Compromise Permissible in Minor Offences Under BNS Section 115(2) & JJ Act Section 75 | Quashing of FIR Allowed for Voluntary Settlement : Himachal Pradesh HC

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed that criminal proceedings involving petty offences, not affecting society at large, can be quashed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) when parties reach a compromise. This judgment clarifies the scope of inherent powers to quash FIRs, distinguishing between heinous crimes and offences of a personal nature where settlement promotes reconciliation.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioner, a teacher at a Government Primary School in Bharai-Ra-Gran, Kullu, was accused of assaulting a minor student (daughter of the complainant) on 23.05.2026, resulting in a fractured finger. An FIR (No. 87 of 2022) was registered against him on 26.05.2026 under:

• Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (cruelty to a child)
• Section 115(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (replacing Section 323 IPC, punishment for voluntarily causing hurt)

Key Facts

• The complainant (Ms. Reena Devi) alleged that the petitioner, her daughter’s teacher, physically assaulted the child during school hours
• The incident occurred on 23.05.2026, and the FIR was lodged three days later (26.05.2026)
• No chargesheet had been filed before the competent court at the time of the compromise
• The petitioner and complainant entered into a compromise, with the petitioner apologizing and undertaking not to repeat such conduct

Procedural History

• 26.05.2026: FIR registered at Police Station Sadar Kullu
• Pre-chargesheet stage: Parties entered into a compromise
• 03.07.2026: Petition (Cr.MMO No. 666 of 2026) filed under Section 528 BNS (equivalent to Section 482 CrPC) for quashing of FIR
• 03.07.2026: Complainant’s statement recorded on oath, confirming voluntary compromise without coercion
• 03.07.2026: High Court disposed of the petition, quashing the FIR

The Parties' Positions

• Petitioner: Sought quashing of FIR on the basis of compromise, arguing that the offences were petty and personal in nature, with no societal impact
• Complainant: Voluntarily stated on oath that she had no objection to quashing the FIR, having accepted the petitioner’s apology
• State (Respondent): Fairly conceded that continuation of proceedings would serve no purpose, as conviction was unlikely given the compromise

Relief Sought

The petitioner sought:

• Quashing of FIR No. 87 of 2022 dated 26.05.2026
• Acquittal from charges under Section 75 JJ Act and Section 115(2) BNS
• Disposal of all consequential proceedings

The Legal Issue

The central question was whether the High Court could exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 BNS to quash an FIR involving offences under Section 75 JJ Act and Section 115(2) BNS, where the parties had amicably settled the dispute, particularly when:

1. One of the offences (Section 75 JJ Act) pertained to cruelty against a child, a vulnerable section of society
2. The offences were not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC (or its BNS equivalent)
3. The Supreme Court’s guidelines in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab caution against quashing FIRs in heinous or socially impactful offences

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

• Relied on Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab to argue that Section 528 BNS empowers the High Court to quash proceedings in cases of a predominantly civil or personal nature, especially where parties have compromised
• Contended that the offences in question were petty and personal, with no grave societal impact, and continuation of proceedings would serve no purpose
• Highlighted that the complainant had voluntarily forgiven the petitioner, and no public interest would be served by prosecuting the case

For the Respondent/State

• Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocate General, fairly conceded that:
  • The offences were not heinous or of extreme depravity
  • The chances of conviction were remote given the complainant’s statement
  • Continuation of proceedings would widen the rift between the parties rather than promote justice
  • No fruitful purpose would be served by sustaining the FIR

The Court's Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed examination of the scope of inherent powers under Section 528 BNS (equivalent to Section 482 CrPC) to quash criminal proceedings, particularly in light of compromises between parties. Key observations included:

1. Distinction Between Compoundable and Non-Compoundable Offences:

   "Power conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. No doubt, under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the High Court has inherent power to quash criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable and where the parties have settled the matter between themselves, however, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution."

   The Court noted that while Section 320 CrPC provides for compounding of specific offences, Section 528 BNS grants broader inherent powers to quash proceedings, even in non-compoundable cases, subject to judicial restraint.

2. Parameters for Quashing FIRs: The Court relied on the guidelines laid down in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab and reiterated in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, which categorize offences into two broad groups:

   • Heinous and Serious Offences: Such as murder, rape, dacoity, or offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, which cannot be quashed merely on the basis of compromise due to their societal impact
   • Petty Offences or Offences of Personal Nature: Such as those arising from commercial transactions, matrimonial disputes, or family settlements, which may be quashed if parties compromise, as they do not affect public interest

   The Court observed:

   "Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Apart from this, offences committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender."

3. Application to the Present Case:

   • The Court held that the offences under Section 75 JJ Act and Section 115(2) BNS were not heinous or of extreme depravity
   • The incident was personal in nature, involving a teacher-student dispute, with no broader societal ramifications
   • The complainant had voluntarily compromised, and continuation of proceedings would serve no fruitful purpose
   • The Court distinguished the case from offences involving public servants or corruption, where compromise is impermissible

4. Reiteration of Principles in Dimpey Gujral and Parbatbhai Aahir: The Court cited Dimpey Gujral v. Union Territory to emphasize that quashing proceedings in personal offences promotes peace and amity between parties. It also referred to Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, which reaffirmed the Narinder Singh guidelines, holding that continuation of proceedings in settled petty offences amounts to abuse of process.

The Verdict

The Court allowed the petition and:

• Quashed FIR No. 87 of 2022 dated 26.05.2026, registered at Police Station Sadar Kullu, under Section 75 JJ Act and Section 115(2) BNS
• Acquitted the petitioner of all charges framed against him
• Disposed of the petition along with all pending applications

What This Means For Similar Cases

Compromise Permissible in Petty Offences, Even Under JJ Act

• Offences under the Juvenile Justice Act are not automatically excluded from quashing on compromise. Courts must assess the nature and gravity of the offence and its societal impact
• Section 75 JJ Act (cruelty to a child) was not treated as a heinous offence in this case, as the incident was personal and isolated, with no evidence of systemic abuse or public harm
• Practitioners should argue that not all offences involving children are non-compoundable - context matters (e.g., a one-time altercation vs. exploitation or trafficking)

Inherent Powers Under Section 528 BNS Must Be Exercised Judiciously

• Section 528 BNS (like Section 482 CrPC) is not a blanket power - it requires caution and sparing use, particularly in offences affecting vulnerable groups
• The Court distinguished this case from offences like murder, rape, or corruption, where compromise is strictly prohibited
• Key takeaway: The test is whether the offence is private or public in nature - if the former, compromise may be permitted; if the latter, quashing is impermissible

Complainant’s Voluntary Statement is Crucial

• The complainant’s statement on oath played a decisive role - her voluntary forgiveness and absence of coercion weighed heavily in the Court’s decision
• Practitioners must ensure:
  • The compromise is genuine and voluntary (no undue pressure)
  • The complainant’s statement is recorded on oath before the Court
  • The State does not oppose the quashing (as in this case, where the Deputy Advocate General conceded)
• Failure to meet these conditions may result in rejection of the quashing plea, even in petty offences

No Chargesheet? Higher Chances of Quashing

• The Court noted that no chargesheet had been filed before the compromise, making quashing more likely
• Post-chargesheet stage: Courts may be more reluctant to quash, as the trial process has commenced
• Strategy for practitioners: File quashing petitions at the earliest stage, preferably before chargesheet, to maximize chances of success