The Bombay High Court’s judgment in Ramesh Dattatray Tapase v. State of Maharashtra redefines the scope of criminal negligence under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code by affirming that liability arises not from the mechanism of death, but from the breach of duty that directly causes it. This ruling clarifies that even without physical contact from a vehicle’s wheel, a conductor’s premature signaling of departure can constitute actionable negligence if it precipitates fatal consequences.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
On 18 October 1992, five-year-old Rubina died after falling from an ST bus at Kamba village, Thane. Her grandmother, PW-2 Kairunissa Abdul Rehman, and Rubina were the last passengers alighting. As they descended, the applicant, a bus conductor, rang the bell prematurely. The driver, A-2, immediately moved the bus forward. Rubina lost her grip, fell, and struck the bus before collapsing. She suffered a fatal skull fracture and died instantly. The bus continued moving for a short distance before stopping.
Procedural History
- 1992: FIR registered under Section 279, Section 304A IPC, and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act against both the conductor (applicant) and driver (A-2)
- 1996: Trial Court convicted the applicant under Section 304A IPC, sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment and ₹3,000 fine; acquitted A-2
- 2003: Appellate Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, upholding conviction
- 2026: Criminal Revision Application filed before Bombay High Court challenging conviction
Relief Sought
The applicant sought acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence and inconsistency in the prosecution’s theory. Alternatively, he requested sentence reduction due to advanced age, prolonged litigation, and health deterioration after 30 years.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 304A IPC applies when death results from a conductor’s negligent act - ringing the bell before passengers fully alighted - even if the victim did not come under the vehicle’s wheel, and whether acquittal of the driver necessarily invalidates the conductor’s conviction.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant/Petitioner
Mr. Girish Kulkarni, Senior Counsel, argued that the prosecution’s theory was physically implausible: PW-4 admitted the bus door was behind the left rear wheel, yet the prosecution claimed Rubina died from being crushed under it. He contended that since A-2, the driver, was acquitted of Section 304A IPC on identical evidence, the applicant could not be convicted for the same act. He emphasized the absence of a map of the scene and the lack of corroborative forensic evidence linking the bell-ringing directly to the fatal injury.
For the Respondent/State
Mr. S.R. Agarkar, Additional Public Prosecutor, maintained that the trial and appellate courts had correctly appreciated the testimony of PW-2, who witnessed the sequence of events. He argued that the conductor’s duty was to ensure safe alighting before signaling departure. His premature action directly caused Rubina’s fall and death, satisfying the causal nexus required under Section 304A IPC. The acquittal of the driver did not negate the conductor’s independent liability.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the causal chain between the conductor’s act and the death. It rejected the defense’s reliance on the absence of a wheel-over injury, noting that the post-mortem report confirmed a skull fracture and neck injury, but made no mention of crush trauma. The Court held that the mechanism of death - whether by crushing or impact from falling while the bus moved - is irrelevant under Section 304A IPC.
"The accidental death of Rubina is attributable to the said negligent act of the Applicant... before ringing the bell and signalling the A-2 to drive the bus forward, the Applicant did not ensure that PW-2 alongwith Rubina had safely alighted from the bus."
The Court distinguished the roles of the driver and conductor. While the driver’s negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the conductor’s duty was distinct: to observe passenger safety before signaling. His failure to do so was a direct, independent act of negligence. The Court affirmed that Section 464 Cr.P.C. precludes setting aside a conviction merely because co-accused were acquitted, provided the evidence against the applicant independently supports guilt.
The Court further noted that the prosecution’s narrative, though imperfectly articulated, was corroborated by multiple witnesses and the sequence of events was logically consistent. The absence of a scene map did not invalidate the testimony of eyewitnesses.
The Verdict
The applicant’s conviction under Section 304A IPC was upheld, but his sentence was reduced from one year to three months rigorous imprisonment, with the fine of ₹3,000 retained. The Court found the prolonged litigation and the applicant’s advanced age warranted leniency, while affirming the legal principle that negligence causing death must be punished.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Negligence, Not Mechanism, Determines Liability
- Practitioners must argue that Section 304A IPC liability hinges on causal negligence, not the physical mode of injury
- A victim’s death from a fall caused by sudden vehicle movement qualifies even without wheel contact
- Forensic evidence of crush injuries is not mandatory; skull fractures from impact suffice
Independent Liability of Co-Accused Is Valid
- Acquittal of one accused does not automatically exonerate another, even if charges are identical
- Each accused’s duty and conduct must be assessed separately
- Conducting a separate analysis of each party’s role is now mandatory in multi-party negligence cases
Procedural Gaps Do Not Invalidate Eyewitness Testimony
- Absence of a scene map or photographic evidence does not render eyewitness accounts unreliable
- Courts will uphold convictions where testimony is consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical reports
- Defense must offer plausible alternative explanations, not merely point to evidentiary gaps
