The Andhra Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a substitute for appellate review, and that writs of certiorari cannot be issued merely because a tribunal’s findings appear questionable - unless those findings are based on no evidence or are patently perverse. This judgment reinforces the boundaries of judicial supervision over quasi-judicial bodies in labour disputes.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Nukala Srinivasu, was employed by M/s International Paper Appm Limited (formerly Andhra Pradesh Paper Mills Limited) and filed a claim before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam, seeking reinstatement and back wages under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal dismissed his claim not on merits, but on the ground that he had allegedly suppressed facts regarding his actual duties to artificially bring himself within the definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Act.
Procedural History
- 2015: Petitioner filed Industrial Dispute (I.D. No. 80 of 2015) before the Industrial Tribunal
- 2019: Tribunal passed an order dismissing the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to establish his primary duties and had cleverly manipulated his role to invoke jurisdiction
- 2019: Writ Petition No. 7698/2019 filed in the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Article 226 seeking quashing of the Tribunal’s order
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of the Tribunal’s order on the ground that its findings were based on surmises and conjectures, with no reference to any evidence in the record. He requested that the matter be remanded for fresh adjudication with proper reasoning.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the Industrial Tribunal’s observation - that the petitioner suppressed facts to invoke jurisdiction under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act - constituted an error of law warranting intervention by way of writ of certiorari under Article 226, when no evidence was cited to support such a conclusion.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel relied on Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das to argue that findings based on no evidence, surmises, or conjectures amount to an error of law apparent on the face of the record. They contended that the Tribunal’s assertion of suppression of facts was unsupported by any citation of documents, witness statements, or cross-examination records, rendering the order jurisdictionally flawed. The absence of evidentiary basis, they argued, transformed a factual dispute into a legal error justifying certiorari.
For the Respondent
The respondent argued that the Tribunal’s observations were based on the overall record, even if not explicitly referenced. They contended that the High Court should not interfere with quasi-judicial findings unless there was a clear violation of law or jurisdictional excess. The Tribunal’s conclusion, they asserted, was a reasonable inference from the petitioner’s inconsistent testimony and role description, and thus not amenable to writ review.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a meticulous review of the Tribunal’s order and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das. It emphasized that while Article 226 does not permit the High Court to act as an appellate forum, it does empower the Court to intervene where an error of law is patent on the face of the record.
"The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record... findings based on ‘no evidence’ or purely on surmises and conjectures... could be regarded as an error of law."
The Court noted that the Tribunal’s entire basis for dismissal rested on a single, sweeping assertion: that the petitioner had "suppressed facts" about his duties to qualify as a workman. Yet, the order contained no reference to any document, testimony, or admission that substantiated this claim. The Court held that such a conclusion, unsupported by any evidentiary anchor, could not be treated as a mere factual disagreement - it was a legal defect. The failure to record evidence rendered the finding arbitrary and jurisdictionally infirm.
The Court further clarified that while tribunals are not required to cite every piece of evidence, they must at least demonstrate a logical connection between the record and their conclusions. Here, the absence of any such linkage meant the order was not merely erroneous - it was legally unsustainable.
The Verdict
The petitioner succeeded. The Court held that the Tribunal’s order, based on surmises without evidentiary support, constituted an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The order was quashed and the matter remanded for fresh disposal with proper reasoning and adherence to natural justice.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Findings Without Evidence Are Jurisdictional Errors
- Practitioners must challenge tribunal orders that make adverse factual assertions without citing any record evidence
- Such orders are not merely flawed - they are voidable under Article 226 as errors of law
- The burden shifts to the tribunal to demonstrate that its findings are rooted in the record
Remand Is Preferred Over Direct Relief in Labour Disputes
- Courts will not substitute their own view of facts even when the tribunal’s reasoning is weak
- The appropriate remedy is remand for fresh adjudication, not direct reinstatement or award
- This preserves the tribunal’s primary fact-finding role while ensuring procedural integrity
No Need to Prove Malice - Absence of Evidence Is Sufficient
- A petitioner need not prove that the tribunal acted in bad faith
- The mere absence of evidentiary basis for a critical finding is enough to invoke supervisory jurisdiction
- This lowers the threshold for certiorari in cases where quasi-judicial bodies rely on unsupported assumptions
