 3517125040924247 - confirming the same device with a number change.
Finally, the Court affirmed the Sessions Court's reliance on dying declarations as the sole basis for conviction, holding that where such declarations are voluntary, truthful and free from tutoring, they can sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC even without eyewitness testimony.
The Verdict
The appeal was dismissed. The Bombay High Court upheld the conviction and sentence of the Sessions Court, Daman dated 24.05.2017, which sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC and a fine of Rs. 500/, with default imprisonment of 15 days rigorous imprisonment. The Court confirmed that the dying declarations were admissible and reliable under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, that the identity of the appellant as the assailant was established, and that the delay in death due to septicemia did not break the causal nexus between the injuries and the eventual death.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Dying Declarations Require No Expectation of Imminent Death
Practitioners must note that under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, a statement need not be made in expectation of imminent death to qualify as a dying declaration. The key inquiry is whether the statement relates to the cause of death or circumstances leading to it. Medical certification of fitness is not mandatory if eyewitnesses confirm the declarant was conscious and capable of narration, as established by Laxman v. State of Maharashtra.
Delay in Death Due to Natural Complications Does Not Break Causal Nexus
Where injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and supervening complications like septicemia or peritonitis are a direct and probable consequence of those injuries, the accused remains liable for murder. The courts will not accept arguments that delay in death invalidates the causal connection when medical evidence shows the complications flowed naturally from the inflicted injuries, per Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh.
Minor IMEI Digit Variance Does Not Defeat Prosecution's Case
A difference in the last digit of IMEI numbers between seizure records and call detail records does not indicate separate devices when the first 14 digits match. The last digit is a Luhn check digit mathematically derived from the preceding digits, and such variance is routinely explained as a technical artifact rather than evidence of device substitution, following Sundar alias Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police.
